Skip to main content

Full text of "Reports on an auxiliary water supply system for fire protection for San Francisco, California"

See other formats


REPORTS 



ON AN 



Auxiliary Water Supply System 

FOR 

FIRE PROTECTION 

FOR 

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



A REPORT BY 

MARSDEN MANSON, C. E., City Engineer 

ALSO 

A report by H. D. H. CONNICK, Chief Assistant Engineer, Board of Public Works 
and T. W. RANSOM, Consulting Mechanical Engineer 

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS 

AND UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF ORDINANCE No. 353 (NEW SERIES) 
OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 



A report by W. C. ROBINSON, Chief Engineer of the Underwriters Laboratories 
Incorporated, Chicago, to the Committee on Fire Department and Water 
Supply of the Board of Fire Underwriters of the Pacific, on a 
proposed Auxiliary Water Supply System for Fire 
Protection in San Francisco, California 



SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA 
BRITTON A- REV 

1908 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 

REPORT OF MARSDEN MANSON ON AN AUXILIARY WATER 

SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 5 

Conditions which make it necessary to install a Fire Protection 

System in this City 7 

Capacity of the System 8 

Twin Peaks Reservoirs 9 

Protected Area 9 

Division of Protected Area into Two Zones 9 

Fresh Water Pumping Station 10 

Salt Water Emergency Supply 11 

Fire Boats 12 

The Pipe System 12 

Fire Cisterns 13 

Telephone Control and Operation 13 

Estimated Cost 14 

Fire Protective Measures 17 

REPORT OF HI D. H. CONNICK AND T. W. RANSOM ON AN AUX- 
ILIARY WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION.. 23 

Plans 24 

Necessity for Better Fire Protection 24 

Summary of the Proposed System 29 

Advantages of the Proposed System 30 

Annual Fire Losses in San Francisco, in the United States and 

in Europe 32 

Topographical Features 41 

Climatic Conditions 42 

Present Water Supply 44 

Liability to Earthquakes 45 

Effects of Earthquakes 50 

Suggested Methods of Fire Protection and Reasons for Recom- 
mending a High Pressure System 57 

Independent High Pressure Fire Protection Systems in Other 

Cities 61 

TYPES OF SERVICE 62 

Automatic Sprinkler Streams 62 

Conclusions and Recommendations Regarding Automatic Sprinkler 

Streams S6 

Inside Hose Streams or First Streams 66 

Outside Hand -Held Hose Streams 6S 

Mechanically Held Semi-portable Streams Discharged from the 

Ground 69 

Streams from Portable Water Towers 69 

Streams from Hydrants Attached to Metal Stand Pipes on 

Buildings 70 

Open Sprinklers or Water Curtains 70 

WATER SUPPLY 71 

AMOUNT OF WATER TO BE SUPPLIED 74 

Fresh Water Supply 82 

Salt Water Supply 82 

PRESSURE REOUIRED 83 

AREA TO BE PROTECTED 87 

THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 93 

Twin Peaks Storage Reservoir 94 

Distributing Reservoirs 94 

Fresh Water Pumping Stations 95 

Salt Water Pumping Stations 98 

Size of Units 99 

Motors 99 

DISCUSSION OF STEAM PLANT 100 

Boilers 100 

Fuel 101 

Steam Engine 101 

Condensors 101 

Pumps 101 

Description of Station 102 

Buildings 104 

Inlet Tunnel 104 

Delivery Pipes 104 

Cost of Steam Plant 104 

Annual Cost of Operation of Steam Plant 105 



TABLE OF CONTENTS -Continued 



Page 

DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE PLANT 10G 

Engines 106 

Fuel 10G 

Pumps 107 

Description of the Gas Engine Station 107 

Cost of Internal Combustion Engine Plant 108 

Cost of Operating Internal Combustion Engine Plant 108 

Reasons for Recommending Steam Engine Plant 109 

FIRE BOATS 109 

DISTRIBUTING SYSTEM 114 

Upper Zone 115 

Lower Zone 115 

PIPE SYSTEM 118 

Location of Mains in Streets 120 

GATE SYSTEM 120 

HYDRANTS 122 

ELECTROLYSIS 123 

SYSTEM OF FIKE CISTERNS 124 

TELEPHt INK SYSTEM 124 

FUTURE EXTENSIONS OF SYSTEM 125 

METHOD OF OPERATION 125 

USB FOR SANITARY AND FLUSHING PURPOSES 131 

ESTIMATED COST 134 

ANNUAL COST OF OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 13G 

APPENDIX NO. 1— List of References 137 

APPENDIX NO. 2— Effects of Salt Water on Systems of Cast-iron 

Pipe in the Vicinity of San Francisco, California 150 

APPENDIX NO. 3— Leakage "from Cast-iron Pipe System 153 

APPENDIX NO. 4— Ordinance of the Board of Supervisors, No. 126 

(New Series) 155 

LETTER FROM BOARD OF FIRE! UNDERWRITERS OF THE PA- 
CIFIC TRANSMITTING A REPORT ON THE PROPOSED AUX- 
ILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION, BY W. C. 

ROBINSON 159 

REPORT OF W. C. ROBINSON ON PROPOSED AUXILIARY WATER 

SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 160 

Effect of Earthquake 160 

Necessity of Better Fire Protection 161 

Types of Service 162 

Water Supplies 164 

Reservoirs 165 

Pumping Stations 166 

Pumps 167 

Fire Boats 168 

Protected Area 168 

Distribution 168 

Method of Operation 17<» 

Fire Cisterns 172 

Telephone System 172 



PLATES AND MAPS. ' 

Opposite Page. 

PLATE NO. 1 — Table showing the number of earthquakes recorded 
in San Francisco, Cal., from 1850 to 1906, inclusive, together 
with the number occurring elsewhere in San Francisco during 
the same period which were not recorded in San Francisco. ... 46 

PLATE NO. 2— Map showing principal known geological fault lines in 

the vicinity of San Francisco, Cal 4M 

PLATE NO. 3 — Plan showing the location of the sixty nearest cisterns 
which it would have been necessary to empty to furnish the 
amount of water estimated as used at the Baldwin Hotel fire, 
assuming one 100,000-gallon cistern located in each street 
crossing 58 

PLATE NO. 4 — Table showing characteristics of the present and pro- 
posed fire systems of American cities 61 

PLATE NO. 5— Twin Peaks Reservoirs 94 

PLATES NOS. 6, 7 and 8 — General arrangement of pumping stations 

driven by steam turbine engines 102 

PLATES NOS. 9 and 10 — General arrangement of pumping stations 

driven by gasoline engines 107 

PLATE NO. 11 — Table of data regarding existing fire boats 110 

PLATE NO. 12 — Proposed pipe joint for use in areas of artificially 

filled or "made" ground 118 

PLATE NO. 13 — Thickness and weight of cast-iron pipe 119 

PLATE NO. 14 — Map showing size and location of underground ob- 
structions in the crossing of Ninth and Mission Streets 120 



TABLE OF CONTENTS— Continued 



SHEETS IN FOLDER ON COVER. 

SHEET NO. 1 — Showing location and arrangement of distributing sys- 
tem and location of hydrants, reservoirs and pumping stations. 

SHEET NO. 2 — Showing of location of call boxes and central stations 
of proposecT telephone system. 

SHEET NO. 3 — Showing location of existing cisterns and preliminary 
location of 65 of the proposed fire cisterns. 

SHEET NO. 4 — Showing general plans for Are boats. 

SHEET NO. 5 — Showing location of breaks in the mains of the Spring- 
Valley Water Company, the fire limits, the boundary of the 
district in which fire-proof roofs are required. 



REPORTS 

ON AN 

Auxiliary Water Supply System 

FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

FOR 

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. 



BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS, BUREAU OF 
ENGINEERING. 

San Francisco, Cal., March 16. 1908. 

TO tin Honorable the Board of Public Works, 

Of the City and County of San Francisco — 

Gentlemen : I have the honor to transmit herewith the 
report of Assistant Engineer H. D. H. Connick and Consulting 
Engineer T. W. Ransom on a Municipal Fire Protection Sys- 
tem. This work has been done by authority of Ordinance 
No. 353 (New Series) Jan. 29th. 1908. The greater portion 
was done under the general direction of my predecessor, Mr. 
T. P. Woodward. I have, however, gone carefully over the 
work of Messrs. Connick and Ransom and it affords me 
pleasure to commend the skill and thoroughness which they 
have brought to bear upon the problem. No detail, experi- 
ence, nor principle developed elsewhere has been overlooked, 
as will be made manifest by a study of their report. This 
study embraces a wide range of the literature of fire loss and 
earthquake damage, the means taken to prevent them and the 
practical application of these means to the requirements de- 
veloped by the disaster of April 18-21. 1906. 

There is also transmitted through Mr. William J. Dutton, 
Chairman Committee on Fire Department and Water Supply 



6 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



of the Executive Committee of the Board of Fire Under- 
writers of the Pacific, the report of 

Mr. W. C. Robinson, Chief Engineer, 

Underwriters Laboratories, Incorporated. 
This report reviews from the highest technical standpoint 
the features and details of the Fire Protection System herein 
submitted. It is gratifying that from so high an authority 
the following commendation is made : "As I stated at the be- 
ginning of this report, I now reiterate at its conclusion, my 
opinion that the proposition for an auxiliary water system 
for fire protection in San Francisco as covered by the engi= 
neers' report, is the one best suited to the present needs 
of the City ; one which will prove of lasting benefit to the 
community, and if efficiently operated, show itself to be a 
wise investment in the curtailment of loss by fire and in 
the substantial recognition such curtailment must receive 
from the Fire Insurance Companies doing business in San 
Francisco." 

In reference to the minor suggestions offered by Mr. 
Robinson; the location of hydrants proposed by Messrs. Con- 
nick and Ransom is intended as tentative only, the sugges- 
tions regarding the pumping stations will receive careful con- 
sideration in the preparation of the final plans, additional 
hydrants and other connections may be installed at any time 
after the completion of the system should it prove necessary. 

The great problems of fire protection in this city are 
severely conditioned in certain restricted areas with the risk 
of possible damage to the water mains by earthquake. These 
areas have been defined, and, provided with their own dis- 
tributing system which will guard the rest of the pipe system 
against loss of water and pressure in the event of ruptures in 
the filled-in areas. There are also provided in these areas a 
limited supply in underground cisterns, and furthermore, they 
can partly be reached effectively by lines of hose from fire 
boats or from the adjacent solid ground. 

As will be indicated later it is recommended to still farther 
reduce fire, conflagration and earthquake hazards in these 
areas by preventive measures of the highest efficiency, and, to 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



7 



extend these measures far more extensively than at present to 
all parts of the City. 

CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE IT NECESSARY TO INSTALL A FIRE 
PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THIS CITY. 

The inadequacy of the present water supply, the small 
size of the distributing mains, which were not designed for 
the high pressure now required, the combustible nature of our 
buildings, the topographical and climatic conditions and the 
liability to earthquakes make an extensive fire protection 
system necessary in this City. 

Since our great losses on April 18-21, 1906, the price of 
insurance has been raised to such a figure that it is a severe 
handicap to all business and imposes upon this community a 
burden of over $4,000,000.00 annually. The necessity of re- 
ducing this makes it imperative that both protective and pre- 
ventive measures of the highest efficiency be provided; for 
only by the use of such measures can the great losses of the 
disaster of April 18-21, 1906, be made of practical and profit- 
able use. As the protective system will benefit both the insurer 
and the insured, the cost should be borne by both. As the 
interest on the necessary bond issue and sinking fund must be 
provided by a general tax upon the homes, properties and 
industries of the City, the owners should be guaranteed a 
very substantial reduction of the price of insurance upon the 
installation of the system herein proposed. The cost will then 
be more equitably distributed and within a few years will be 
returned to each through reduction of the destruction by fire. 

After a study of the various possible and proposed methods 
of fire protection, Messrs. Connick and Kansom determined 
that the most efficient system is to lay cast-iron mains buried 
about five feet below the surface of the streets under sufficient 
pressure to render the use of portable steam pumping engines 
or fire engines unnecessary. Such a system will be al- 
ways ready for instant use, in fact, in many cases, 
it may be used even before the arrival of the fire 
department. By dispensing with the use of heavy 
fire engines, the department will be able to reach a fire and 
apply water to it more quickly than at present. All the water 



8 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE FKOTKCTION 



that the department can use will be available in all parts of 
ihe protected districts. With the precautions which are pro- 
vided against damage by earthquake, this system may be relied 
upon to offer a greater resistance to destruction than the 
majority of the buildings which it is designed to protect. 

On account of the rapid deterioration of pipes exposed to 
salt water and the damage to stocks of goods which the use 
of salt water at a small fire would entail, it has been decided 
to use fresh water under ordinary conditions and salt water 
only in the event of exceptionally large fires. 

CAPACITY OF THE SYSTEM. 

After consideration of the quantities of water that have 
been used in great fires in this country and England, it has 
been decided to adopt the recommendation of the Committee 
of Twenty of the National Board of Fire Underwriters, which 
requires that the system be designed so that fifteen thousand 
gallons of water per minute may be concentrated on any area 
in the congested value district of one hundred thousand square 
feet. The size of mains and location of hydrants have conse- 
quently been determined on this basis. This delivery of water 
is sufficient to cover one of the blocks in the fifty vara survey 
more than one foot in depth in one hour; or, the block 
bounded by Kearny, Post, Grant Avenue and Sutter Street 
can be covered 25 feet in depth in a day. As more than one 
fire may occur at once, or as a part of the system may be out 
of service, it has been considered advisable to provide for the 
delivery into the distributing system of more than twice the 
above quantity, or 43.000 gallons for thirteen hours and 28.000 
gallons for sixty-four hours thereafter. This is equivalent to 
52,000,000 gallons in the first twenty-four hours and 40,000,000 
gallons per day thereafter, or more than is available from 
the works of the Spring Valley Water Company for all pur- 
poses. Working pressures up to two hundred and thirty 
pounds per square inch will be necessary at the hydrants in 
order that this water can be used to the best advantage and in 
order to provide for the loss of pressure through friction in 
the pipes of the distribution system, provision is made for 
static pressures up to three hundred and twenty-seven pounds. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



9 



The system which is proposed may be described as fol- 
lows : 

TWIN PEAKS RESERVOIRS. 

Two storage reservoirs, having a combined capacity of ten 
million gallons will be located on Twin Peaks in the vicinity 
of the intersection of Twentieth street with the southerly 
extension of Cole street, at an elevation of seven hundred and 
fifty-five feet. They are to be constructed by making rock 
excavations and lining the sides and bottoms with concrete. 
Two lines of twenty-inch pipe will connect these reservoirs 
with the distributing system and with the upper distributing 
reservoir. 

PROTECTED AREA. 

The protected area is shown on Sheet No. 1 and lies on the 
easterly water shed of the peninsula between Potrero hills 
and the Golden Gate. It includes the entire present fire limits 
and nearly all of the district in which shingle roofs are prohib- 
ited. In extent it covers 5300 acres, about 8.2 square miles 
or nearly double "the burned area." 

DIVISION 1 OF PROTECTED AREA INTO TWO ZONES. 

Since the pressure from these storage reservoirs will be 
greater than is necessary, except for the very largest fires, 
and since maintaining this pressure constantly on the mains 
will involve considerable expense and some danger, the pro- 
tected area has been divided into two zones. 

The lower zone will include those portions of the protected 
area less than one hundred and fifty feet in elevation and is 
6 square miles in area. It will be supplied from a concrete 
reservoir having a capacity of one million gallons which is to 
be constructed under the roadway of Jones street between 
Sacramento and Clay streets and having an elevation of about 
329 feet. The roof of this reservoir will be the roadway of 
the street and will rest upon concrete and steel beams. 

As this zone includes the congested value district and the 
greater portion of the manufacturing and mercantile indus- 
tries, it is to be girded by 14 and 18-inch mains and gridironed 
at frequent intervals in both directions with 12 and 14-inch 
mains. 



10 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



The upper zone will include all those portions of the pro- 
tected area, the elevation of which is more than one hundred 
and fifty feet and is 2*4 square miles in area. It will be 
supplied from a reservoir of five hundred thousand gallons 
capacity situated in the vicinity of Seventeenth and Ashbury 
streets at an elevation of about four hundred and ninety feet. 

These zones and the relation of the reservoirs and pipe 
systems are shown on Sheet No. 1. 

Each of these zones is to be supplied with water under 
pressure up to one hundred and fifty pounds from its own 
distributing reservoir located at considerably less elevation 
than the main storage reservoir, as mentioned above. When 
necessary the mains of the upper zone may be connected with 
the Twin Peaks reservoirs and the pressure raised to two hun- 
dred and eighty-four pounds or less, depending upon the ele- 
vation. 

The mains of the lower zone may be connected with the 
reservoir of the upper zone or with the Twin Peaks reservoirs 
whenever pressures higher than ordinary are required. Both 
zones are thus commanded by ordinary pressures for general 
use and high pressures for emergencies. In addition, salt 
water stations and fire boats are designed to pump either 
against the lower ordinary pressures or against the highest 
pressures of emergency conditions. 

FRESH WATER PUMPING STATIONS. 

The above named reservoirs will be filled with fresh water 
which will be pumped into them through the pipes of the dis- 
tributing system from two stations situated near Seventh and 
Harrison streets and near Sixteenth and Shotwell streets 
respectively. The capacity of each station will be 1050 gallons 
per minute or one and one half million gallons per day. A 
number of wells will be sunk in the streets in the vicinity of 
each station and water pumped from them to a concrete cis- 
tern under the station by means of air lift pumps. Centri- 
fugal pumps will draw the water from these cisterns and 
deliver it into the distributing system under sufficient pressure 
to force it through the pipes to the desired reservoir. As 
these stations are intended only to fill the reservoirs and to 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



1 1 



supply evaporation and Leakage, a few hours interruption in 
their running will have no materia] effect on the efficiency of 
the system. They will, therefore, be operated by electric 
motors using current from the power wires of the local electric 
companies. 

The quantity of water stored in the above reservoirs is 
about twice the amount that was used in controlling the Bald- 
win Hotel fire, which was one of the largest in the history of 
this City; it is, therefore, evident that it will be sufficient to 
control all but the very largest fires or a general conflagration. 

SALT WATER EMERGENCY SUPPLY. 

To guard against these emergencies, two salt water pump- 
ing stations are to be provided on the water front and two 
large fire boats which can be used independently or be con- 
nected with the pipe system. One of the pumping stations 
will be situated in the vicinity of Second and Townsend 
streets, the other will be located near the northerly termina- 
tion of Van Xess avenue or Polk street. Each station is 
designed for an ultimate capacity of sixteen thousand gallons 
per minute and pumping machinery having a capacity of ten 
thousand gallons per minute will be installed at once. 

The pumps will be of the turbine type capable of deliver- 
ing water at pressures up to three hundred pounds per square 
inch. Consideration of the various types of motive power 
available shows the steam engine to be the most desirable 
in economy and reliability : this type has accordingly been 
selected. Water tube boilers will be used ; they will be fitted 
to burn fuel oil in the furnaces. 

Storage tanks for a sufficient quantity of oil to run each 
plant for forty-eight hours at its full ultimate capacity of 
sixteen thousand gallons per minute are to be provided. Xo 
effort nor expense is to be spared in the design and construc- 
tion of these plants to make them earthquake proof and secure 
from other accidents. The total horse-power developed in 
each station when pumping ten thousand gallons per minute 
against three hundred pounds pressure will be about three 
th< usand or six thousand for the two stations, which is more 



12 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM EOR FIRE PROTECTION 

than twice the power of all of the steam fire engines, including 
reserve engines at present in the City. 

FIRE BOATS. 

To protect property on the water front and to reinforce 
the system, if necessary, two large fire boats are to be pro- 
vided. They will be about 135 feet long, 26 feet beam and 
13^2 feet deep. They will draw about 11 feet of water and 
the displacement of each will be about 520 tons. Each boat 
will be constructed of steel throughout and will be equipped 
with propelling machinery capable of driving it at a speed of 
about thirteen miles per hour, and with pumps capable of 
discharging 8,000 gallons per minute against the ordinary 
pressure of 150 pounds per square inch, or 4,000 gallons per 
minute against the emergency pressure of 300 pounds per 
square inch. They will be provided with every appliance to 
make them of the highest efficiency either independently or 
to reinforce the salt water emergency pumping stations. 
Twenty-three stations at which they may be connected to the 
distributing system will be provided on the water front. The 
concentration of the energies of both emergency salt water 
pumping stations and the two fire boats will enable the Fire 
Department to cope with a general conflagration, even in the 
remote and almost impossible contingency of the crippling of 
the mains from the reservoirs. 

THE PIPE SYSTEM. 

The capacity of the pipe system has been previously men- 
tioned. The pipes and connections are to be of sufficient 
strength to stand the full pressure of the storage reservoir or 
327 pounds per square inch, and are to be tested to double 
this pressure. The aggregate length is 9iy 2 miles. Maximum 
size of mains 20 inches and minimum size 12 inches in diam- 
eter with 8-inch hydrant connections. 

Whenever it shall be found necessary to extend the sys- 
tem, the machinery and mains now proposed are of sufficient 
capacity to permit such extensions without changing any part 
of the system. It will only be necessary to acquire the sites, 
provide the storage reservoirs and install the required cast- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



L3 



iron mains and hydrants for districts beyond the present 
boundaries of the protected area. 

Cut-off gate valves are provided at sufficient intervals 
to prevent loss of pressure in the system in case of breaks 
in the mains through the artificially filled areas, and to cut 
out any block for repairs or connections without shutting off 
water from adjacent blocks. 

The pipe,, gate and hydrant systems are shown on Sheet 
No. 1, together with their connections with the main and dis- 
tributing reservoir, the emergency salt water pumping sta- 
tions and fire boat connections. Hydrants in the congested 
value district of the lower zone are so distributed that with 
maximum hose lengths of 400 feet 15,000 gallons per minute 
can be concentrated on any area of 100,000 square feet ; in 
other parts of the protected area from one-half to three- 
fourths this volume of water can be concentrated on a block. 

FIRE CISTERNS. 

As an additional precaution existing fire cisterns are being 
cleaned out, repaired and filled and provision is made for one 
hundred additional ones of reinforced concrete, each having a 
capacity of 75,000 gallons. Sixty of these are shown on 
Sheet No. 3 and forty more are to be located as indicated by 
the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department, 

TELEPHONE CONTROL AND OPERATION. 

For the direction and control of the entire system 395 
special telephones are provided. These are to be upon 66 
independent under-ground circuits connecting with the switch- 
boards at the pumping stations. In addition there will be 
connections between each of these central stations with the 
nearest office of the local telephone companies and with the 
Police and Fire System. 

Two lines will run to each gatehouse and also to the sta- 
tions of the fire boats. 



14 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



ESTIMATED COST. 
The estimated cost of this system is as follows: 
Two storage reservoirs on top of Twin Peaks, 

capacity 10,000,000 gallons $ 126,000 00 

Distributing reservoir of Upper Zone, near 17th 

and Ashbnry streets, capacity 500,000 gallons 17,000 00 
Distributing reservoir of Lower Zone in Jones 
street, between Sacramento and Clay streets, 

capacity 1,000,000 gallons 55,000 00 

Distributing system consisting of 483,558 lineal 
feet of cast-iron pipe with necessary specials, 
gate valves, gate boxes, hydrants, air valves, 
relief valves, blow-off valves and fire boat 

connections v. 2.900,000 00 

One hundred 75,000-gallon cisterns 600,000 00 

Two fresh water pumping stations 117,000 00 

Two salt water pumping stations 650,000' 00 

Two fire boats 300.000 00 

Quarters for men on wharf 10.000 00 

Telephone system 125,000 00 

Real estate for distributing reservoirs and pump- 
ing stations 100,000 00 

Engineering, preparation of plans, specifications, 
testing materials and inspection of construc- 
tion 200,000 00 



Total $5,200,000 00 

When this system shall have been installed, San Francisco 
will have the most powerful and efficient engine of fire pro- 
tection ever constructed. The area protected is greater by 
2300 acres than that of Greater New York and the volume of 
water available will exceed that available either in New York 
or Brooklyn. 

The means to be provided for the application of water to 
the seat of a fire will be the most modern and efficient known 
to fire protection engineers. The safeguards with which the 
system is to be surrounded to protect it or any considerable 



t OR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



15 



portion of it from damage by earthquake or accident are more 
extensive than have hitherto been considered necessary. 

Statistics show the annual fire loss in the United States 
to be between 7 and 8 times as great as that in European 
countries. For every dollar's worth of gold and silver pro- 
duced in all the mines of the United States and Alaska dur- 
ing the last thirty-seven years, property to the value of one 
dollar and fifty-two cents has been destroyed by fire during 
the same period. This appalling loss is accounted for by the 
combustible nature of our buildings and the carelessness of 
our citizens. 

San Francisco is more exposed to fire loss than other large 
American cities for the following reasons: A larger propor- 
tion of our buildings are constructed of wood. The topogra- 
phy \s such that a large number of streets are too steep to 
admit the rapid movement of heavy fire apparatus. During 
the summer months practically no rain falls and the sides and 
roofs of our buildings become very dry. at the same time 
winds having average velocities of from 14.1 miles per hour 
in April to 22 miles per hour in July prevail during the after- 
noon hours and greatly increase the danger of a fire escaping 
from the control of the fire department. The fire department 
depends for water for fire protection purposes principally 
upon the mains of the Spring Valley Water Company. It is 
recognized that the works of that company are constructed 
on conservative lines with large factors of safety, but partly 
on account of defects which can be remedied only at an ex- 
pense which the company claims its income will not warrant 
and partly by reason of defects which are inherent the fire 
protection afforded is not sufficient. The pressure is too low 
and many of the distributing pipes are too small to permit of 
the delivery of sufficient quantities of water for effective fire 
control in all parts of the city. Many of the mains pass over 
ground liable to serious displacement from earthquake, and, 
as was shown in the conflagration of April, 1906, are a serious 
menace to the safety of the entire city because of insufficient 
gate control to guard against loss of water and preserve the 
rest of the system should these pipes be ruptured. Further- 
more, it is not desirable in a city like San Francisco to attempt 



16 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



to combine a domestic supply and a fire protection system in 
one, as in the event of a general conflagration the loss of water 
through broken house connections in districts already burned 
over is liable to impair or destroy the efficiency of the entire 
system, and numerous small connections increase the earth- 
quake hazard in the pipe system. 

Although fire insurance experts have long known that 
these conditions render San Francisco especially liable to a 
great conflagration, the extreme danger of the situation was 
not fully appreciated until the fire of April, 1906, showed 
how easily the city could be destroyed. The result of that 
conflagration and the consequent realization of the existing 
conflagration hazard has been that fire insurance rates have 
been greatly increased and the agents of the various insurance 
companies have been so limited in the amount of business they 
are permitted to write that competition has been practically 
eliminated and many merchants are unable to obtain fire insur- 
ance even at such high rates as five per cent and upwards per 
annum. Under modern conditions such a state of affairs 
makes it exceedingly difficult and expensive to conduct business 
and will, if steps are not taken at once to reduce the con- 
flagration hazard, seriously handicap the future growth of the 
city. 

The comparative ease with which the recent conflagration 
was finally checked along Van Ness avenue and in the Mis- 
sion, has created in the mind of the public an erroneous 
opinion as to the difficulty of controlling a general conflagra- 
tion. The fire originated in the eastern part of the city and 
spread in a direction contrary to that in which the prevailing 
wind was blowing so that it was retarded rather than assisted 
by this wind, consequently it was checked without great diffi- 
culty, wherever even comparatively small quantities of wafer 
were available. 

"The turned area had a fire front of 49,305 feet or 9.34 
miles, a water front of 9,510 feet or 1.80 miles and a total 
of 58,815 feet or 11.14 miles. 

Of this 49,305 feet of frontage, 9,540 feet are on the wide 
streets or avenues — Van Ness avenue. Market and Dolores 
streets. The remainder. 39,765 feet, are on ordinary streets, 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



17 



across blocks, etc., or about 20% of the total frontage is on 
wide streets, and the remainder, 80% on ordinary streets-, 
etc." (P. 56 Report of Sub-Committee on Statistics). 

Considering these data and the fact that in the absence of 
a water supply, the fire crossed and re-crossed streets of the 
width of Market, Van Ness avenue and Dolores, the main 
dependence must be placed on the efficient means herein pro- 
posed. 

Had the earthquake which preceded it not disabled the 
water supply system by breaking a number of distributing 
mains and house connections, the fire or fires could undoubt- 
edly have been confined to a few buildings in the vicinities of 
their origin. The great danger to San Francisco is that a 
fire originating in the Western Addition or the Mission at a 
time when a strong west wind is blowing will get beyond the 
control of the fire department and fanned by the wind will 
be swept through the congested value district to the eastward 
until it reaches the bay shore. Such a disaster can be pre- 
vented only by providing water in larger quantities and at 
higher pressures than have hitherto been available, and by 
the introduction of fire preventive measures of high effi- 
ciency. 

FIRE PROTECTIVE MEASURES. 

It is manifest that after having put in operation the most 
efficient and largest fire protection system in the world that 
but a portion of our duty will have been performed ; there yet 
remains the necessity for reducing fire, conflagration and 
earthquake hazards by a far greater restriction of the use of 
combustible materials in buildings and the substitution there- 
for of absolutely non-combustible materials and the modifica- 
tion of the building laws so as to permit and prescribe a 
greater safety from damage by earthquake. These measures, 
while practically more necessary in the restricted areas of 
artificially filled lands, are also greatly needed all over the 
city. 

It has been clearly pointed out that our risks are greater 
lhan elsewhere and that fire losses are greater in the United 
States than in Europe by reason of our greater use of com- 
bustible material in construction. It is, therefore, our impera- 



18 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

tive duty to the lives and interests of this city to reduce these 
risks, first, by extending the fire limits, and second, by pre- 
scribing a far greater use of non-combustible materials in all 
building operations. Fortunately, there are sound reasons 
other than fire and conflagration risks in favor of this change. 
1st. Greater protection of life. 2d. Economy in construc- 
tion. 3rd. A decrease in earthquake risk, and 4th, further 
reduction in insurance rates. 

Moreover, our mild climate permits us to adopt types of 
construction different from and cheaper than those in use in 
eastern cities. It is therefore recommended 

1st. That a definite study be made as to greater extension 
of fire limits with the particular aim of extending them over 
the artificially filled lands where all hazards are at a maximum. 

2nd. That an entire reclassification of buildings be made 
and that certain types now permitted be restricted or prohib- 
ited and that others be introduced. 

The proposed classification will only be indicated at present 
and should be fully discussed and elaborated with a view 
of reducing to a minimum the hazards of the lives, homes, pro- 
perties and industries within our borders. 

Class A buildings should be defined to include all buildings 
erected entirely of non-combustible materials. At the head of 
the list should stand Class Al. The modern steel framed 
building provided with every requirement of the National 
Board of Underwriters. Near the bottom of the list a steel 
framed building not exceeding two stories in height, covered 
and roofed with galvanized iron. 

This is outlined in the following table : 

CLASS Al. 

Steel cage construction concrete brick or tile walls and 
floors, metal framed doors, windows and finishings, plate wire 
glass windows, iron or asbestos curtains on exposed sides. 

CLASS A2. 

Concrete or brick walls, steel posts concrete or tile covered, 
concrete steel or tile floors, steel framed metal covered roof, 
fire shutters on exposed sides. 

i CLASS A3. 

Re-inforced concrete walls, steel framed roof, metal cov- 
ered, fire shutters on exposed sides. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



19 



CLASS A4. 

Light steel frames, walls metal lathing or expanded metal, 
plastered with cement mortar on one or both sides of frame- 
work, concrete, steel or tile floors, metal roof, metal framed 
windows and doors, plate wire glass, asbestos curtains, for 
light stores or dwellings etc. 

CLASS A5. 

Steel frame, corrugated iron sides and roof for sheds and 
lightest buildings. If more than one story, walls metal lathed 
and plastered, upper floors of steel and concrete or tiles. Wire 
glass windows and skylights. 

CLASS A6. 

Any combination of the above classes which are structur- 
ally sound. 

Class B should include the present Class Bl and a second 
Class B2 suggested by City Architect Tharp, constructed of 
a properly proportioned and braced wooden frame with wire 
or expanded metal lathing plastered inside and out, and with 
floor protection and ceilings of the same materials. It will 
be observed that this building is not only earthquake proof 
but has high fire and conflagration resistance. 

The present Class C should be strengthened as to wall ties, 
and restricted in size and height. 

It is apparent that one of the forms of Class A or slight 
modifications to include it in Class B or Class B2, will largely 
supersede frame buildings to the advantage of the property 
holder, and that these can be used in the present fire limits at 
less expense and hazard than the present Class C. 

If the improvements above outlined be made San Francisco 
will have but little to dread from even a more serious earth-' 
quake than that of April 18th, 1906; the possibilities of 
great fires will be reduced from a maximum, as at present, to a 
minimum ; and confidence will mark our recovery and develop- 
ment in every line to the remotest future. 

Respectfully submitted, 
(Signed) MARSDEN M ANSON, 

City Engineer. 
San Francisco, California, Jan. 31, 1908. 



REPORT 

ON AN 

AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM 

FOR 

FIRE PROTECTION 

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF 

THE BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS AND CITY ENGINEER 

BY 

H. D. H. CONNICK, Chief Assistant Engineer, Board of Public Works 

AND 

T. W. RANSOM, Consulting Mechanical Engineer 
DURING THE YEARS 1907-1908 

UNDER AUTHORITY OF 

ORDINANCE No. 126 (New Series) OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. 

SUBMITTED. JANUARY. 1 908 

Approved : March 16th, MARSDEN MANSON, City Engineer 



23 



To Mr. Marsden Manson, City Engineer, 
San Francisco, Cal. 

Sir: Ordinance No. 126 (New Series) of the Board of 
Supervisors (Appendix No. 4) directs the Board of Public 
Works to procure through the City Engineer and file with the 
Board of Supervisors plans and estimates of the cost of an 
auxiliary water system for fire protection and for sanitary 
and flushing purposes. 

Early in the progress of the work of the preparation of 
the plans, it was apparent that if the provisions of the above- 
mentioned ordinance were followed, the resulting system 
would not be thoroughly practical. As the adoption of the 
best possible means of protecting the City from future con- 
flagrations is of prime importance, it was decided to eliminate 
those provisions of the ordinance which, if followed, would 
impair the efficiency of the proposed system, and prepare 
plans and estimates of cost in accordance with the apparent 
intention of the ordinance, without attempting to conform 
too strictly to its minor provisions. 

It is, therefore, recommended that the Board of Super- 
visors rescind Ordinance Number 126 (New Series) and that 
a new ordinance drawn with a consideration of the recom- 
mendations of the following report be passed. 

During the time which has elapsed since the passage of 
the ordinance, a number of meetings have been held with 
Engineer Mr. Geo. M. Robertson, and members of the fire 
and water committee of the Board of Fire Underwriters of 
the Pacific, the local representatives of insurance companies, 
the Secretary and representatives of the Merchants' Associa- 
tion and the Chief Engineer of the Fire Deparftnmt. 

Through the courtesy of the Board of Fire Underwriters 
of the Pacific, your engineers have been enabled to avail them- 
selves of the services in the capacity of Consulting Engineer 
of Mr. W. C. Robinson, Chief Engineer of the Underwriters' 
Laboratories, Chicago. Mr. Robinson spent the greater parts 
of the months of June and July in consultation with your 
engineers in this city and his advice and criticisms have been 
of great value. Your engineers are also indebted to Mr. Hugo 
P. Frear, Superintendent of Hull Construction at The Union 



24 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



Iron AYorks, for valuable counsel and assistance in the prep- 
aration of the plans for the fire boats. 

PLANS. 

The location of the pipes and appurtenances forming the 
distributing system, the fire cisterns, the telephone call boxes 
and central telephone stations and the general plans of the 
Twin Peaks Reservoirs, pumping stations and fire boats are 
shown by drawings on twelve sheets of plans which accom- 
pany and are made a part of this report, entitled Plans for 
an Auxiliary Water System for Fire Protection, prepared 
under the direction of the Board of Public Works and City 
Engineer, by H. D. H. Connick and T. W. Ransom during the 
years 1907-8, under authority of Ordinance No. 126 (new 
series) of the Board of Supervisors, San Francisco, Cal. Sub- 
mitted January, 1908, approved by Marsden Manson, City 
Engineer, March 19, 1908. 

Sheet No. 1 Showing location and arrangement of distribut- 
ing system and location of hydrants, reservoirs and pumping 
stations. 

Sheet No. 2 Showing location of call boxes and central sta- 
tions of proposed telephone system. 

Sheet No. 3. Showing location of existing cisterns and 
preliminary location of sixty-five of the proposed fire cisterns. 

Sheet No. 4 Showing general plans for fire boats. 

Sheet No. 5. Showing location of breaks in the mains of 
the Spring Valley Water Co., the fire limits, the boundaries of 
the district within which fireproof roofs are required. 

Sheets No. 6, 7, and 8. General arrangement of pumping 
station drf& by steam turbine engines. 

Sheets No. 9 and 10. General arrangement of pumping 
station driven by gasoline engines. 

Sheet No. 11. Twin Peaks Reservoirs. 

Sheet No. 12. Table of data regarding existing fire boats. 

NECESSITY FOR BETTER FIRE PROTECTION. 

The object of installing a municipal fire protection system 
in any city is to reduce the fire and conflagration hazard to a 
minimum. In the system which is described below, this is to 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



25 



be accomplished in the protected district, by providing means 
for delivering water in such quantities and at such pressures 
that it will be possible : 

First. To practically dispense with the use of portable 
steam fire engines. 

Second. To apply sufficient water at the seat of an incipi- 
ent fire to extinguish it in the shortest possible time. 

Third. To quickly concentrate large volumes of water 
on any area in which a fire may have reached dangerous pro- 
portions. 

Fourth. To furnish in emergency as much water as can 
be used to advantage by the fire department. 

A building may be destroyed by fire in two ways, viz : by 
a fire originating within, or by a fire communicated from out- 
side sources. The danger of its being damaged in the first 
manner is termed the fire hazard, and the chance of a fire 
being communicated to it from outside sources is known as 
the conflagration hazard. 

The fire hazard in any building depends upon its con- 
struction, its occupants, the nature of its contents and the 
precautions employed to prevent and extinguish fires. As 
these are matters largely within the control of the owner, he 
should provide such inside protection as is necessary. 

The conflagration hazard depends principally upon the 
construction and contents of nearby buildings, the topography, 
climatic conditions, the fire protection provided outside the 
building and to a less extent upon the construction, character 
of contents and the fire protection within the building. Since 
the property owner has little or no control over the conflagra- 
tion hazard, the cost of the necessary protection should be 
met by the community as a whole. 

As the storage of inflammable materials and poorly con- 
stucted buildings greatly increase both the fire and conflagra- 
tion hazard, large cities enforce restrictions regarding the 
construction of buildings, the purposes for which they shall 
be occupied, the materials that may be stored therein and, to 
a limited extent, the fire protection facilities that shall be pro- 
vided. 



26 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Through experience extending over a number of years, fire 
underwriters are able to closely estimate the fire hazard in 
any building. Owing to lack of sufficient data, the conflagra- 
tion hazard can not be even approximately determined in 
American cities, but that it may be great is shown by the fact 
that while, in 11,827 fires which occurred in this city during 
the years 1891 to 1904 inclusive, the total direct property 
loss was estimated at $13,500,000, in the general conflagra- 
tion of April, 1906, this loss has been estimated to have been 
in the neighborhood of $360,000,000. 

The price of fire insurance is based largely upon estimates 
of the existing fire and conflagration hazards and is an ex- 
pression of the opinion of experts in matters relating to fires 
and fire protection as to the hazards or risks presented by 
the conditions. The rates in force in any city, therefore, rest 
mainly upon the efficiency of the methods of fire prevention 
and protection in use and indicate whether additional protec- 
tion is desirable. 

Conservative fire underwriters have always considered the 
conflagration hazard in San Francisco to be much greater than 
in other large American cities on account of the large amount 
of combustible material entering into the construction of the 
buildings, the inadequacy of the water supply system, the 
topographical and climatic conditions and the isolation of the 
city. 

While this opinion did not receive the attention which 
subsequent events showed it deserved, fire insurance rates 
were higher in this city than elsewhere and, until the recent 
conflagration, underwriting fire insurance was considered 
profitable. The conflagration demonstrated the fallacy of this 
view, with the result that insurance rates were immediately 
raised to a high figure, agents were limited in the amount of 
insurance they are permitted to write, a number of companies 
ceased writing insurance in this city, and the competition has 
been so reduced that it is impossible in many cases to obtain 
fire insurance even at such high rates as five per cent and 
upwards per annum. 

These conditions have imposed heavy and unusual ex- 
penses upon the business of this city and it is probable that 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



27 



expense from this cause will become still heavier unless the 
conflagration hazard is reduced. 

The recent conflagration and the subsequent attitude of fire 
underwriters has led to a general recognition of the necessity 
of providing additional fire protection, but owing to the fact 
that the fire was finally checked with comparatively small 
quantities of water there exists a popular belief that all that 
is necessary in order to prevent the spread of a general con- 
flagration, is to provide means for supplying large quantities 
of water along certain selected streets and that the proposed 
system should be used only for extinguishing large fires. 

No opinion could rest on a more fallacious basis nor be 
further from the truth. Means for supplying large quanti- 
ties of water are indeed necessary but, as will be shown later, 
the cheeking of a general conflagration under conditions which 
are likely to prevail here is no simple matter, but will require 
an extensive fire protection system. 

The conditions prevailing at the time the recent conflagra- 
tion was finally checked were unusually favorable for the 
control of a fire. The velocity of the wind was low, the build- 
ings burning were mostly frame residences not exceeding 
three stories in height in which there was comparatively little 
combustible material, and the fire was checked not on the lee- 
ward side, but either to windward or in a direction laterally 
to that of the wind. In fact, although the earthquake and the 
fire which followed it, clearly demonstrated the futility of 
depending, for a water supply for fire fighting purposes, upon 
pipe lines not located, designed and constructed with a con- 
sideration of the probable effects of earthquake shock, this 
conflagration indicated little or nothing of the difficulties 
which usually confront the fire department of a large city dur- 
ing a general conflagration and it is necessary to consider the 
history of other great fires in order to arrive at a full appre- 
ciation of these difficulties and the importance of attempting 
to extinguish all fires before they attain conflagration pro- 
portions. 

The greater number of general conflagrations could have 
been extinguished in their early stages, by small quantities 
of water; however, after their proportions had increased and 



28 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

they had escaped the control of the fire department, millions 
of gallons were insufficient and they generally continued burn- 
ing until they had destroyed all the combustible material in 
their paths. It is important to note that when a conflagration 
has occurred during a strong wind, the intense heat has pre- 
vented firemen from approaching near enough on the leeward 
side to utilize fire streams and consequently it was necessary 
to confine their efforts to preventing its spreading laterally and 
against the wind. 

Albert M. Quick states regarding the Baltimore fire that 
"all Sunday night and Monday morning it frequently occurred 
that, in attempting to use hydrants a block ahead of the main 
fire and in line with the wind-driven flames, the firemen and 
horses would be singed by the heat before they could attach 
the hose, and would have to move; and at various times single 
buildings were on fire several blocks ahead of the main body 
of flame. All streets in the main line of fire were, without 
exaggeration, a solid wall of flame from the pavement to the 
roofs of the buildings. The heat was so intense as to complete- 
ly consume every thing combustible, even wooden sleepers en- 
tirely embedded in concrete floors." Others have estimated that 
at this fire it was at times impossible on account of the heat 
to approach within five hundred feet on the leeward side of 
the main body of flames. As this is more than four times the 
distance that unusually strong fire streams will reach against 
the wind, the impossibility of checking a conflagration under 
such conditions is apparent. It is extremely doubtful whether 
after the first thirty minutes, any fire department, equipped 
with the most modern fire fighting apparatus, would have been 
able to control this fire before it reached the river front. 

On the other hand, many fires in mercantile establishments, 
warehouses, cotton mills, and factories containing large quan- 
tities of very inflammable material have been easily extin- 
guished in their first stages simply because the probability of 
their occurrence had been foreseen and ample means provided 
for meeting the emergency. 

The only certain way to protect property from great loss 
by general conflagration under the conditions existing in this 
city, is to extinguish all fires in their early stages. In fact, 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



29 



the efficiency of a fire protection system should be measured 
not so much by the number of large fires which are extin- 
guished through its use as by the number of small fires in 
dangerous localities which are extinguished before they assume 
conflagration proportions. 

From this, it is not to be understood that it is unnecessary 
to provide an elaborate fire protection system capable of de- 
livering large quantities of water at high pressure for long 
intervals. The arts of fire prevention and protection in Amer- 
ican cities have not reached such a state of perfection that it 
is possible to entirely prevent occasional great conflagrations 
The desirability of extinguishing the incipient fire and thus 
reducing the probability of general conflagration is, however, 
an important feature of fire protection which is too apt to be 
overlooked in the design of such systems. 

The principal defects of the fire protection methods in use 
in this city at present are that too much time elapses between 
the discovery of a fire and the application of water and that 
sufficient quantities of water are not available in all parts of 
the city for the control of a large fire. By increasing the size 
of some of the pipes in the present water supply system, 
larger amounts of water could be concentrated on any area 
but no improvement in the time consumed in reaching a fire 
can reasonably be expected as long as it is necessary to draw 
heavy portable fire engines over the steep grades and poor 
pavements of our streets to the scene of the fire and to connect 
them to hydrants in the vicinity before water is available. 

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED SYSTEM. 

After consideration of the peculiar conditions existing in 
this city and the requirements arising therefrom it has been 
decided to recommend a modification of the plan proposed by 
former City Engineer C. E. Grunsky in a report to the Board 
of Public Works dated March 8th, 1904, with such changes 
and additions as appear necessary in the light of later experi- 
ence. 

The total area to be protected is about 5,300 acres. 
The system will consist of : 



30 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

First, two storage reservoirs each with a capacity of 5,000,- 
000 gallons, situated on Twin Peaks at an elevation of 755 
feet, which are to be supplied by pumps of 3,000,000 gallons 
per day capacity. A high level distributing reservoir of 500,- 
000 gallons capacity at an elevation of 495 feet in the vicinity 
of 17th and Stanyan streets; a low level distributing reser- 
voir of 1,000,000 gallons capacity on Jones street near Clay 
street at an elevation of 329 feet. 

Second, two emergency salt water pumping stations, each 
with an ultimate capacity of 16,000 gallons per minute in 
which machinery sufficient to pump 10,000 gallons per minute 
is to be immediately installed. 

Third, two fire boats, each having a capacity of 8,000 gal- 
lons per minute against a pressure of 150 pounds per square 
inch or 4,000 gallons per minute against a pressure of 300 
pounds per square inch. 

Fourth, a net work of distributing pipes in two levels with 
a total length of about 91% miles, fitted with the necessary 
hydrants, shut-off gates, relief valves, air valves, blow-off 
valves, and fire boat connections. These pipes will be laid in 
all of the main streets of the principal manufacturing and 
business districts of the city. In the residential districts, 
mains will be installed to prevent a fire originating therein 
escaping the control of the fire department and gaining suffi- 
cient headway to sweep through the business and manufactur- 
ing districts. 

Fifth, a number of independent under-ground cisterns con- 
structed in the streets. 

Sixth, a telephone system for the exclusive use of the fire 
department. 

It is estimated that this fire protection system will cost 
$5,200,000 and that under proper management it can be com- 
pleted in two and one-half years after the necessary money is 
available. 

ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM. 

The installation of this system will greatly reduce both the 
fire and conflagration hazards. The pressure to be maintained 
in the mains will be sufficient to render water available for use 
by the fire department immediately upon their attaching a hose 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



31 



to the hydrant and opening the hydrant valve. The present 
necessity of hauling heavy steam fire engines to the fire will be 
obviated, the time elapsing between the receipt of an alarm 
and the application of water to the seat of a fire will be 
materially reduced and consequently the efficiency of the fire 
department will be greatly increased. In buildings where 
the fire hazard is extreme, it will be advantageous for the 
owner or tenant to provide means for the application of 
moderate quantities of water to a fire before the arrival of the 
fire department by reason of the reduction in insurance rates 
allowed by the underwriters for such installations. 

In the event of a large fire far greater quantities of water 
than have hitherto been available, may be quickly concen- 
trated on any area. 

With the precautions which are provided against damage 
to any extensive part of the system by earthquake, the danger 
of fire destroying the city in the event of the occurrence of a 
shock similar to that of April 18, 1906, will be obviated. 

An examination of the records of the number and size of 
fires which have occurred in San Francisco during the five 
years, 1900 to 1904 inclusive, shows that in this time 5,426 
fires occurred in buildings, from 932 to 1,243 per year, the 
yearly number steadily increasing with the population. About 
two-thirds of these fires were extinguished during their early 
stages by chemical engines. For the control of the remainder, 
say about four hundred a year, it was necessary to use port- 
able steam fire engines. 

From a consideration of these facts and the percentage of 
the buildings of the city which are in the protected area, it 
has been estimated that the proposed system, which will 
replace the present system in the districts in which it is in- 
stalled, will be used about three hundred times a year. 

Before proceeding with a description of the details of the 
project, it will be necessary in order that the desirability of 
so extensive a system may be fully appreciated, to review 
the conditions and requirements and discuss the reasons which 
have led to its recommendation. It is believed that careful 
consideration of these reasons will convince all of the urgent 
need of a comprehensive fire protection system of the most 



32 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

effective type and will demonstrate that the system recom- 
mended will provide a maximum of protection at a reasonable 
cost, and at a profit to both the insurer and the insured. 

ANNUAL FIRE LOSSES IN SAN FRANCISCO IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE. 

Few persons outside of those directly interested in the 
insurance business realize how enormous is the value of 
property annually destroyed by fire in the United States, or 
how rapidly this loss is increasing from year to year. 

It has been estimated that in the ten year period from 1875 
to 1884 inclusive, the aggregate property loss by fire was 
$803,605,448, from 1885 to 1894 it was $1,273,784,810, and 
from 1895 to 1904 it amounted to $1,523,719,823, an increase 
of one hundred per cent in three decades. 

The fire loss in the United States during the year 1906 
has been estimated to have been equivalent to a tax of $7.41 
per capita of population if the loss by the conflagration in 
this city is included, or $2.25 if the losses by that conflagra- 
tion are not included. In addition to these amounts, in order 
to determine the total cost due to fires, exclusive of the loss 
due to interruption of business caused by fires and the cost 
of insurance, it is necessary to add the cost of maintaining 
fire departments, and of additional water supplies together 
with the expense of all other appliances furnished or main- 
tained for fire protection purposes, an amount which was 
estimated in 1906, by Mr. J. K. Freitag, to be not less than 
$150,000,000 annually. In other words, during 1906 the 
people of the United States paid about $668,611,800 for 
protection, and for the property destroyed by fire. It is true 
that because of the local conflagration this was not an ordi- 
nary year, but had our fire not occurred, it would still have 
amounted to about $307,500,000. 

The magnitude of the fire losses in this country can be 
better realized after inspection of the following table, which 
gives the aggregate property loss due to fire, and the value 
of all the gold and silver produced by the mines in the United 
States, including Alaska for each year from 1875 to 1906 
inclusive. From this it will be seen that for every dollar 
produced in the gold and silver mines during the past thirty- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



33 



seven years, property to the value of about one dollar and 
fifty-two cents has been destroyed by fire and irretrievably 
lost to the use of mankind. 





Aggregate Yearly Property 


Annual Production of Gold and 




Loss by Fire in the United 


Silver in the United States and 


Year. 


States. (From the Insur- 


Alaska. (Reports of the Di- 


ance Year Book. 1907, Fire 


rector of the Mint. Treasury 




and Marine 


Annual Reports). 


1875 


$ 78.102,285.00 


$ 63,953,800.00 


1876 


64,630,600.00 


74.849,000.00 


1877 


68,265,800.00 


83,888,900.00 


1878 


64,315,900.00 


91,607,400.00 


1879 


77.703,700.00 


74.377,100.00 


1880 


74,643,400.00 


70,717,000.00 


1881 


81,280,900.00 


72.357,500.00 


1882 


84,505,024.00 


73,605,900.00 




100,149,228.00 


69,618,400.00 


1884 


110,008.611.00 


72.721.300.00 




102.818,796.00 


74.304,500.00 


1886 


104,924,750.00 


74.351.400.00 


1887 


120,283,055.00 


74.023,200.00 


1888 


110,885.665.01) 


76.212.600.00 


1889 


123,046,833.00 


79.805.400.00 


1890 


108.993,792.00 


90.087.100.00 


1891 


143,764.9(57.00 


90,805,000.00 


1892 


151,516.098.00 


88.677,500.00 


1893 


167,544,370.00 


82,755,000.00 


1894 


140,006,484.00 


70,922,100.00 


1895 


142,110,233.00 


83,055,500.00 


1896 


118,737,420.00 


92,742.600.00 


1897 


116,354,575.00 


89,679,000.00 


1898 


130,593.905.00 


96,581,400.00 


1899 


1 53,597,830.00 


103,912,100.00 


1900 


160,929,805.00 


114.912,100.00 


1901 


165 817 810 00 

xu'jjOi i , o ±\j .\jyj 


111 795 100 00 


1902 


161,078,040.00 


109,415,000.00 


1903 


145.302.155.00 


102.913,700.00 


1904 


229,198,050.00 


113,920,700.00 




165,221,650.00 


122.402,700.00 


1906 


518,611,800.00 


135,652,491.00 


Totals 


$4,284,943,531.00 


$2,826,622,491.00 



34 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



In 1904 the Committee on Statistics and Origin of Fire 
of the National Fire Protection Association requested the 
United States Government to secure through the Consular 
Service data regarding the loss from fire in the cities of for- 
eign countries. The results of these investigations are given 
in "Special Consular Report No. XXXVIII," entitled "In- 
surance in Foreign Countries," published in 1905 by the De- 
partment of Commerce and Labor. In the report of the Com- 
mittee presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Fire 
Protection Association, May 10, 1906, these statistics, together 
with some additional data which was secured directly from 
the consuls in European cities was reviewed and compared 
with similar statistics from American cities. 

The following extracts are quoted from the report of the 
Committee "In nearly all the cases the statistics were for 1904. 
Only European cities reported, although the request was also 
made of consuls in leading cities of South and Central America 
and a few in Asia and Africa ha ring characteristics to some 
exh iii in common with American cities. The tabulation in- 
cludes 43 cities of Europe. Only 30 of these gave the loss, 
which may be assumed to be the insurance loss, as there ap- 
pears to be no data of losses not covered by insurance. The 
remarkably low average is shown of 61 cents loss per capita 
against $3.10 in the five years' average of 252 American cities. 
In the European average of 61 cents is included the cities of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia, with an average of $1.32 
and $1.42. respectively, and if we eliminate these two we 
should have a still lower average per capita for the remain- 
ing 28 cities. Certainly our own per capita loss when thus 
compared is most striking and alarming, and while, on the 
one hand, it explains the higher rates of premuium which 
must of necessity be charged here, on the other hand, it points 
unmistakably to the remedies which should be applied to 
check the waste — such as improved methods of building con- 
struction added to the greatest care and the use of the best 
known facilities for protection against fire. 

Taking the number of fires to each 1,000 population in the 
same cities, we find it is 4.05 in the American cities as against 
.86 in those of Europe, showing that in point of frequency 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



35 



fires here are far in excess of those abroad, which would seem 
to indicate a general lack of care in the United States, per- 
haps on the part of all classes. Practically all fires are con- 
fined to the buildings or place of origin in the European cities, 
as will be seen from the table and the extracts from the re- 
perts given below. 

Your Committee, however, desired to go further than to 
present these facts as to fires in cities. The Chairman was 
asked by a prominent underwriter, called upon to address a 
commercial body, for proofs of the statement so often made 
tltat the United States leads all countries in the amount of its 
fire loss in proportion to the population, and it was found 
that while all underwriters were convinced of that fact, no one 
had the figures to substantiate it. Accordingly, the govern- 
ment ivas again addressed, and on advice of the Bureau of 
Statistics in Washington, a request was sent by us direct to the 
consuls asking for the amount of the total loss in each country, 
and if that could not be stated, then for the insurance loss for 
a period of five years. Up to this writing we can only give 
the residt in the six countries named in the following table : 



Country. 


Years. 


Fire Loss. 
Annual Average. 


Population 
1901 


Loss 
per 
Capita. 


Austria 


1898-1902 1 


$ 7,601,389 


26,150,597 


$0.29 


Denmark 


1901 


660,924 


2,588.919 


.26 


France 


1900-1904 


11,699,275 


38,595,500 


.30 


Germany 


1902 


27,655,600 


56,367,178 


.49 


Italy 


1901-1904 | 


4,112,725 


32,449,754 


.12 


Switzerland . . . 


1901-1903 ! 


909,364 


3,325,023 


.30 



Or an average loss per capita of $0.33. 

Now, compare this with the official report from the States 
of Maine. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Ohio, statistics 
of which are in a table accompanying this report: 



State. 


Five Years. 


Fire Loss. 
Annual Average. 


Population. 


Loss 
per 
Capita. 


Maine 


1901-5 


$2,240,158 


694,647 


$3.22 


Massachusetts 


1901-5 


6,285,891 


2,844,068 


2.21 


New Hampshire 


1901-5 


1,174,061 


411,588 


2^85 


Ohio 


1901-5 


7.502,561 


4,157,545 


1.80 



Giving an average of toss $2.12 per capita." 



36 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



It is of interest to note at this point for the purpose 
of comparison that during the five year period 1900-04 that 
the average losses due to fire in this city were $866,319.00, or 
based on an average population of 400,000, $2.17 per capita 
per year. 

Quoting further from the above mentioned report: 

"Again, the total loss in the United States, as reported in 
Uu Chronicle tables and by the Journal of Commerce, was 
$866,617,705 for the five years ending with 1905. or an average 
of $173,323,541 per annum, which, upon a population basis 
of 70,000,000 gives a per capita loss of $2.47. 

Thus it would appear from all of the statistics available 
that tin per capita loss in the United States is appallingly 
greater titan in any other country whether the comparison 
be by cities or by countries." 

The Committee concluded its report with some excerpts 
from the reports and letters from consuls ;is given in " Insur- 
ant << in Foreign Countries," portions of these excerpts are 
given beloAV. 

From the introduction : 

*'//; Europe the fire insurance laws are remarkable, chie fly 
because they compel insurance in some countries, while in all 
cities they prevent great losses by insisting on the erection 
of only stone and brick buildings. The fire department sys- 
tems are ridiculously inadequate as compared with those of 
American cities, yet the net residts are better." 

From the Consul General, Paris, France. March 9. 1906. 

"There is nothing in which American municipal govcrn- 
im tit makes so unfavorable a showing, in comparison with 
those of European cities, as in all that relates to construction 
of buildings and the enforcement of regulations which minim- 
ize the danger of losses of life and property by fire." 

From the "onsul General, Berlin. 

"The comparative immunity of Berlin from disastrous 
fires results, not from the efficiency of its fire department, al- 
though it does promptly and -ccell what work it has to do, 
but from the absence of wooden houses and the solid, careful 
construction of all kinds of stone anel brick buildings under 
tli< rigid scrutiny of the building police, which, acting under 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



37 



an elaborati and searching statute, have authority to compel 
the use of iron and steel girders, fireproof stairways and 
roofing, heavy fireproof ceilings, and every detail of construc- 
tion which can diminish the risk of conflagration. The exac- 
tions of the building police seem sometimes excessive. They 
involve df lays an<l expenditure that had not been reckoned up- 
on, and which an annoying to contractors and owners of build- 
ings, but the wisdom of such restrictions is shown by the com- 
paratively trifling fire losses in a great capital city like Berlin, 
where, as lias b( en shown above, they amount to less in a whole 
year than thost entailed by one moderately large fire in the 
1 r nited Statt s. ' ' 

In 1003-4. at which time the population of this city was 
estimated to be about 400,000, it cost $832,337 to maintain our 
fire department, which consisted of 643 men with 53 steam 
fire engines, of which 15 were in reserve and 38 in service, 
together with a considerable amount of other equipment, such 
as hose, trucks, chemical engines, automobiles, water towers 
and batteries. During the period from 1900 to 1904 inclusive, 
about 11 per cent, or say, 687 out of about 6,147 fires ex- 
tended beyond the place of origin. 

For the purpose of comparison, similar data regarding con- 
tinental cities where the majority of the buildings are of fire 
resistive construction have been compiled from Special Con- 
sular Report. Vol. LXVIII. 

PARIS, FRANCE. 

The population in 1904 was 2,714,068. The annual fire 
loss per capita was about 47 cents. The fire brigade consisted 
of 1855 officers and men and the cost of maintaining it was 
$586,028. 

BERLIN. 

The following excerpts from a letter written by Consul 
General Frank H. Mason, concerning fire insurance in Berlin 
and suburbs are of interest: "The number of brick and stone 
buildings October 1, 1903, was 37,000, insured for $1,025,- 
898,000. Wooden buildings are not permitted in Berlin. 
Th( population of Berlin including the immediate suburbs, 
was in 1904 about 2.863.088." 



38 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



"The owner of every building is compelled by law to insure 
it, from the time the construction reaches the first story, in a 
municipal organization known as the ' Stadische Feuer 
Societal', or City Fire Insurance Association. Every building 
within municipal limits is required to be insured in this organ- 
ization for what is known as its ' Minderwerth' , or mortgagablc 
value, which is carefully estimated and fixed by the expert 
officials of the department. " 

"As has been already stated, the nominal or insurable 
value of buildings in Berlin during the fiscal year 1894 was 
4,310,495,800 marks ($1,025,898,000.) The percentage of 
premium charged for such insurance is calculated from year 
to year so as to produce an income that covers three items of 
expenditure namely: Losses on property through fires, ex- 
penses of administration, and the cost of maintaining the fire 
department. For the fiscal year 1904, now under considera- 
tion, the premium rate was 4^4 pfennigs per 100 marks, or 
4.75 per mille — that is, somewhat less than one-half of one- 
thousandth per cent, and the sums of the different items paid 
were as follows : Losses paid, on 2,040 fires, 840,062 marks 
($199,935;) costs of administration, 150,092 marks ($35,722) ; 
mainienace of fire department, 1,063,868 marks ($253,200) ; 
total, 2,054,022 marks ($488,857). Furniture and all movable 
properly in buildings may be insured in private insurance 
companies, but there appear to be no trustworthy statistics 
to show the amount of such, insurance effected in Berlin during 
any given year, 'tin ordinary premium rate for such insurance 
is three-fourths per mille, so that, including registration fee, 
stamp, etc., the cost of a chattel insurance policy of, say, 
30,000 marks ($7,140) would be 26.30 marks ($6.25 per 
annum." 

"Fires which escape control and extend until they destroy 
adjoining buildings or an entire block are so rare in Berlin 
as to be left out of account in the records and there appear 
to be no statistics which divide the direct from the exposure 
losses. ' ' 

While the method of insurance outlined above may be 
an excellent thing in such a city as Berlin, where practically 
no conflagration hazard exists, it is hardly necessary to point 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



39 



out that in a city having such a large conflagration hazard as 
San Francisco, such a method would be most impractical, as 
in the event of a conflagration of the magnitude of the recent 
one, the proportion of the total loss for which each property 
owner would be liable would result in the bankruptcy of the 
greater majority of our citizens. 

ROTTERDAM, NETHERLANDS. 

The population in 1904 was 372,495, and during the year 
there were 361 fires, practically all of which were confined 
to the building in which they originated. The fire department 
is composed entirely of volunteers, who serve gratuitously. 

ZURICK. SWITZERLAND. 

The population in 1904 was 163,500. During the year 
there were only 72 fires, none of which extended to adjoining 
buildings. The city has a volunteer fire department, the fire- 
men being paid a fee for every fire they attend. 

BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND. 

With a population of 550,000 people in 1904, there were 
only 557 fires, 15 of which extended to adjoining buildings. 
The loss was $226,506. The fire brigade consisted of 89 officers 
and men. There are six steam engines and two chemical en- 
gines in the department. 

LONDON, ENGLAND. 

The population in 1904 was 4,536,541. During the year 
3,904 fires occurred, of which 49 extended to adjoining build- 
ings ; 29,000,000 gallons of water were used to extinguish fires, 
one-sixth of which was taken from the river and canals. The 
London Fire Brigade is composed of about 1,295 men. or in 
other words, though the population is more than eleven times 
greater than that of San Francisco, they only require about 
twice as many firemen. This is not because our fire depart- 
ment is not as efficient as that of London, but it is because 
since 1666 legislation has compelled the use of fireproof ma- 
terials in the repair and construction of buildings, and, con- 
sequently few timber structures remain. 

VIENNA, AUSTRIA. 

The folowing data from the Municipal Journal and En- 
gineer, October 23, 1907. is also of interest : 



40 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



"For a city of move than 200,000 inhabitant*. 
Vienna enjoys remarkable immunity from fire. The 
total losses in 1006 were less than $130,000, while the fire de- 
partment cost the city about $30,000. In all there were 1,169 
fires, an average of a little over three a day. Of these 
37 were classified as large, 156 medium, and 976 small. The 
small total of the aggregate loss is due not only to the activity 
of the Fire Department but to the very solid construction of 
all buildings in the city, public and private alike. While prac- 
tically the whole population live in flats, it is seldom that a 
fire will extend beyond the apartment in which it originated ." 

Mr. Freitag in an article in Engineering News. April 26. 
1906, states that the fire department of Vienna consists of 
"five steam engines, but very seldom called into action, and a 
large and sufficient number of hand engines, manned by 265 
men in tin department. Hardly what we would term and ef- 
ficient fire fighting organization." 

That this enormous drain upon the country's resources 
should be allowed, not only to continue but to rapidly increase 
from year to year can be explained only upon the assumption 
that the general public is ignorant of the true state of affairs. 

The remedy is apparent from the statistics which are set 
forth above. It is only by the habitual exercise of greater 
care in the prevention of fire on the part of all classes and by 
ceasing to erect buildings not designed or constructed with a 
view to preventing the spread of fire that this loss can be 
brought down within reasonable limits. 

The installation of the proposed fire protection system will 
effect a material reduction of the annual fire loss in this 
city, but this reduction will in no way be comparable to that 
which would ultimately result from removing the cause of 
serious fires by the enactment and honest enforcement of a 
good building code embodying the recommendation of the 
'• Committet of Fireproof Construction of tin National Fin 
Prot( i f Ion Association. 

From past experience, it is apparent that any improvement 
in our building laws can be accomplished only with the 
greatest difficulty, and even if proper laws were passed at once 
many years must elapse before the general average of build- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



41 



bags in this city would be brought up to the high standard 
of European cities. Consequently adequate fire protection in 
this city is an imperative necessity. 

It is urgently recommended, however, that the fire limits 
be extended at once and that the building- laws be so altered 
as to prevent the construction of any but so called fireproof 
buildings within the more congested business districts. 

TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES. 

San Francisco is built on the northerly portion of a penin- 
sula, lying between the southerly arm of San Francisco Bay 
ami the Pacific Ocean. Its southerly boundary is an east 
and west line about seven miles south of the Golden Gate, the 
entrance to San Francisco Bay. The city has an area of about 
forty-eight square miles, of which sixteen, including the four 
square miles burnt over by the recent fire ; are occupied. It is 
divided into two main water sheds by a spur of the Coast 
Range mountains. This spur, extending in a general northerly 
and southerly direction through the center of the city, has an 
elevation at the southerly boundary in the vicinity of Ocean 
View of about 300 feet above sea level. Thence it rises to an 
elevation of 900 feet at Twin Peaks, about the geographical 
center of the city, and slopes to the northern end of the Penin- 
sula near Fort Point. 

The westerly water shed is divided into four drainage 
basins by three spurs from the main ridge, of which the north- 
ern is the Point Lobos ridge crossing Golden Gate Park; the 
central is the Sunset ridge, and the southern is the flat-topped 
ridge between Lake Merced and Laguna Puerca. With the 
exception of the Presidio and Golden Gate Park, the greater 
portion of the surface of this western slope is covered with 
wind-blown sand. 

The easterly water shed is divided into four main drainage 
basins. 

The southern basin, comprising the Visitacion Valley and 
Bay View districts, is bounded on the south by a spur from the 
San Bruno Mountains and on the north by Hunter's Point 
ridge, having a maximum elevation of about 400 feet. This 
valley is subdivided into two smaller drainage areas by a 



42 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



group of hills having elevations of from one to four hundred 
feet. 

North of Hunter's Point ridge is the Islais Creek Valley, 
the northern slope of which terminates in the Potrero Hills, 
having a maximum elevation of 300 feet. The western portion 
of this valley is still further sub-divided by Bernal Heights, 
a group of hills which reach an elevation of 500 feet. 

The above basins, as well as all of the westerly water sheds 
of the city, are mostly unoccupied, or are so thinly built up 
that the potential fire hazard is not sufficiently great to war- 
rant the installation of a system of high pressure mains. 

North of the Potrero hills lies the principal drainage basin 
of the easterly water shed. It is bounded on the north by a 
spur from the main ridge, of which the most prominent points 
are known as Pacific Heights, Russian, Nob and Telegraph 
Hills. These hills reach elevations of from 230 to 380 feet. 
By far the greater part of the built-up portions of the city 
is located in this basin. 

North of the Pacific Heights, Russian and Telegraph Hills 
spur the land slopes toward San Francisco Bay and the Golden 
Gate. 

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. 

The following facts have been compiled from the records 
of the U. S. Weather Bureau : 

TEMPERA TI'RE. 

The mean annual temperature at San Francisco is 55.8 
degrees Fahr. The highest temperature ever recorded was 101 
degrees Fahr. on September 8, 1904, and the lowest, 29 de- 
grees Fahr. on January 15, 1888. The temperature has never 
been low enough for sufficiently long periods to freeze water in 
the distributing pipes of the local water companies or in the 
fire hydrants. 

RAINFALL. 

The average rainfall is 23 inches, most of which falls dur- 
ing the months of November, December, January, February 
and March. In the summer months there is practically no 
rain. 

WINDS. 

The prevailing winds are from the west. Winds from the 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



43 



southwest occur frequently and from the north occasionally. 

The following table shows the average velocity for each 
hour of the day for each month : 

AVERAGE HOURLY WIND VELOCITY (MILES PER 
HOUR). 



Time 


Jan. 


F.'b. 


Mar. 


Apr. 


May 


[line 


July 


Am.'. 


Sept. 


Oct. 


Nov. Dec. 


1 a.m 


6.1 


6.1 


6.7 


7.3 


7.9 


9.3 


9.2 


8.9 


6.8 


5.3 


5.2 


6.1 


2 a.m. 


6.2 


5.9 


6.3 


7.0 


7.6 


8.8 


8.8 


8.5 


6.4 


5.0 


5.1 


6.2 


3 a.m. 


6.3 


5.8 


6.3 


6.6 


7.2 


8.2 


8.2 


7.9 


6.0 


4.9 


5.2 


6.2 


4 a.m. 


6.3 


5.9 


6.2 


6.3 


6.8 


7.6 


7.8 


7.6 


5.9 


4.8 


5.1 


6.3 


5 a.m. 


6.4 


6.1 


6.3 


6.1 


6.6 


7.1 


7.4 


7.3 


5.6 


4.8 


5.2 


6.4 


6 a.m. 


6.5 


5.9 


6.1 


6.0 


6.4 


6.9 


7.4 


6.9 


5.4 


4.7 


5.3 


6.5 


7 a.m. 


6.4 


5.8 


6.1 


6.2 


6.7 


7.1 


7.4 


6.8 


5.4 


4.7 


5.1 


6.6 


8 a.m. 


6.5 


6.2 


6.6 


7.0 


7.5 


8.1 


8.0 


7.4 


5.8 


5.0 


5.5 


6.8 


9 a.m. 


7.0 


6.9 


7.3 


7.8 


8.3 


8.8 


8.6 


7.8 


6.4 


5.6 


6.1 


7.1 


10 a.m. 


7.6 


7.6 


8.0 


8.6 


9.3 


10.3 


9.9 


8.9 


7.0 


6.2 


6.6 


7.7 


11 a.m. 


7.9 


7.6 


8.4 


9.7 


11.0 


12.4 


11.8 


11.1 


8.3 


6 7 


6.7 


7.8 


12 m. 


8.2 


7.8 


9.2 


11.6 


13.3 


15.2 


14.7 


13.3 


10.7 


8.1 


6.8 


7.9 


1 p.m. 


8.4 


8.6 


10.6 


13.9 


15.4 


17.8 


17.4 


16.0 


13.3 


9.9 


7.4 


8.2 


2 p.m 


8.7 


9.6 


12.2 


15.6 


17.0 


19.8 


19.7 


18.5 


15.7 


11.8 


8.6 


8.5 


3 p.m. 


8.8 


10.5 


13.4 


16.7 


18.0 


20.8 


21.0 


20.2 


17.7 


13.4 


9.2 


8.4 


4 p.m. 


8.6 


10.8 


14.1 


17.3 


18.5 


21.3 


21.6 


20.9 


18.5 


14.0 


9.4 


8.1 


5 p.m. 


8.0 


10.8 


14.1 


16.9 


18.1 


21.0 


22.0 


20.8 


18.4 


14.1 


9.6 


7.7 


6 p.m. 


7.6 


9.8 


13.1 


15.9 


17.1 


20.1 


20.7 


19.9 


17.0 


13.2 


8.8 


7.6 


7 p.m. 


7.3 


9.0 


11.6 


14.3 


15.2 


18.2 


18.7 


17.5 


14.8 


11.0 


7.7 


7.0 


8 p.m. 


6.8 


8.3 


9.9 


12.3 


13.1 


16.1 


16.2 


15.2 


12.0 


9.0 


6.7 


6.7 


9 p.m. 


6.5 


7.4 


8.6 


10.6 


11.3 


13.5 


14.0 


13.3 


10.0 


7.7 


6.1 


6.6 


10 p.m. 


6.1 


7.0 


7.8 


9.5 


10.0 


11.8 


12.3 


11.3 


9.0 


6.6 


5.6 


6.4 


11 p.m. 


5.9 


6.4 


7.2 


8.6 


9.0 


10.8 


10.8 


10.2 


8.2 


6.0 


5.2 


6.2 


12 p.m. 


6.0 


6.1 


6.8 


7.8 


8.3 


10.1 


10.0 


9.4 


7.4 


5.6 


5.1 


6.0 


Av'ge 


7.0 


7.6 


8.8 


10.4 


11.3 


13.0 


13.1 


12.3 


10.1 


7.8 


6.6 


7.0 



Attention is called to the facts that the highest winds pre- 
vail during the afternoon, that between sunset and sunrise 
the velocity is generally low and that the maximum average 
velocities occur during the dry summer months. As fires 
starting during the day time are liable to be discovered soon 
after their outbreak, the fire and conflagration hazards are 
not as great as if the high winds prevailed during the night, 



44 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

but the fact that the higher velocities occur during- a time 
when the roofs and sides of buildings are dry increases these 
hazards. 

PRESENT WATER SUPPLY. 

At present the City depends almost entirely upon the 
Spring Valley Water Company, a private corporation, for its 
water supply for fire fighting purposes. The supply and dis- 
tribution works are owned by the company; the hydrants, 
about 3,870 in number, are the property of the city. There 
are also 29 hydrants connected with the mains of the Olympic 
Salt Water Company. In addition there are located in the 
older parts of the city 62 fire cisterns ranging in capacity 
from 25,000 to 100.000 gallons each, of which 23 are in repair 
and available for use. The remainder are being restored. 
During fires near the water front assistance is sometimes ren- 
dered by bay steamers and by the two State tugs. Since the 
fire of April 18, 1906, a number of manufacturing concerns 
have installed private fire protection systems. 

The Spring Valley Water Company obtains its water from 
several different sources located on this peninsula and in Ala- 
meda County, from which it is conveyed by conduits to the 
College Hill, University Mound and Lake Honda distributing 
reservoirs located in this city. From the above mentioned 
reservoirs the water flows by gravity to the Potrero Heights, 
Francisco street and Lombard street reservoirs. The Clay 
street, Pacific Heights and Clarendon Heights tanks are sup- 
plied by pumps which draw from the distributing systems of 
the above reservoirs. From these reservoirs and tanks the 
water is conveyed by the distributing system to the consumers. 

The out of town conduits pass for a portion of their way 
over marsh ground and are intersected by fault lines, and 
are consequently liable to be put out of use by a severe earth- 
quake. Furthermore, the geological formation of the San 
Francisco peninsula renders it impossible to locate conduits 
for conveying water into the city from the peninsula sources 
of the company without crossing geological faults. 

The distributing reservoirs of the company are well con- 
structed in desirable locations, their combined capacity is 91,- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



45 



200,000 gallons, about three days' supply. The distributing 
system is satisfactory as regards its ability to supply an 
adequate quantity of water for ordinary domestic, public and 
commercial use. 

It is recognized that the works of the company have been 
constructed on conservative lines, with large factors of safety. 
However, partly on account of faults which can be remedied 
only at an expense which the company claims its income will 
not warrant and partly by reason of defects which are in- 
herent, the fire protection afforded is insufficient. Many of 
the distributing pipes are not of sufficient size to supply an 
adequate quantity of water for fire protection purposes. A 
number of important ones are in areas of artificially filled or 
made ground. The distance between the gate valves is too 
great to afford adequate control. The hydrants are generally 
well placed, but are of an undesirable type and in many in- 
stances they are connected with mains of insufficient size. The 
distributing system is so arranged that in by far the greater 
portion of the city the pressure is not sufficient for effective 
fire fighting purposes and it is, therefore, necessary to rely 
entirely upon steam fire engines. This is undesirable, because 
the grades of a large percentage of the streets are so steep that 
the time lost in concentrating the necessary fire apparatus and 
applying water to an incipient fire greatly increases the diffi- 
culty of extinguishing it before it attains dangerous pro- 
portions. 

LIABILITY TO EARTHQUAKES. 

Geologists have recognized the existence of a system of 
faults extending through the State of California in a general 
northeasterly and southwesterly direction. These faults or 
fractures are caused by the development of stresses in the 
rocks. They extend to unknown depths. 

The causes of the strains or differences in pressure in the 
earth's crust which bring about these faults are not definitely 
known. They have been attributed to the expansion and con- 
traction of the rocks due to changes of temperature and to 
the shifting of the loading on the crust of the earth by the 
material washed by erosion from the land areas into the sea. 

Unequal strains in the crust of the earth cause movements 



46 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



of the rock masses along the walls of these faults. These move- 
ments or re-adjustments of the rock masses are the cause of 
the numerous earthquakes which occur in this vicinity. 

The accompanying table (Plate No. 1) has been compiled 
from earthquake catalogues, published by Smithsonian Institu- 
tion. It shows the number of earthquakes recorded in San 
Francisco during each month from January 1st, 1850, to 
January 1st, 1907, together with the yearly number recorded 
elsewhere in California and not in San Francisco during the 
same period. 

The greater number recorded in recent years in California 
elsewhere than in San Francisco is accounted for by the 
growth in population and consequent additional number of ob- 
servers and the increase in efficiency and methods of re- 
cording. It does not indicate that the frequency or intensity 
of earthquakes in this region is increasing. 

While the majority of these disturbances have been of 
minor intensity and caused little or no damage, there have 
been a number of extremely heavy shakes. 

In the H olden Catalogue of Earthquakes on the Pacific 
Coast 1769-1897 there are tables of the destructive earth- 
quakes and the extremely severe disturbances that have been 
recorded on the Pacific Coast during the years 1769 to 1897 
inclusive. 

These tables show that between 1800-1872 the coast of 
California, Washington and Oregon has been subjected to ten 
destructive earthquakes of which the destructive effects of 
three were especially severe on the San Francisco Peninsula. 
They also indicate that during the period from 1806 to 1893 
there have occurred twenty-nine earthquakes which have been 
classed as extremely severe, of which four have been especially 
severe in the vicinity of San Francisco. 

The destructive earthquakes described by Holden (Cata- 
logue of Earthquakes on the Pacific Coast — 1769 and 1897) 
as especially severe in San Francisco are as follows : 

"1839; shortly after 12 m. Intensity IX Rossi — Forel 
Scale. 

Where Redwood City now is. Destructive. Adobe walls 
seven feet thick were cracked from top to bottom. The earth 



PLATJ-: NO. 1 



TASl£ 

Show/no namier o7~ £~0/~//y<7c/&/res fee o/-c7&<? 7/7 7rc7/?t;/sC0, &7//7ir~/7/a 
/ra/77 /830 ' 7o '906, /nc/t/s/ve , fops/A&r //m nu/T?2>er occf/~r//ig a/setv/?era 7/7 
/7a//7or/?/a, c/i//~//7? Jt7/77e /Der/atf; tr/?/c7> tva/-e /?a7 reco/rix/ //7 Sa/7 Ty-^/p^/sco. 



)fe/7/~ 




<-//7/7 




7%>r 


/for 






y 




Serf 


0c/. 


/Vat/ 


/Jet 


Te/o/*> 


7850 


3 


7 


/ 






/ 


/ 






/ 








5 


7 


/O 










2 


/ 










4 


3 


3 


2 


/ 






















/ 




3 


3 


3 


/ 




/ 
















2 


/ 


/7 


4 


s 


/ 


/ 


/ 


2 


7 










2 






74 


3 


3 
















/ 




/ 




/ 


77 


6 


70 


4 


/ 


2 




/ 






/ 




/ 






73 


7 


/7 7 


/ 


/ 


2 








/ 




_ 

2 


2 


3 


3 


74 


3 


7 




/ 












c 


3 




/ 




3 


9 


8 
















/ 


2 


/ 


2 


2 


7/ 


7330 


9 


/ 


/ 




2 


7 








2 




/ 


/ 


// 


7 


4 






/ 


/ 




/ 


/ 












7 


2 


2 


















/ 






/ 


77 


3 


8 


/ 










7 


2 


7 








3 


9 


4 


76 




/ 


3 




2 


2 


3 




3 






/ 


6 


3 


23 


/ 


2 


4 


3 


/ 






/ 




a 
y 


/ 


/ 






8 


/ 


2 


(- 




/ 


- 

/ 


— 

(— 










/ 


/■-> 


7 


2 


/ 
















. 

/ 








4 


3 


74 






/ 




7 




/ 






7 


3 


/ 


40 


9 


70 


2 


2 




/ 


2 


3 














2/ 


73*70 


8 


/ 


3 


4 




















7/ 


/ 


2 




/ 




/ 


















77 


2 


3 






1 










7 




3 






36 


3 


4 




2 




/ 














7 




77 


4 


6 


2 




/ 




/ 


7 












/ 


4 


5 


8 




/ 








3 








7 


3 




9 


6 


2 


/ 


















7 






3 


7 


2 










/ 






7 










74 


3 


4 




/ 














2 




7 




/3 


9 


7 




/ 






















7 


7380, 


4 








/ 


/ 


7 










7 




22 


7 


3 


/ 
















7 


7 


2 




/3 


2 


9 






/ 


/ 




7 


2 


7 


3 








77 


3 


6 


/ 




/ 


/ 












3 






22 


4 


3 


/ 




2 


/ 






/ 












22 


5 


3 


2 


















/ 


7 


/ 


34 


6 


7 


/ 








7 


7 


/ 






7 


7 


/ 


5 


7 


8 


2 














/ 


7 


/ 




3 


34 


— 4- 


9 


/ 


/ 


/ 




7 






/ 


2 




2 




2/ 


9 


6 








2 


2 








7 




7 




3Z 


7890 


7 








/ 


7 




4 




7 








38 


/ 


3 


2 








J 


/ 














26 


2 


6 








4 






7 








7 




47 


3 


3 












/ 


2 












42 


4 




























23 






























26 


— f 


/ 








/ 


















23 


7 


7 


2 










/ 


7 






2 




/ 


63 


3 


3 






/ 


/ 








/ 










70 


9 


6 








/ 




2 


7 


2 










73 


7900 


2 












/ 


7 












74 


/ 


// 




2 


3 






/ 




2 




7 




2 


47 


2 


8 








t 






/ 


7 


2 








34 


3 


3 












/ 




2 










73 




2/ 




/ 


/ 


2 


7 




7 








4 


77 


70 


3 


27 


5 






2 


7 




/ 


3 


2 




3 


4 


58 


a 


82 


2 




/ 


49 


76 


4 


4 


/ 




2 


2 


7 


27/ 




46S 


39 


26 


33 


80 


44 


29 


JO 


24 


30 


43 


43 


4-4 


/34S 



FOR SAX FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



47 



was cracked in many places, and one immense fissure extended 
from Lone Mountain (?) to the Mission San Jose — Bancroft — 
Ms. — San Francisco Call, December 21, 1879." 

"1865. October 8; {Sunday) Intensity IX Rossi — Forel 
Scale. 

San Francisco. The first shock was felt at sixteen minutes 
before one o'clock p. m., and lasted perhaps five seconds. It 
was almost instantly followed by a heavier shock, which con- 
tinued' for ten seconds or more. The vibrations appeared to 
be east and west, or northeast and southwest. TJvere was 
nothing in the weather or in the condition of the atmosphere 
during the previous week to foretell the earthquake. On Oc- 
tober 8. in the evening, there were two or three slight aeldi- 
tional shocks. The chief elamages to buildings were to Pop- 
per's building. Third and Mission streets, the City Hall, flu 
old Merchant's Exchange, corner Battery and Washington 
streets. The latter building was completely ruined. The Cali- 
fornia Engine Company's House, Market and Sansome stret ts, 
was severely injured and rendered unfit for occupancy. The 
chimney in the rear of the Lick House was shaken down. 
Stoddard's warehouse on Beale street is said to have been 
thrown out of place several inches. On Third street, from 
Market to Howard, the window glass was broken in. many 
places. ' On Washington street, also, the glass appears to have 
suffered from Dupont street down to Montgomery. On the 
marshy lands in the vicinity of Howard and Seventh streets, 
lamp posts, water pipes and gas pipes were broken and thrown 
out of position. The ground on Howard street, from Seventh 
to Ninth, cracked open, leaving a fissure nearly an inch wide. 
Not one fatal accident has yet been heard of. The effects of 
the earthquake on the waters of Mission Bay and on Long 
Brielge was frightful. The shock was felt severely at San 
Jose. About ten feet of the wall of the jail was thrown down, 
and a portion of the wall of the Methodist church. The bell 
of the convent was tolled. At Santa Clara nearly all of the 
brick buildings in town were more or less injured. On the 
Santa Cruz gap road chimneys were thrown down and the roads 
more or less obstructed by stones rolled down from the moun- 
tains. At Stockton the shock was very severe. At Visalia anel 



48 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



Los Angeles the earthquake was not felt at all. Bancroft M. S. 
— San Francisco Bulletin^ October 9, 1865." 

"1868. October 21; Intensity IX Rossi — Ford Scale. 

The great earthquake at San Francisco, Cat. The first 
shock was at 7:53^2 a. m. Its direction was northerly and 
southerly {more correctly S. 30° W. to N. 30° E. — J. R. J.) 
Its duration was forty-two seconds. The second shock came 
at 9:23 a. m., lasting five seconds. Lighter and briefer trem- 
ors occurred at intervals of about half an hour, till 12 :15 p. m. 
The first shock was most severely felt on the eastern side of the 
cilu, on the made land between Montgomery street and the 
bay. On the solid land no serious damage was done to any 
well constructed house. Window panes were broken, chimneys 
twisted or thrown down, mantel ornaments overturned, etc. 
Steeples strayed to and, fro. On Russian and Telegraph Mills 
the shock was comparatively light. On, the flat between 
Howard strict and the Mission the shock was most severe. The 
Custom House was badly damaged. It was poorly constructed. 
Co/fee and Risdon's building (corner of Market and Battery 
streets) was of brick, three stories high, and unfinished. The 
walls of a portion of this fell, killing a man. The machines 
in tin Union Foundry (First and Mission streets) were put out 
of order. Several buildings in this neighborhood were more or 
less wrecked. The tall chimney of the San Francisco Gas 
Works (Howard and Fremont streets) was thrown down. The 
Mission Woolen Mills were damaged badly. As in 186."). a 
small crevasse teas opined, on Howard street, beyond Sixth. 
The Deaf, Dumb and Blind Institution teas damaged.. The 
greatest damage was done in a belt several It and red feet wide, 
running northwest and southeast, commencing at the Custom 
House and ending at the Folsom street wharf. Tin tail chim- 
ney of the United Stales Mint was damaged. The ferry 
steamer Contra Costa was near Angel Island and felt the 
shock strongly. Shocks were noted at 7:53, 8:10. 8:15, 9:20, 

9 :35, 10, 10 :30, 11 :05 a. m., and at 12 :15, and 2 :58 p. m. ( The, 

10 :30 shock was vertical at Pine and Mason Sts. — J. R. J.) < 'tiff 
House, S. F. ; an unusual commotion in the sea, and the waves 
came fifteen or twenty feet further inland than usual. Tin re 
were about thirty casualties in the 150,000 inhabitants. Fire 



Jfto/r/hf Pr//?c//)(7/ (jeo/oy/ca/ foe// A/hes 
J? //be //c//7//y of Sc?/? fr-a/TCASco, Ca/z/br/p/a 

c//>a/ /77c//s S/70/T/7 TTrtAS: 

sff>r// /S -/S<?£ 0Gcw«e/ JMem? 7%e/ti:-< • • • 1 • 



FOR SAN FRAN-CISCO. CALIFORNIA 



49 



deaths occurred from falling walls, etc. Xot a single well- 
built house on tlie solid land suffered materially, whether of 
brick, stone or wood. Wooden houses suffered least. II. Ms. 
Also derived from 8. F. daily papers of the few dags imme- 
diatelg following the shock. See Bowlandson, et seq. No reg- 
ister of this shock on the tide-gauges at San Diego and Fort 
Point." 

The San Francisco peninsula is traversed by a number of 
faults, the location of the more important known ones being 
indicated on the map on Plate Xo. 2. The earthquake of April 
18th, 1906, was the result of a movement along one or more of 
these faults, the principal movement being in the San An- 
dreas or Stevens Creek fault, along which a rift was opened 
which can be traced across the land for 192 miles, and prob- 
ably extends as great a distance under the ocean. The move- 
ment on the land was greatest in Marin Co., where on the 
westerly side of the rift it moved as much as 17 feet to the 
north or on the easterly side it moved as much as 17 feet to 
the south or there was a differential movement amounting to 
17 feet. Extensive surveys will be required to ascertain which 
of these took place. The amount of movement along the rift 
gradually decreased toward the south. At Pajaro Bridge it 
was about 18 inches and a short distance southerly the rift 
disappears. 

David Starr Jordan in an essay entitled "The Earthquake 
Rift of 1906" states: 

"In this fault hundreds of thousands of earthquakes, large 
and small, have preceded the recent one. In it the aggregate 
displacement horizontally has been very great, and tin aggre- 
gate vertical displacement produced by all its many earth- 
quakes, as shown by the rock strata on either side of it, ex- 
ceeds half a mile." 

The existence has been recognized of an old fault which 
crosses the city in a northwesterly and southeasterly direction, 
marking the westerly limits of the Franciscan serpen- 
tine formation in the northerly portion of the peninsula. It 
enters the city from the southeast, a short distance southerly 
from Hunter's Point, crosses Market street near its westerly 
termination and enters the Pacific Ocean about midway be- 



50 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



tween Fort Point and Bakers Beach. It has been stated by 
geologists that there is little or no danger of movement along 
this old fault line because of its great geological age and the 
existence of other nearby and more recent faults. 

The susceptibility of San Francisco and vicinity to earth- 
quakes greatly increases the fire and conflagration hazards and 
makes it necessary to consider the probable occurrence and 
effect of earthquakes in the design of any fire protection 
system. 

EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES. 

In order to determine whether the more disastrous results 
of a severe earthquake are confined to particular localities in 
this city and to what extent the water works structures recom- 
mended in connection with the proposed fire protection sys- 
tem, may be expected to resist such a shock, the effects of the 
recent earthquake upon pipe lines, reservoirs and pumping 
plants in San Francisco and vicinity have been carefully in- 
vestigated, and consideration has been given to the destructive 
effects of other great earthquakes. The findings of this in- 
vestigation are briefly summarized below. 

When the Spring Valley Water Company repaired its 
distributing system after the fire, the locations of the breaks 
in the pipe lines were plotted on a map which was afterwards 
published in connection with the report on "The Wafer Sup- 
ply of San Francisco" by Chief Engineer Herman Schussler, 
and by his courtesy is reproduced herewith. (Sheet No. 5). 

With a few exceptions these breaks may be segregated into 
several well defined groups which are located on areas of soft 
alluvium and in artificially filled or made ground and failures 
occurred in practically all such areas in which there were pipe 
lines. Investigation of the causes of the breaks located in ap- 
parently firm ground shows that the majority of those in the 
burned district were probably caused by the use of dynamite, 
by impact due to the fall of heavy portions of buildings on 
the streets directly over the pipes or by explosions in nearby 
gas mains. 

The pipes forming the distributing system of the Olympic 
Salt Water Company and the pipe system through which Mr. 
Geo. Center distributes water from his well in the vicinity of 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



51 



Sixteenth and Shotwell streets were affected in a similar 
manner. 

The mains of the g'as' company are constructed of lighter 
pipe than those of the water company, and for this reason 
and because of explosions in the drips or water traps they 
suffered more severely. The majority of the breaks, however, 
as in the case of the mains of the water company, occurred in 
areas of soft alluvium and in artificially filled or made (/round. 

A study of the effects of the recent shock upon a number of 
pipe systems in various cities and towns between Santa Rosa 
and Bakersfield shows that no serious injury occurred to pipe 
lines constructed in firm ground. 

Only one of the distributing reservoirs of the Water Com- 
pany, Lake Honda, was injured, and the damage to this was 
slight and easily repaired. 

The Spring Valley Water Company has six important 
pumping stations on the San Francisco peninsula ranging in 
capacity from five to eight million gallons per day. All are 
equipped with steam-driven pumping engines and boilers of 
the water-tube type. Their mechanical equipment suffered no 
material injury. 

Dr. Andrew C. Lawson, Chairman of the State Earthquake 
Commission, made a careful investigation of the effects of the 
recent earthquake and has prepared a map showing the rela- 
tive intensity of the shock in different sections of the City. 
(As the report of the Commission has not yet been published 
this map is not reproduced herewith.) This map indicates that 
the areas which may be considered dangerous are somewhat 
more extensive than are shown on Mr. Schussler's map, but the 
two closely conform. 

From this investigation the following conclusions have been 
reached : — 

First — The destructive effects of earthquakes in this City 
will be far greater in areas of soft alluvium and artificially 
filled or made ground, than on the higher firm rocky ground. 

Second — Reservoirs and pumping stations, if correctly 
designed and honestly constructed on firm foundations will 
safely resist severe earthquakes. 

Third — -Pipe and conduit lines correctly designed and 



52 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



honestly constructed in solid ground at sufficient depth to be 
protected from injury by falling buildings, will not be seri- 
ously affected by severe earthquakes.* 

Fourth — No assurance can be had that pipe and conduit 
lines will not fail as a result of severe earthquake shock when 
intersected by a geological fault or located in ground liable to 
serious unequal displacement under violent agitation such as 
solf alluvium and artificially filled or made ground. 

A review of the studies made of other great earthquakes 
shows that investigators have generally found that the de- 
structive effects were similar to those resulting from the 
California earthquake of April 18, 1906, namely, other things 
being equal, structures situated on firm rocky ground except- 
ing those over or near a fault plane along which movement 
occurred, suffered comparatively little damage and the serious 
effects were generally confined to areas of soft alluvium or 
artificially filled or made ground. The occasions when atten- 
tion has been directed to this phenomena are quite numerous. 

Archibald Geike states in his Text Book on Geology: 

"It is usually found that buildings erected on loose, inelas- 
tic foundations, such as sand and clay, are more liable to de- 
struction than those placed on solid rock." This was observed 
at Port Royal, Jamaica, after the earthquake of 1692. The 
portions of the town which did not disappear were built on 
solid, white, limestone, while the parts built on sand were 
shaken to pieces. "The opposite effect has been observed on 
the Island, of Ischia, the houses built on loose, subsoil having 
suffered less than the others." 

In Leyll's Principles of Geology it is stated: "According 
to the observations made at Lisbon in 1837 by Mr. Sharp, the 
destroying effects of the earthquake were confined to the ter- 
tiary strata, and were most violent on the blue clay, on which 
the lower part of the City is constructed. Not a building on 
the secondary limestone or basalt was injured," 

In John Milne's work on Earthquakes page 131 we read 
that he has been informed by "M. Redent of Ariquipa that 
near the City there are villages built on solid rock and others 
on marshy ground, These latter suffered much more than the 
former, which sometimes do not suffer at all, as, for example, 
in 1868." 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



53 



Also, "That in the great earthquakes of Messina, those por- 
tions of the town situated on alluvium, near the sea, were 
destroyed whilst the high parts of the town, on granite, did 
not suffer so much. " "Similar observations were made in Cala- 
bria, when districts consisting of gravel, sand, and clay became, 
by the shaking, almost unrecognizable, while the surrounding 
hills of stale and granite were but little altered." 

It was observed at Conception after the earthquake of 
Feb. 20, 1835, that the destructive effects were greatest on 
low-lying and loose ground and that at Talcahuano and Penco, 
nearby towns, the same phenomena occurred. 

Old residents of this City remember that the destructive 
effects of the great earthquakes of 1865 and 1868 were similar 
to those of the recent movement, namely, the damage was 
greater in alluvium and made ground. 

Charles Davidson notes in his late work A Study of Recent 
Earthquakes, page 95, that the investigators of the Andalusian 
earthquake of Dec. 25, 1884, found that "Other conditions be- 
ing the same, houses built on alluvial ground suffered most of 
all. The destruction was also great in those standing on soft 
sedimentary rocks, such as clays and friable lime-stone. On the 
other hand, when compact lime-stone or ancient schists formed 
the foundation rock, the amount of damage was conspicuously 
less than in other eases." 

He also makes the following statement regarding the de- 
structive effects of the Reveira earthquake of Feb. 23, 1887, 
page 165. 

"In Mentone, the greatest damage occurred to houses of 
two stories built on alluvial soil in the low-lying parts near the 
sea and in the valleys. The effect of the foundation in this 
part was well shown in the case of two equally well-built houses 
not more than three hundred yards apart. One in the valley, 
with doubtful foundations, ivas very much shattered; the other, 
built on rock, was uninjured, The large hotels, especially 
those on high ground, suffered least, few of them having their 
main walls seriously damaged. These buildings rise to heights 
of from 4 to 6 stories, and, of necessity, have a firm and solid 
foundation." 

"Professors Taratmelli and MercalU have made a careful 
study of the subject of this section. The general conclusions 



54 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



at which they arrive are that the intensity of the shock was 
greatest at places below the plioei nt and conglomerates, beds 
of clay superposed on compact old rock, patches of alluvium, 
miocene formations of some thickness formed of repeated 
alteration of strata of incoherent marls and lime-stones or 
compact sandstones, beds of chalk or somewhat rotten dolo- 
mite." 

"'Flit shock was also more destructive on the summits of 
isolated liills and ridges and on the steep slopes of mountains. 
The influence of the formation of the ground was, how< nr. 
subordinate to that exerted by the nature of the sub-soil. Thus 
at Mentone. as w< hart seen, and also at Nia and Genoa, 
houses built on rock in elevated positions, suffered much less 
than those situated on the plains below that are composed of 
sand and recent alluvium." 

In the Indian earthquake of June, 1897 it was observed 
that the shock was more destructive to houses built on alluvial 
ground than to those founded on rock. 

F. P. Anderson, in reporting- upon the effects of the earth- 
quake of 1897 on the Shais Taganj Division of the Assail 
Bengal Railway, states that generally speaking, little or no 
damage occurred to the railroad where it runs through solid 
ground. However, on the alluvial plains the damage was 
enormous. 

Maj. Dutton. U. S. A., in reporting to the U. S. Govern- 
ment upon the Charleston earthquake stated that "as a g< m ral 
rule the destruction was greater upon made ground than upon 
the original higher ground." 

The same conditions were noted at Bellumo in 1873 and at 
Casamicciola in 1883. 

The same phenomena was observed at Valparaiso after the 
unusually severe earthquake of Aug. 16, 1906. 

The eity is situated on the Bay of Valparaiso and parts of 
the occupied areas are filled ground. In these districts the 
destructive effects of the shocks were much more severe than 
in the other sections. 

The financial and commercial centers are situated in the 
older part of the town, known as the Puerto. The buildings 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



located on the firm ground suffered far less than those on the 
tilled land. In the southeastern part of the city, known as 
the "Baron District," the damage was comparatively trivial, 
except toward the low land. In the high district known as 
English Hill, which is occupied by the foreign colony, the 
earthquake effects were less than in any other part of the town. 

In regard to the water works system, which was new. the 
shocks put it out of use for a short time; however, in two days, 
service was resumed everywhere, and in four days the repairs 
were completed. 

After the recent earthquake of Jan. 14, 1907. in the Island 
of Jamaica, the intensity of which it has heen stated exceeded 
that of the shock of April 18, 1906, in this city, and also that 
of the Charleston earthquake, it was observed that the regions 
of greatest, destruction were confined to areas of alluvia i 
detrital material. 

In the City of Kingston the water works structures were 
ni it greatly disturbed. The reservoir near Constant was some- 
what cracked and a break in the Hope Culvert cut off par, of 
the supply. The mains in the distributing system were little 
damaged. The failure to secure water to fight the fires which 
started immediately after the earthquake was largely due to 
the engines being injured by falling walls and the burial of 
the fire hydrants by debris. 

In Wm, Herbert Hobbs' recent work on Earthquakes he 
states : 

"It is a fact of rather general observation that the greatest 
destruction from earthejueikcs, other things being eejual, is 
found upon the softer ground. Upon rocky ledges, except 
over or very near to where they have been actually displaced 
upon a fault plain, the damage from an earthquake is rela- 
tively small. Over so-called 11 made land," however, and upon 
alluvial plains, the maximum of destruction is to be found." 

The opposite effect, namely, that the destructive effects 
were greater in the areas of firm or rocky ground have been 
noted, but such instances are comparatively rare. 

In Milne's work on Seismology, page 116. he states: 

"Mallet, after his survey of the district devastated by the 
Neapolitan earthquake of 1857, states that mon places were 



56 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



destroyed upon the rock than upon loose clay or other ma- 
terials, but this, he remarks, may have been due to the fact 
that there were more places situated upon the rock and hills 
than upon the alluvium and the plains. Nevertheless he is of 
opinion that high and lofty situated places, all other things 
being equal, are likely to suffer most. In places situated in an 
epicentral area, throughout which a succussatory movement 
has been experienced, as was the case in Tokyo on June 22, 
1894, it would seem that movements of the high and low 
ground, as exhibited by shattered buildings, have sometimes 
been practically equal." 

" Instances of this description are, however, comparatively 
rare, and it is generaly found, even for local disturbances, that 
buildings on the lower ground have suffered most." 

"This ivas so marked after the disturbance of 1883, which 
was confined to the small island of Ischia, that the Govern- 
ment took advantage of the observations which were then 
made to mark out sites on which the new town might be built." 

It has also been stated that the destructive effects of the 
New Zealand earthquake of 1855 were most violent on the 
sides of the hills, and also that in Long Island, during the 
New England earthquake of 1874, the shocks were generally 
more strongly and frequently felt on rocky than on soft 
ground. 

It is recognized that the occurrence of a much more severe 
earthquake than that of April 18, 1906, is possible. In such 
cases the above conclusions mentioned on page 51 may not hold 
true, but a fire protection system composed of reservoirs, 
pumping stations and pipe lines, correctly designed and hon- 
estly installed, will afford a far greater resistance to such a 
shock than the great majority of buildings which it is designed 
to protect. 

As a result of those conclusions the plans for the installa- 
tion and operation of the proposed distributing system have 
been so made that all main pipe lines will be located in solid 
ground, and the portions of the distributing system in areas 
of unstable ground have been so planned that they can be 
readily and promptly disconnected from the rest of the system. 
The details of this arrangements are discussed later. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



57 



Consideration of the mental effects of severe earthquake 
shock upon the inhabitants of regions subject to such disturb- 
ances is of importance. A review of the history of great 
earthquakes shows that under the stress of violent mental ex- 
citement produced by an unforeseen and terrifying occurrence, 
men cannot be depended upon to perform duties requiring 
judgment. It is, therefore, necessary that any system of fire 
protection proposed for use in this city be of the simplest 
design and that the men responsible for its operation be so 
drilled that the performance of their duties becomes, in a way, 
automatic. 

SUGGESTED METHODS OF FIRE PROTECTION 
AND REASONS FOR RECOMMENDING A 
HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM. 
Since the recent conflagration a number of methods of 
providing suitable fire protection for this city have been sug- 
gested. No attempt will be made to discuss all of these plans, 
but the more prominent ones are considered below. 

It is a fact that any fire protection system for this City 
whose main reliance is portable steam fire engines will be 
inefficient, because the steep grades of many of our streets 
make it impracticable to use the larger sized engines, and 
these grades, together with the condition of our pavements, 
make it difficult to quickly move such engines and other heavy 
apparatus as are in use. Consequently there is a delay in 
getting water on a fire, which greatly increases the difficulty 
of extinguishing it. Furthermore, the portable steam fire 
engine is wanting in efficiency as a machine, as is shown by 
the following extract from the report of the committee on 
High Pressure Systems for Fire Service of the National Fire 
Protective Association : 

"The following is a summary of recent tests of steam fire 
engines picked at random from service equipment of many of 
the best city departments in the country: 

Number of engines tested 102 

Nominal capacity 69,800 gallons 

Actual capacity 55,900 " 

Percentage of efficiency 80% 

In many cases the efficiency of individual "steamers" is 
less than 50%." 



58 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



The scheme to construct a large number of cisterns in the 
streets, from which stored water may be pumped to the scene 
of a fire by portable steam fire engines, while attractive at 
first sight, and desirable for emergency use to assist in check- 
ing the spread of a general conflagration, has been, after 
investigation, concluded to be insufficient. 

The capacity of cisterns in most localities is limited to 
about 100,000 gallons by the grades and widths of the streets, 
the position of existing underground structures and the limited 
depth from which water can be pumped by the present type of 
fire engines. It is recognized that large quantities of water 
may be stored by this means, but the supply would be so scat- 
tered as to be inefficient for effective fire control in any dis- 
trict where the buildings are large. 

As an illustration of what might be expected from such 
a system in the event of a large fire, the Baldwin Hotel fire 
may be cited. It was estimated in the office of the water 
company that about 6,000,000 gallons of water were used in 
extinguishing this fire. Had the department been dependent 
upon cisterns alone for water and had one cistern of 100,000 
gallons capacity been located at each street crossing in the 
vicinity, it would have been necessary, in order to secure this 
amount, to have used the contents of sixty cisterns, the most 
distant being situated half a mile from the fire. The possible 
location of such cisterns is shown on Plate No. 3. The loss 
of pressure in the long hose lines due to friction, and the time 
used in moving the engines as the cisterns were emptied, would 
have rendered such a system less efficient than the one in use 
at present. 

Furthermore, the necessity of using portable fire engines 
in order to make the water in a cistern available, and the 
consequent loss of time in drawing the engines to the scene of 
the fire and making the necessary connections, would render 
such a system of little or no value in extinguishing incipient 
fires. 

In fact, the use of cisterns is desirable only in areas of 
artificially filled or made ground, where pipe systems are liable 
to destruction from earthquake shock, and for protecting iso- 
lated groups of buildings located outside of the protected area. 




PLAN 

Show/no the iocaf/on of the s/xfy nearest c/s ferns which it 
routd nan? heen necessary to empty to hrrn/sh the amount o/ 
wafer trsf/mdted as used at the oatdmn ftofef f?re asst/m/ny one 
t 000<?o ydt/or? c/s fern /aca/ed /react? street crvss/ny 

•Scc/e - ti ,J ■ T T* T * 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



59 



Their installation as the main reliance in districts where it is 
possible to construct and maintain a reliable high pressure 
fire protection system may be characterized as ill advised and 
impracticable. 

It is not practicable, as has been suggested, to utilize the 
present distributing system of the Spring Valley Water Com- 
pany and, upon receipt of an alarm of fire, to increase the 
pressure by means of pumps. Many existing mains are too 
small. The mains, house connections and plumbing fixtures 
have not sufficient strength to withstand the additional pres- 
sure necessary. It is undesirable to attempt to combine a 
high pressure fire protection and domestic supply system in one 
in a city where the conflagration hazard is high, as during a 
large fire the loss of water through broken connections in dis- 
tricts already burnt over seriously interferes with or destroys 
the usefulness of the undamaged part of the system. 

Mr. Herman Schussler, Chief Engineer of the Spring 
Valley Water Works, stated that in excess of 23,200 service 
connections were found to be broken after our local con- 
flagration. 

The experience at Baltimore is also of interest in this con- 
nection. It was estimated by Alfred M. Quick, Water En- 
gineer of Baltimore, that the amount of water running to 
waste through broken service connections at the time the fire 
was extinguished, amounted to 21,000,000 gallons per day, 
or about one-third of the average daily consumption at that 
time. 

The proposed plan to lay mains exposed in the streets in 
order to readily detect breaks and facilitate repairs during 
emergencies is not desirable, as such construction would cer- 
tainly result in the system being put out of service by the 
great masses of masonry which fall into the streets from the 
walls and cornices of buildings during a large fire. Besides 
breaking the pipes, these masses of masonry would render 
them inaccessible until such time as the debris was removed. 

It is necessary for a fire protection system to be efficient 
during emergencies, that the fire department be thoroughly 
trained in its use, and this training will certainly be most 



60 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

complete if the system is used at all fires within the protected 
district. This fact, together with a consideration of the 
inefficiencies of the present system, and the possibility of con- 
structing pipe and conduit lines, reservoirs and pumping 
plants that will withstand severe earthquakes, have led to the 
conclusion that it is not adequate or proper to propose any 
project for emengency use only. 

It is therefore proposed to install a comprehensive fire 
protection system of modern type for ordinary use as well as 
during emergencies. It will be composed of reservoirs, pump- 
ing plants, pipe and conduit lines designed to offer a maxi- 
mum resistance to the destructive effects of earthquakes, and 
will be capable of supplying sufficient water under adequate 
direct pressure for all types of fire protection service. 

There also exists an opinion that the City should be sub- 
divided into a number of fire districts by increasing the width 
of certain streets and opening a number of new ones, so that 
great fires would be confined to the districts in which they 
originate. 

It is believed that a study of the history of large fires will 
convince any one of the fallacy of this view. During our 
recent conflagration, which had there been sufficient water 
would have been easily controlled on account of the favorable 
direction and low velocity of the wind, the fire readily crossed 
Market street, which is one hundred and twenty feet in width in 
several places, and notwithstanding that there was somewhat 
of a breeze from the west, the heat from the buildings burning 
on the easterly side of Van Ness Avenue near O'Farrell was 
sufficient to set fire to the wooden cross on the top of St. 
Mary's Cathedral, two hundred feet to windward. 

In the official report of the Garden Walk fire, London, 
June 10, 1896, it is stated that owing to the wind, which was 
blowing fresh at the time, carrying sparks from this fire a 
great distance, a block of buildings several blocks away be- 
came lighted. 

The inefficiency of wide open spaces in retarding the spread 
of a fire was most forcibly illustrated in a fire which occurred 
on the water front of Superior, Wis., on the night of Nov. 8th, 
1907. This fire started under the Great Northern Elevator A. 



TABLE SHOWING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED 

FIRE SYSTEMS OF AMERICAN CITIES. 



Nearly all the data in this table is from "Report of Committee on 
Auxiliary High Pressure Fire Protection Water Supply to the Court of 
Common Council of the City of Hartford, Conn., March 5th, 1907," page 10. 





6sl I /fna7?a' 






&?7/of7s 




/me*/ 7? 


o/Afav/rs 

/h //yc/iss 


M/mAes- e7 
//ytfctn/j 


Z7a/<6™7 




0as7/?tr/~ 
7) era 


<Zweo7/o/7 
2v//c7/s?ps 


777a2/ or? 
/nso/zvx&Srfe 




ooo 


7609 


57?}v/3e^/j 


/Sooo 


2SO 


4S, 


7/7 


5-/2 


/<8J 




530 






/o7t ' flluhc&n 




420000 











/2 


756 


~/2 












7)e<*,cJfen f/ 


7?a/ro// 


3 So ooo 


/<S3J 


3 Tvrff $0&/s 




2/0 


25 


33/ 


3 -70 


$5 




356 


#/35 




^£-£&%£ 




(520, OOO 


7398 


2672e73o&& 


6 000 


2oo 


4, 


700 


/2. 


74 


<* 30, 000 


65 


463 






C7&f£/&/7& 


4S0, OOO 


6o/7j/nJc///y 




/oeoo 


300 


32, 


se4 


3-20 




* / 70,0 00 i 


333 
572 " 


/f357 






7 J /?/7o<7e/7>/?/a 


/300, OOO 


/903 


/- jMb mas . 


9JOO 


300 


35, 


300 




766 
























3 /6 




30,000 


747 


6/2 




Sr*<* , L'c//tr> 
o/~ J?S X 


/3/-ooA/yr? 


/400 OOO 






32, 000 


30O 






3-20 




7384 500 


7420 


375 








2/00, OOO 






30,000 








72-24 




3i,950,40d 


/430 


2/63 




714? 6rf&/7&& 




//0, OOO 






/0,£tX7 


300 


/5,SO0 


3-20 




750, O00 


230 


52.6/ 






7hs-cr?7<? 








3,333 


300 


40,00 o 


3-20 




500, OOO 


340 


/,477 


— - — — — 


7jr?£g/7£7//7 




2yOO,OO0 


/-fcpojed 




30,000 


300 


263,900 


3-35 


850 


3203,480 


/,2dO 


2,503 




**et,cS,er, <*ni7. 


77&/-7/e>/~<7' 


33,000 


/ = h? / aass4 


7 S/i?//<P/7 


70,000 


30O 


55,430 


3-24 


733 


735,277 


737.3 


7,039 












/-Jfof/a/? £:/*& 


7, 000 


225 


38, 


590 


3-/4 


62 


787,272 


306 


6/2 








575, COO 














70-20 




"397,999 


360 








/ibc/HSsA;/- 


73S,OO0 


7374 


6>r&v/Ty 


3,000 


740 


702. 


960 


4-20 










5**<r 0e™ 


0>valx//<bKtKjan 


///cAtiurg 


33,000 








7dO 


28,250 


3-/6 




SO,0OO 


34(5 






ros7/t?o' trs? 

7fo6&*jpa< 


Latrrer>c e 


75.000 


7306 


£>/-oy//y t 




734 


7O.2O0 


70-72 


39 




720 




TVetvarA 


290,000 


7305 


<S/~ay/fy 


3,SOO 


765 


7S,0OO 


20-30 


52 


735,000 


303 


446 


5lVJ7f 00/?/?. 


/OZ/fojknJavJ 




200,000 


7337 




3,472 


776 


23,409 


72-24 


39 


743,736 


3S3 


400 


J-A,/S~,<,/,i 
jy*-^>>A/erj 


/K>67?&s7&& 




/3d00O 




Grow// t 




765 


700,320 


3-30 






7330 




S/ero'/orj 






273,7/6 








770 






3-36 




§75 O, OOO 












3 710,000 






35,000 


327 


463,ssa , 3-20 


/0U--4 


SS0O000 


3JOO 


76>36 







t System consists of extension of pipes from high service into district covered by low pressure. 

\ Board of Fire Underwriters have voted to reduce rates to the amount of 10 cts. per $100= A total of $40,000 if extensions costing $150,000 are made to the Syste 

§ Not including reservoirs and pumps already in service. 

* Exclusive of Pumping Station and Equipment. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



61 



The wind was blowing with a velocity of forty miles per hour 
at the time. The fire jumped over Globe Elevators 1, 2 and 3, 
located about 2,000 feet to the east, and destroyed the Grand 
Republic Mill and Elevator, the Minkoba Mill and Elevator 
and the Freeman Mill and Elevator and then made another 
big jump to a shipyard and to a group of mills a mile from 
the starting point. 

Furthermore, in reaching conclusions regarding the neces- 
sary width of streets, which are also to serve as fire barriers, 
consideration should be given to our large percentage of frame 
buildings with shingled roofs, our winds of high velocity, 
and the consequent fact that during a large fire in the frame- 
building district, the wind would probably scatter a number 
of dangerous fire brands to leeward. 

In view of the above facts, and since it has frequently been 
found impossible during great conflagrations, to approach 
within five hundred feet of a fire on the leeward side, on 
account of the great heat, it is believed that no material 
reduction in the conflagration hazard of this city will be effected 
by any widening of the streets that is practicable at the pres- 
ent time. 

INDEPENDENT HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PROTECTION 
SYSTEMS IN OTHER CITIES. 

Independent high pressure fire protection systems have 
been in successful use in American cities for about nineteen 
years, and it may be said that their installation is no longer 
an experiment. 

The accompanying table, Plate No. 4, shows the character- 
istics of the present and proposed systems in a number of dif- 
ferent cities. They may be divided into three classes, depend- 
ing upon their method of supply, as follows: 

First, Gravity systems in which the water is supplied to 
the distributing system from reservoirs located on high ground 
in the vicinity of the area to be protected, such as are at 
present in use in Newark and Providence. 

This method of supply possesses decided advantages over 
all others because of its positiveness and economy of operation 
and the short time required to get the water on a fire. It is 



62 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

not necessary to telephone to a central station and start pumps 
or to make connections with fire boats, and it possesses none 
of the various uncertainties inherent to complicated mechanical 
equipment. 

Second. Pumping systems in which the water is forced 
directly into the high pressure pipe system by pumping 
engines located in permanent stations. 

This type of system is of proved efficiency when properly 
designed and operated and is desirable for use in cities where 
the topographic' conditions will not permit a gravity supply. 
The most notable examples of this type of service are the 
Brooklyn and New York systems. 

Third. Pumping systems in which the water is forced 
directly into the mains by pumps located on boats. This sys- 
tem was the first to go into use, being adopted by Cleveland 
and Milwaukee in 1888, and at present it is also utilized in 
Boston, Buffalo, Detroit and Chicago. 

Though valuable for emergency use, it is believed that 
systems of this type are much over-rated for every day em- 
ployment. They lack in quickness and efficiency. In a num- 
ber of the Eastern cities during the winter, the distributing 
pipes are drained after each fire to prevent freezing, and con- 
sequently much valuable time is lost after an alarm is received 
in refilling them. Furthermore, the fire boats themselves are 
often required to be away from their moorings, and therefore 
they cannot be considered reliable sources of supply. 

TYPES OF SERVICE. 

Before proceeding with a discussion of the quantity of 
water and the pressure at which it is to be supplied in the 
proposed system it will be necessary to describe the various 
methods which are to be used in applying water to a fire. 

It should be possible to obtain from a comprehensive fire 
protection system the following different types of service. 

AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER SYSTEMS. 

Automatic sprinklers are devices so constructed that when 
the surrounding air is heated to a predetermined point they 
open by the fusion of a small strip of alloy and discharge a 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA 



63 



spray of water. They are located upon pipe lines suspended 
from the ceiling. 

Systems of two different types are employed, namely wet 
pipe and dry pipe systems. The latter are installed where 
pipes are exposed to low temperature and the former in all 
places where there is no danger of the water in the pipes 
freezing, and thereby putting the system out of service: The 
wet pipe system possesses decided advantages over the dry 
pipe system, because of its simplicity, and is the most suited 
to the conditions existing in this City. 

This type of service is recognized as the most efficient 
known means of fire extinguishment. When properly installed 
and maintained ready for service, this system may be depended 
upon to automatically extinguish or check any incipient fire 
in the building in which it has been placed, and to prevent or 
retard the entrance of nearby fires. It is of particular value 
in the protection of buildings with large floor areas, such as 
theatres, department stores, planing mills, box and furniture 
factories and warehouse, etc, where draperies, large quantities 
of merchandise frequently piled to the ceiling, or the inflam- 
mable nature of the contents render it impossible except in the 
very earliest stages to get at the seat of a fire with hand-held 
streams. 

For satisfactory service these systems require a continuous 
supply of water under a pressure of not less than twenty-five 
pounds per square inch at the highest sprinkler level. 

They have been installed in a few instances in this city, but 
owing to the refusal of the Spring Valley Water Company to 
permit sufficiently large connections to their mains, it has been 
necessary to supply them from gravity or pressure tanks. 
Besides greatly increasing the expense of installation this is 
not entirely satisfactory on account of the limited amount of 
water that it is practicable to store and the danger of the tanks 
being overthrown by an earthquake. 

The advisability of permitting permanent open connections 
between fire mains and sprinkler systems has been questioned, 
but, as is shown below, the value of such connections to the 
whole community is so great that no high pressure fire pro- 



64 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

tection system in which they are prohibited can be considered 
fully utilized. 

For effective service the diameter of these connections 
should be upwards of three inches, depending upon the size 
of the building and the character of the protection. 

The principal argument against allowing open connections 
is that, should a fire get beyond control in a building equipped 
with a sprinkler system supplied through an open connection 
to the fire mains, or should such a building collapse, the in- 
terior piping would be ruptured and the efficiency of the entire 
fire protection system of the city might be reduced because 
of the resulting loss of water. 

Under ordinary conditions a fire cannot get beyond control 
in a building properly equipped with automatic sprinklers. 
However, it is conceivable that such a disaster might be caused 
by part of the system being out of use, by an explosion within 
the building or by the collapse of the building. It is also 
possible that the connection might be ruptured as a result of 
an earthquake or that the building might be burned by a fire 
originating outside. 

Should any of these contingencies occur the system could 
be cut off if desirable, by closing a shut-off valve on the con- 
nection near the street main, or in case this valve were not 
accessible, by closing the shut-off valves on the street main 
at the adjacent street crossings. This latter method might 
involve shutting off the supply to hydrants and other private 
fire protection systems, and judgment would have to be used 
as to whether it would not be advisable to retain these nearby 
hydrants and systems in use and allow a portion of the water 
supply to run to waste through broken connections. 

A further objection to permitting such connections is that 
water may be drawn from them for other purposes than fire 
protection. It is possible to prevent this by the use of sealed 
valves and by the rigid enforcement of severe penalties for 
tampering with the system. 

In the published Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meet- 
ing of the National Fire Protection Association is a summary 
of the results obtained from the use of these sprinklers for 
eleven years. Out of 5,313 fires which occurred in buildings 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



65 



equipped With automatic sprinklers, during- the years 1897 
to 1907 inclusive, 4,982, or 93.76% were either extinguished 
by the sprinklers or properly held in check so as to allow of 
easy extinguishment by such outside aid as was at hand. Of 
the 331 cases (6.23%) in which fires were not controlled by the 
sprinklers, the greater number of failures were attributable to 
defective water supply, old style inefficient sprinklers, insuffi- 
cient equipment or closed gates. 

From the Fire Insurance Statistics printed in the Report 
of the Committee of Twenty we find that out of a total of 5,635 
fires which occurred in this city in five years (1900-1901) only 
4,948, or 87.8%, were confined to the localities in which they 
originated, and that 687, or 12.2%, were communicated to 
adjoining buildings. 

When we consider that sprinkler systems have, as a general 
rule, been installed only in buildings which have been con- 
sidered extra hazardous or in which large stocks of goods 
are carried, and that the statistics for San Francisco cover 
fires in all classes of buildings, the remarkable efficiency of 
sprinklers in extinguishing incipient fires is apparent. 

As a device for preventing the communication of a fire in 
the vicinity to the contents of the building in which it is 
installed and thus acting as a fire break, the automatic 
sprinkler system is hardly less valuable than for extinguishing 
an incipient fire. 

It is doubtful whether enough heat can enter through the 
wall openings of a well-constructed so-called fireproof building, 
thoroughly equipped with automatic sprinklers and provided 
with an adequate water supply, to result in its destruction by 
fire. This was demonstrated in the recent Boston fire, where 
it is admitted that the Brown-Durrell building, equipped with 
automatic sprinklers, checked the spread of the flames suffi- 
ciently to enable the fire department to regain control and so 
saved the city from a general conflagration. 

The installation of automatic sprinkler systems will greatly 
reduce the fire and conflagration hazard of buildings in which 
they are placed and will enable the owners and tenants of such 
buildings to secure desirable additional insurance and at lower 
rates. This saving, however, on the part of the individual 



66 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

property owner should be considered as merely incidental to 
the benefits conferred upon the community as a whole in 
decreasing the possibility of a small fire escaping control and 
in furthermore providing a most effective fire break in the 
path of a possible conflagration. 

It may be advocated that automatic sprinkler systems can 
be installed with a closed connection to the street main, to be 
opened upon the arrival of the fire department, or with a 
Siamese inlet outside the building near the street level, to 
which hose from the nearest hydrant can be attached. 
However, as considerable time must elapse between the break- 
ing out of a fire and the arrival of the fire department, such 
systems can in no way be compared in efficiency to those 
furnished with an adequate supply of water under constant 
pressure. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING AUTOMATIC 
SPRINKLER SYSTEMS. 

After a careful consideration of the possible injuries that 
may result to the proposed fire protection system because of 
open connections, the great importance of extinguishing all 
fires in their incipient stages because of the immense values 
housed in frame structures in this city and the proved effi- 
ciency of private fire protection systems of this type when 
provided with a continuous supply of water under adequate 
pressure, it is recommended that open connections with auto- 
matic sprinkler systems be permitted, subject to the following 
restrictions : 

Sprinkier systems may be connected directly with the fire 
mains by an open connection or connections not more than 
four inches in diameter, equipped with a shut-off valve in the 
street. They should be installed and maintained at the ex- 
pense of the property owners under the direction and subject 
to the regulations of the Chief Engineer of the fire depart- 
ment. 

INSIDE HOSE STREAMS OR FIRST STREAMS. 

Streams of this type may be supplied from hose connected 
with a building stand pipe which may or may not be directly 
connected to the street main, or from hose carried into the 
building by the fire department. Building stand-pipes should 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



67 



be fitted with l 1 '-' inch and 2% inch hose connections, with 
shnt-off valves on each floor. If directly connected to the 
street main they should also be provided with a shut-off valve 
located near the main and under the sole control of the Chief 
Engineer of the Fire Department. 

For use immediately upon the discovery of fire and before 
the arrival of the fire department, gravity or pressure tanks 
should be kept connected with the stand-pipe, or if it is 
directly connected with the street main, the shut-off valve 
should be lifted with a by-pass of sufficient area to provide 
the water for not more than eight streams from half inch 
nozzles under twenty-five pounds nozzle pressure, each fed 
through one hundred feet of V/ 2 inch hose. This is about the 
maximum stream that one man can successfully turn on and 
operate. 

If there is no main in the street, or if for any other reason 
the building stand-pipe is not connected directly with the 
main, it should be provided with a Siamese inlet near the street 
level. It may then be put into service upon the arrival of the 
fire department, by being connected with ordinary tire hose 
to an adjacent hydrant, 

The local fire department provides this type of service by 
leading from the hydrant or engine to the front of the burning 
building a 2% inch hose, to which they attach a Vh inch hose, 
100 to 200 feet in length, equipped with a smooth bore shut-off 
nozzle from three-eighths to three-quarters of an inch in 
diameter, or by using similar hose from a chemical engine. 
The 1% inch hose is carried into the building, and on account 
of the short time in which the seat of an incipient fire can 
be reached with this light and flexible hose, over 80% of all 
fires are extinguished by its use and with a minimum of 
damage by water. If. upon the arrival of th<> department, 
the fire is well under way, or cannot be extinguished with a 
stream from the small hose, the two and three-quarter inch 
hose is carried into the building and used with a \h inch 
nozzle under from thirty to forty pounds per square inch 
nozzle pressure. 

The statements as to many advantages of open connections 
between automatic sprinkler systems and fire mains apply 



68 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

with equal force to simlar connections with building stand- 
pipes. Therefore, it is recommended that the installation of 
such connections be permitted under the following restrictions : 

Stand-pipes for inside service in Class A and approved 
reinforced concrete buildings may be connected directly with 
the fire mains by an open connection equipped with a shut-off 
valve in the street, under the sole control of the Chief of the 
fire department. When the diameter of this shut-off valve 
exceeds two inches, it should be kept normally closed and 
water for use before the arrival of the fire department supplied 
through a by-pass not exceeding two inches in diameter. 

In all other than the above types of buildings, the fixed 
stand-pipe is to be provided with a Siamese inlet near the 
street, which can be connected to the nearest hydrant upon the 
arrival of the fire department. To provide fire streams prior 
to their arrival, a permanent one and a half inch open con- 
nection, fitted with a gate valve near the fire main, may be 
permitted. 

OUTSIDE HAND HELD HOSE STREAMS. 

Outside hand held streams are used for fighting a fire 
from outside a burning building. Smooth bore nozzles from 
one and a quarter to one and three-quarters inches in diameter 
with nozzle pressures up to seventy-five pounds per square 
inch, are desirable for this type of service. 

The discharge from 1^4 an d 1^4 mcn smooth bore nozzles 
under 75 pounds nozzle pressure is approximately 39-4 and 771 
gallons per minute, respectively. Experience has shown this 
to be about the maximum hand held stream that can be safely 
utilized even by trained firemen. 

About one-third greater length of hose is run out and used 
in furnishing this type of service than the distance in a 
straight line between the hydrant or engine and the nozzle. 

As the loss of pressure in hose lines due to friction is very 
large because of the high velocity of flow, it is necessary in 
order to provide effective streams to so locate the hydrants 
in a fire protection system that no leads longer than 400 feet 
will be required. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



69 



MECHANICALLY HELD SEMI-PORTABLE STREAMS DISCHARGED 
FROM THE GROUND. 

The local fire department utilizes a battery wagon when 
large quantities of water at high nozzle pressure are required. 
When in use it is operated by one man and is braced in order 
to take up the recoil. It is so constructed that it can be fed 
through six lines of hose and is provided with a number of 
interchangeable smooth bore nozzles from 1^ to 2% inches 
in diameter. Nozzle pressures up to 140 pounds per square 
inch have been successfully used. 

Another mechanical device which is used for holding high 
pressure streams consists of a bar of steel about four feet in 
length with one end pointed and the other equipped with a 
cross piece and straps. This is strapped to the play pipe and 
the pointed end fixed in the pavement or ground. Four men 
can safely hold and direct a stream from a two-inch nozzle 
under seventy-five pounds nozzle pressure when thus equipped, 
but they canot readily change their position without shutting 
off the water. For this type of service it is desirable that 
smooth bore nozzles 1^4 to 2 inches in diameter, with not more 
than 75 pounds nozzle pressure, be used. The employment of 
higher pressures than this, in connection with streams from 
the ground, is not necessary or advisable, as the widths of the 
streets are such that the angle of discharge renders such 
streams of little or no use above the fourth or fifth stories. 

STREAMS FROM PORTABLE WATER TOWERS. 

These are mechanical devices employed to elevate the nozzle 
to the second or third story windows of a burning building. 
They are so constructed that the nozzle is controlled from the 
ground. When they are employed the hydrant pressure must 
be increased sufficiently to overcome the loss of pressure due 
to friction in the hose and tower and to provide for the differ- 
ence in elevation between the nozzle and the hydrant. 

There are two water towers in use by the local fire depart- 
ment, the nozzle of one may be elevated 52 feet and the other 
76 feet above the street and they may be fed through 6 and 
8 lines of hose, respectively. Each is fitted with a smooth bore 
nozzle 2 T 4 inches in diameter and is provided with a battery 
in front, which is fitted with interchangeable smooth bore noz- 



70 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

zles from 1?4 to 2*4 inches in diameter. Pressures up to 
150 pounds per square inch at the base of the stand pipe have 
been effectively utilized with these towers. Four men are 
required to operate one. 

STREAMS FROM HYDRANTS ATTACHED TO METAL STAND PIPES 
ON BUILDINGS. 

Metal stand pipes should be 6 inches in diameter and pro- 
vided with a Siamese connection at the base and with hose 
connections at each story and on the roof. Upon the arrival 
of the fire department, in response to an alarm, connection 
with ordinary hose can be made between the Siamese and the 
nearest hydrant. When the water is turned on it is avail- 
able for immediate use at each hose connection. Metal uni- 
versal nozzles can be attached to the various outlets of such 
stand pipes and used to advantage to discharge streams 
across the street into nearby burning buildings in the same 
manner as a water tower. Hose lines can also be connected 
to these outlets and the streams used to protect the building 
from nearby fires. 

The pressure necessary for this type of service depends 
upon the elevation of the tops of the buildings. It is desir- 
able that with 100 feet of 2^ hose and a 1 5-16 inch smooth 
bore nozzle, 75 pounds nozzle pressure be available on top of a 
building 100 feet in height. 

No open connections should be permitted between fire 
mains and stand pipes for furnishing the above type of 
service. 

OPEN SPRINKLERS OR WATER CURTAINS. 

Systems of open or exposure sprinklers are in effective 
use. They provide a means of preventing fires entering a 
building from without, through openings such as windows, 
etc., and also protect the exterior of a building by in, til- 
ing, when required, the immediate presence of water economi- 
cally and effectively distributed at exposed points, such as 
over windows and at cornices, eaves, etc. 

The system consists of a number of special sprinkler 
heads which are always open. These are distributed outside 
the building over windows and at such other points as are 
liable to be severely exposed to a fire from without and are 



FOR SAN FRANCISC O. CALIFORNIA 



71 



attached to dry pipe lines which may be located either within 
or without the building. These distributing pipes may be 
fed from a dry building stand pipe provided with a Siamese 
at its base near the street level to which hose lines from the 
nearest fire hydrant may be attached. 

Such protection is especially valuable in high valued dis- 
tricts where the streets are narrow and during a fire, the dis- 
tribution of water by means of such a system is far more 
effective than the usual method of application from hose 
streams. It can be installed in such a manner as not to 
disfigure the building. 

In order to insure successful operation, these systems 
must be supplied with water under adequate pressure from 
some constant source of supply. Xo permanent connections 
should be permitted to the fire mains for this type of ser- 
vice, because of the loss of water that may result from their 
being opened during a fire when not needed by persons not 
connected with the fire department. 

WATER SUPPLY. 

There is a popular belief that any fire protection system 
devised for San Francisco should obtain its water supply 
from the bay or from the Pacific Ocean. Although these 
inexhaustible sources will furnish a valuable emergency sup- 
ply, the following serious objections to the use of salt water 
under normal conditions require consideration. 

Iron pipes will be used in the distribution system, and 
many parts of the hydrants and gate valves will be of brass 
or bronze. It is a well-known fact that the life of iron pipes 
when used for carrying salt water is materially less than 
when used for conveying fresh water. Furthermore, when 
dissimilar metals, as there would be in gate valves and hy- 
drants, are exposed to the action of salt water, a galvanic 
action is set up which rapidly destroys them. No reliable 
method of preventing this deterioration of pipe systems and 
their appurtenances has as yet been devised. 

A thick growth of mussels, barnacles and sea grass soon 
becomes firmly attached to the interior of pipes which carry 
salt water and greatly reduces their capacity by decreasing 



72 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

the area and increasing the roughness of the surface. These 
growths may be removed by scraping the pipes or by flush- 
ing them with hot water and it is claimed that fresh water if 
frequently forced through them at high velocity, will accom- 
plish the same result. While in some cases, where the pipe 
lines are short, they may be cleaned by such methods, the 
necessary frequent cleaning of the mains, in the extensive 
system proposed, besides interrupting the service, would be 
practically impossible. 

It has been suggested that marine growths and the corro- 
sion which take place in a salt water pipe system, may be 
avoided by keeping the mains filled during normal condi- 
tions, with fresh water under pressure and that after use in 
extinguishing a fire with salt water the mains may be flushed 
and refilled with fresh water, the system being supplied with 
fresh water from the regular domestic service through connec- 
tions provided with check valves, to prevent the salt water 
from backing into the fresh water system. It is estimated 
that the proposed high pressure fire protection system will 
be used about three hundred times a year for extinguishing 
fires, and 'hat thirty-two million gallons of water per year 
will be required for this service. It is impossible to deter- 
mine the amount of fresh water which would be used to 
flush out the mains if the above plan were adopted, but as it 
will require about three and a half million gallons to fill 
them, it is evident that it would be greatly in excess of that 
used for extinguishing fires. In other words, the adoption 
of the above plan would result in an extravagant use of 
fresh water. 

The use of salt water to extinguish small fires is not de- 
sirable as in many cases the damage done by water would be 
greater than that due to the fire. 

Owing to the rapid deterioration of pipe systems carrying 
salt water, the difficulty of keeping them in efficient condi- 
tion, and the damage resulting from the use of salt water 
in small fires, the proposed system has been so planned that 
the pipes will be kept filled with fresh water which will be 
used to extinguish all but the very largest fires. 

In selecting the fresh water supply, consideration has been 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



given to the following sources: The Spring Valley Water 
Company's mains, Lobos Creek and systems of bored wells 
in Golden Gate Park and in different localities in the pro- 
tected area. 

It is not considered advisable to depend for so important 
a service upon the mains of the Spring Valley Water Com- 
pany, because it does not, at present, appear probable that 
that company will, at all times, be able to deliver the neces- 
sary water, and because the primary source of supply should 
be directly under the control of the city. 

Estimates of the cost of securing water from other sources 
show the systems of bored wells described below to be ade- 
quate and the least expensive. 

Investigations regarding the number and yield of bored 
wells in various sections of the city have been made, and it 
has been planned to install two systems, one near 7th and 
Harrison streets and one near Sixteenth and Shotwell streets. 
These wells are to be bored in the street and will be distributed 
over a considerable area in order to insure a sufficient supply. 

From these wells the water will be pumped and stored in 
two reservoirs of sufficient capacity to supply water for 
ordinary fires. These will be constructed near the top of 
Twin Peaks, that being the most desirable location, at an 
elevation sufficient to maintain the direct pressure necessary 
for fire protection. 

Salt water is to be provided for emergency use. Be- 
cause of the existence of the old geological fault previously 
described and the possibility of any pipes which cross it 
being broken by an earthrpiake, it is necessary that this salt 
water supply be obtained on the easterly or bay side of the 
peninsula. Therefore, two stations will be installed as aux- 
iliaries to pump salt water from the bay. One will be located 
near the northerly termination of Van Ness avenue or Polk 
street and the other near Second and Townsend streets. In 
these vicinities there are exceptional opportunities for secur- 
ing desirable sites, as the rocky backbone of the peninsula 
approaches the bay shore and provides the necessary firm 
foundations, not only for the stations themselves but also for 
the main pipes leading therefrom. Stations thus located will 



74 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



be widely separated from each other as well as from the main 
reservoirs, thus affording a maximum of security against 
accident. 

If the plant of the Spring Valley Water Company should 
become the property of the city and the supply reinforced 
before the proposed system is constructed, it would be advis- 
able to modify the above described scheme and in place of 
obtaining the fresh water supply from a system of bored wells, 
the location of fresh water pumping stations should be changed 
and they should be arranged to pump directly from the street 
mains. 

AMOUNT OF WATER TO BE SUPPLIED. 

Reliable data regarding the yearly amount of water used 
for fire protection, and also the actual amount used in ex- 
tinguishing individual fires is not extensive. The general 
impression that the amount used annually is enormous is not 
correct. 

The following data showing the amounts of water used 
for fire protection purposes has been compiled from various 
sources: 

BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN. 

1900— 60,258,679 gallons, of w hich 27,955,325 gallons were 

river water. 

1901— 99,228,572 gallons, of which 69,552,105 gallons were 

river water. 

1902— 49,032,542 gallons, of which 16,136,150 gallons were 

river water. 

1903— 80,342,443 gallons, of which 17,920,000 gallons were 

river water. 

1904— 81,191,779 gallons, of which 23,720,059 gallons were 

river water. 

The total yearly amount required for fire purposes by the 
Borough of Manhattan is less than 1-3 of the total daily water 
consumption for all purposes or in 1900 the average daily 
per capita consumption for fire protection was .09 gallons. 

BOROUGH OF BROOKLYN. 

1900—50,126,363 gallons, of which 22,584,630 gallons were 
river water. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 75 

1901— 64,038,745 gallons, of which 36,948,130 gallons were 

river water. 

1902— 38,827,222 gallons, of which 13,797,420 gallons were 

river water. 

1903— 22,691,120 gallons, of which 4.368,750 gallons were 

river water. 

1904— 42,344,391 gallons, of which 17,355,710 gallons were 

river water. 

In 1900 the average daily per capita consumption for fire 
protection was less than .03 gallons. 

The following table has been compiled from the Annual 
Reports of the Water Department of Madison, Wis., the 
population of which was 25,000 in 1906 : 



Year 


Total Amoutof 
Water Pumped 
Per Year. 
Gallons 


Amount used 
for Fires. 
Gallons 


Total Yearly Time 
of Fires 


A mount of 
Water used at 
Longest Fire 
Gallons 


Time 
Longest 

Fire 
Burned 
Hrs. Min. 


1891- 


-197,839,450 


409,000 


17 


Hrs. 05 M. 


195,000 


10 00 


1892- 


-226,035,800 


135,000 


5 


" 30 " 


35,000 


1 20 


1893- 


-268,246,300 


128,700 


6 


" 17 " 


45,000 


2 10 


1894—272,006,950 


202,700 


8 


" 35 " 


42,000 


1 45 


1895- 


-313,705,500 


528,200 


19 


" 00 " 


84,500 


2 10 


1896- 


-325,408,500 


317,400 


15 


" 22 44 


98,000 


4 25 


1897- 


-290,972,750 


299,250 


12 


« 40 44 


82,500 


2 05 


1898- 


-273,016,500 


92,500 


6 


" 45 " 


18,000 


1 20 


1899- 


-291,934,250 


907,100 


27 


" 57 " 


408,000 


8 00 


1900- 


-306,639,450 


349,400 


19 


44 50 44 


124,000 


2 25 


1901- 


-358,494,000 


314,500 


14 


44 09 44 


110,000 


3 00 


1902—458,815,000 


112,500 










1903- 


-530,523,600 


89,500 










1904—547,834,400 


824,000 










1905- 


-537,187,000 


112,000 


8 


44 50 44 


34,000 


1 20 


1906- 


-522,648,000 


170,000 


11 


44 35 " 


46,000 


1 25 



In 1906 the average daily per capita consumption for fire 
protection purposes was less than .02 gallons. 



It was determined (partly measured and partly estimated) 
that the average daily per capita consumption for fires in 
Boston in 1892 was about .10 gallons. In Fall River in 1888 
the average daily per capita consumption was .11 gallons. 
Folwell estimates in his Water Supply Engineering that the 



76 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



average daily per capita consumption of water in American 
cities for fire protection purposes is between .08 and .12 gal- 
lons. 

The amount of water used for fire protection purposes in 
this city was estimated in 1904 by Fire Chief D. T. Sullivan, 
to be 32,000,000 gallons per year, or .22 gallons per capita 
per day. In comparison with the above data regarding the 
yearly amounts used elsewhere this appears to be high. 

Investigation of insurance records shows that the number 
of fires per year per capita in San Francisco is slightly below 
the average of the larger American cities, and that the per- 
centage of frame buildings and the number of fires that 
extend beyond the premises in which they originate is 
greater. From this it appears reasonable to expect the 
amount of water used anually in extinguishing fires in San 
Francisco to exceed that used in cities in which a greater 
percentage of the buildings are of a more fire resisting type. 
Therefore, m the absence of more reliable data this amount 
together with the probable leakage from the mains of the 
proposed distributing system, estimated at 24,000,000 gallons 
per year (See Appendix No. 3) or a total of 56,000,000 gal- 
lons, has been assumed as the probable amount of fresh 
water that will be required during an ordinary year. 

The following data collected from various sources show the 
amount of water used on individual fires. 

St. Louis Mo. Collier Lead Works. Loss, $81,000. The 
maximum rate of fire over ordinary draft, 3,375 gallons per 
minute. Maximum number of streams in use at one time, 10. 
(M. J. Holman). 

Fall River, Mass. Border City Mill. Loss, $450,000. 
Maximum rate of fire over ordinary draft, 2,400 gallons per 
minute. Maximum number of streams in use at one time 11. 
Total draft, 3,035,000 gallons. Loss nearly as complete as if 
no water supply existed. (J. H. Shedd). 

Providence, R. I. Sept. 27, 1877. Loss was $362,000. 
Maximum rate of fire over ordinary draft, 9,500 gallons 
per minute. Maximum number of streams in use at one 
time, 25. (W. B. Sherman). 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



77 



Providence, K. I. Aldrich House. Feb. 15, 1888. Maxi- 
mum rate of fire over ordinary draft, 4,100 gallons per 
minute. Maximum number of streams at one time, 22. Total 
fire draft until fully controlled or nearly out, 2,000,000 gal- 
ions. (J. II. Shedd, W. B. Sherman). 

Lynn, Mass. Population, 55,727. Fire of Nov. 26, 1889 
began at noon, burned uncontrolled 6 hours, burning 300 
buildings. Loss, $5,000,000. Maximum rate of fire draft 
about 6,700 gallons per minute. The amount of water used 
during first six hours or till fire was controlled was about 
3,000,000 gallons, about 8,000,000 gallons were used during 
the first 24 hours, about 5,000,000 gallons during the second 
24 hours, about 3,000,000 gallons during the third 24 hours, 
about 2,000,000 gallons during the fourth 24 hours. (Has- 
kell). 

Boston, Mass. Nov. 28th, 1889. Population, 400,000. 
Loss, $4,000,000, area burned over 3y 2 acres. Maximum rate 
of fire draft over ordinary draft, 20,000 gallons per minute. 
Total fire draft during first 24 hours. 14,000,000 gallons, or 
enough water to cover burned area to a depth of 12y 2 feet. 
Total quantity of water used on fire exclusive of leakage from 
services in buildings, 24.000.000 gallons. Maximum number of 
engines in use, fifty-two, furnishing eighty-six streams. The 
fire did not get beyond the buildings to which it had 
spread during the first hour. (Dexter Bracket). 

Milwaukee, Wis. Oct. 28, 1892. Loss, $4,500,000. Area 
covered, 66 J / 2 acres. Minimum rate of fire over ordinary 
draft from water works system was about 12,600 gallons per 
minute. To this may be added about 8,600 gallons per 
minute delivered directly from the river. The maximum 
number of streams at work at one time supplied from the 
water works system was 42, in addition to which there were 
24 streams supplied from the river. The fire lasted about 7 
hours before it was controlled or checked, and 18 hours before 
it was entirely extinguished. Total fire draft was about 
8,750,000 gallons supplied from the water works system and 
750,000 taken from the river. (C. H. Benzenburg). 

Cripplegate, London. Nov. 19, 1897. Loss, $6,250,000. 
Fire started at 1:00 o'clock p. m. and was under control be- 



78 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



tween 7 and 8 p. m., 51 steam fire engines and 294 men 
worked. Enough water to flood the whole area 6 feet deep 
was used before the fire was under control. Total amount 
of water used before the fire was entirely out as given by the 
New River Company was 15,000,000 gallons or 17 feet in 
depth over the whole area. (Chas. E. Goad). 

San Francisco, Cal. Baldwin Hotel fire. Nov., 1898. 
Loss, $2,000,000. It is estimated that 6,000,000 gallons were 
used. 

Atlantic City, N. J. April 3, 1902. Fire started at 10 
a. m., under control at 3 :15 p. m. 16 steam fire engines used, 
throwing 23 streams, approximately 2,900,000 gallons of 
water used. (Kenneth Allen). 

Boston, Mass. Nov. 12, 1904. Number of engines in use 
at fire, 21. Length of time for each engine from 1 hour, 15 
minutes to 17 hours, 20 minutes. Amount of water used, 
approximately 2,150,000 gallons. (Engineering News). 

Baltimore, Md. Feb. 7th and 8th, 1904. Burned area, 
140 acres. Loss, $75,000,000. Normal pressure in burned 
district 50 to 80 pounds per square inch. From the records 
of the Water Department it has been estimated that 70,000,- 
000 gallons were used on the fire and that during the week 
of the fire, or from Feb. 6th to 13th, 122,000,000 gallons were 
wasted through broken service pipes. 

During the first few hours of the fire when it had a front 
of not over three blocks, the force employed in fighting it was 
280 firemen, including district chiefs and 25 fire engines fur- 
nishing 50 streams, with a combined capacity of 19,000 gal- 
lons a minute. At the time the fire was at its height with a 
front not over five blocks in length the force working on it 
consisted of 1,073 men, 57 fire engines and 2 fire boats, having 
a total capacity of 50,000 gallons per minute. It was esti- 
mated that at this time 100 streams were in continuous ser- 
vice. 

Although the above force was ably handled by veteran 
firemen, they were only able to check the spread of the fire 
laterally to and against the wind. It burned onward in the 
direction of the wind to the water's edge. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



79 



Philadelphia, Pa. The following data from the Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of the High Pressure Fire 
Service gives the amount of water pumped, the pressure and 
duration of each fire at which the system was used during 
1906. 

January 9, 1906. Time run, 1 hour, 54 minutes. Pres- 
sure, 225 to 100 pounds. Gallons pumped, 136,800. 

January 11, 1906. Time run, 1 hour. Pressure, 250 
pounds. Gallons pumped, 294,000. 

February 6, 1906. Time run, 1 hour, 57 minutes. Pres- 
sure, 250 pounds. Gallons pumped, 572,500. 

February 19, 1906. Time run, 2 hours, 9 minutes. Pres- 
sure, 215 pounds. Gallons pumped, 433,200. 

July 10, 1906. Time run, 32 minutes. Pressure, 275-225 
pounds. Gallons pumped, 94,600. 

March 24, 1907. Time run, 4 hours, 26 minutes. Pres- 
sure. 300-200 pounds. Gallons pumped, 1,360,000. 

March 29. 1907. Time run, 1 hour, 48 minutes. Pres- 
sure. 275 pounds. Gallons pumped, 282,000. 

*Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. October 29, 1900. 
Tarrant fire, Xos. 276 to 280 Greenwich street, of 22 hours 
duration ; amount of water used, 330,000 gallons. 

*In the Annual Report of the Department of Water 
Supply, Gas and Electricity of New York City for 1905. 
from which the above data regarding the amount of water 
used on individual fires in the Boroughs of Manhattan, 
the Bronx and Brooklyn were obtained, there appears the fol- 
lowing note. "N. B. — In an extract from this annual report 
published by the 'Engineering News' these data about the 
operation of and amount of water used at the largest fires were 
included, and a correspondent pointed out the fact that in 
nearly all, if not in all, cases the quantities given are merely 
the product of the number of hours duration of the fire by 
15,000 gallons, thus leading to the assumption throughout 
that only one standard stream at low pressure was used on 
an average in the case of every fire, regardless of its char- 
acter or duration. The attention of the Chief Engineer of 
this Department was called to the matter, and as this result 
is certainly extraordinary we wrote to the Fire Commissioner 



80 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



January 31. 1901. Wicks fire, Nos. 538 to 544 First ave- 
nue, 10 hours' duration; amount of water used, 150.000 gal- 
lons. 

February 22, 1902. Seventy-first Regiment Armory, east 
side of Fourth avenue, between Thirty-third and Thirty- 
fourth streets, 61 hours' duration; amount of water used, 
90,000 gallons. 

December 21, 1903. Nos. 188 to 194 Mott street, 10b' 
hours' duration; amount of water used, 1,590,000 gallons. 

March 26, 1904. No. 61 Broadway to Nos. 39 and 41 
Trinity place; 5 hours' duration; 75,000 gallons of water 
used. 

Borough of Brooklyn. April 9, 1900. Eight one-story, 
twelve two-story, two three-story lumber yard fire, s-outh side 
Newton Creek, 7 hours' duration; amount of water used, 
105,000 gallons. 

April 30, 1901. Nos. 558 to 578 Flushing avenue, Brook- 
lyn Eapid Transit car sheds, 3 hours duration ; amount of 
water used, 45,000 gallons. 

May 2, 1902. Nos 239 to 245 Willoughby street, five-story 
brick, 120 by 150 feet, Freeborn G. Smith Piano Manufac- 
tory, 3 hours' duration; amount of water used, 45.000 gal- 
lons. 

November 30, 1903. Nos. 176 to 194 Montague street, 100 
by 265 feet. Academy of Music, 2 hours' duration-, amount 
of water used, 30,000 gallons. 

February 19, 1904. Two two-story brick and frame, two- 
story brick, four-story brick, eight five-story brick. Messrs. F. 
W. Devoe and C. T. Reynolds Company, 3y 2 hours' duration; 
amount of water used, 52,500 gallons. * 

*/or such explanatory statement or correction, if any, as he 
might deem advisable and received in reply a communication 
transmitting report from the Chief of the Fire Department 
in which he states tlmt he had no corrections or other state- 
ments to make in relation to the matter, the information given 
being as correct as could possibly be approximated, {I. M. dc 
Varona)." 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



81 



In addition to the former data, the Reports of the Com- 
mittee of Twenty of the National Board of Fire Under- 
writers on a number of American cities contains information 
as to the number of engines which worked at the more 
important fires during recent years in each city. 

After consideration of the above data, the recommendation 
of the Engineers of the Committee of Twenty of the National 
Board of Fire Underwriters, was adopted, viz : that the sys- 
tem be arranged so that 15,000 gallons per minute be avail- 
able for delivery on any area not exceeding 100,000 square 
feet within the congested value district; and this amount has 
been used in determining the size of the mains in the distrib- 
uting system and in locating the hydrants. 

While 15,000 gallons per minute is believed to be sufficient 
for the control of a fire in any block not exceeding 100,000 
square feet in area, occasions will arise which make it neces- 
sary for the system to be capable of delivering much larger 
quantities of water. 

First. Conditions exist which may permit a fire to as- 
sume conflagration proportions. 

Second. More than one fire may be under way at the 
same time, as was the case on July 4th, 1905, when the Chief 
of the Fire Department states that there were nine burning 
at once, and immediately after the recent earthquake when 
between fifty and sixty fires started. 

Third. One of the storage reservoirs, part of the equip- 
ment of a pumping station, or the supply pipes between the 
reservoirs or one of the pumping stations and the distribuitng 
system may be out of service. 

Consideration of the probability of the occurrence of any 
one of the above contingencies shows it to be necessary that 
additional supply be provided and in reserve. 

It is therefore recommended that supplies of fresh water 
for use at ordinary fires and salt water for emergency use 
be provided as follows: 



82 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



FRESH WATER SUPPLY. 

2 storage reservoirs, each of 5,000,000 gallons 

capacity 10,000,000 gals. 

1 distributing reservoir for upper zone 500.000 " 

1 distributing reservoir for lower zone 1,000,000 " 



Total 11,500,000 " 

These reservoirs will supply 15,000 gallons per minute for 
12^4 hours. 

In addition there are two fresh water pumping stations 
with a combined capacity of 2,100 gallons per minute against 
a pressure of 327 pounds per square inch to fill the above 
reservoirs. As these stations are electrically operated, and 
therefore the sources of power are liable to interruption, they 
are not included in the above total. 

SALT WATER SUPPLY. 

Two salt water pumping stations, each with a capacity of 
10,000 gallons per minute will be provided, the buildings and 
foundations being so arranged that at any time desired their 
capacity can be increased to 16,000 gallons per minute by in- 
stalling additional machinery. They are designed to store 
sufficient fuel for their operation for forty-eight hours at the 
rate of 16,000 gallons per minute, or seventy-two hours at 
the rate of 10,000 gallons per minute. 

Two fire boats are also provided, each with a capacity of 
8,000 gallons per minute at a pressure of 150 pounds per 
square inch, or of 4,000 gallons per minute against a pressure 
of 300 pounds per square inch. 

The salt water pumping stations, together with the storage 
reservoirs, will be capable of delivering water into the dis- 
tributing system at the rate of 35,000 gallons per minute for 
1234 hours, or until the fresh water supply is exhausted, and 
thereafter at the rate of 20,000 gallons per minute. 

With no fresh water in the reservoirs, or in case the pipe 
lines between the storage reservoirs and the distributing sys- 
tem are out of service, the salt water pumping stations can 
supply 20,000 gallons per minute until the fuel is exhausted. 

These amounts can be increased to 43,000 and 28,000 gal- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



83 



Ions per minute, respectively, by connecting both fire boats to 
the system. 

The amount of water recommended is considerably in ex- 
cess of the quantities suggested in previous reports. However, 
it is justifiable when due consideration is given to the great 
increase in area of the protected district and the possibility 
of the occurrence of one of the emergencies mentioned above. 

PRESSURE REQUIRED. 

As the pressure necessary for adequate fire protection 
depends largely upon the elevation of the tops of the build- 
ings which are to be protected, the city building ordinances 
and data regarding existing buildings will be reviewed. 

Class A buildings are built with a steel frame support- 
ing all floor and wall loads. The structural parts are of in- 
combustible materials, and there is no restriction as to the 
height. 

Class B buildings are built with the walls supporting 
the adjacent floor loads and with steel or reinforced concrete 
columns supporting the interior portions of the floors, or 
with wall self-supporting only and floor loads carried entirely 
by steel, cast-iron or reinforced concrete columns. The maxi- 
mum limit of height of this class of buildings is one hundred 
and two feet, and it is required that the structural parts and 
the roof be of incombustible materials. 

Class C buildings are built with the walls supporting the 
adjacent floor loads and with the interior floors supported by 
studded partitions, or by wooden, steel or cast-iron columns 
and wooden or steel girders. Combustible material may be 
used in all parts except walls. The limit of height of this 
class of buildings is eighty-four feet if metal lath be used on 
all floor and ceiling joists and girders, studding, wood furring 
and soffits of stairs, or if the interior framing, floors and 
partitions are Mill construction; and fifty-five if wooden 
lath be used, or if not lathed. 

Buildings of the type designated Mill construction may be 
constructed to a height of 45 feet. 

Frame buildings may be constructed to a height not ex- 
ceeding forty-five feet, anywhere in the City and County ex- 
eept within the fire limits, provided, that this type of con- 



84 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



struction shall not be permitted for theatres, hospitals or 
sanitariums. They may be built entirely of combustible ma- 
terials. However, in a large district, described by ordinance, 
they are required to have fireproof roofs. 

Building's throughout the city with the exception of those of 
the Class A type are not permitted to exceed in height one and 
one-half times the width of the street upon which they front, 
regardless of any other conditions. Buildings fronting upon 
two streets are governed in height by the width of the wider 
street. Where no street is established the height of buildings 
is determined by the Board of Public Works. 

At present there are about twelve buildings constructed 
in this city over one hundred and fifty feet in height, and 
eight of these have heights between one hundred and seventy- 
five and three hundred feet. Judging by the permits for 
buildings issued during the past year, it is probable that very 
few buildings exceeding three hundred feet in height will be 
constructed m the near future. 

As the system may be called upon to furnish any of the 
before described types of service, the following computations 
have been made of the greater pressures required. 

To fight successfully a fire on the top story of a building 
three hundred feet high with inside hand-held streams would 
require a working pressure of 208 pounds per square inch 
at the base of the hydrant under the following conditions. 

Assume that two lines of 2 l / 2 inch hose one hundred feet 
in length, with 1*4 inch nozzles, are required on the top floor 
of a building two hundred and eighty feet above the street 
level, and that the base of a 6-inch stand pipe which feeds 
them is connected with a hydrant by two lines of 2^4 inch 
hose 250 fest in length. 

The pressure is distributed as follows : 

Effective pressure at nozzle 35 pounds per square inch 

Loss of pressure in hydrant hose 

line on street, stand pipe, and 

hose line on top floor 51 " " " 

Loss due to difference in elevation 
between city base and play 

pipe 122 " " " " 

Total pressure ...208 " " " 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



85 



To provide a stream from a universal metal nozzle attached 
to a roof hydrant in a building one hundred feet high would 
require a working pressure at the base of the street hydrant 
of 219 pounds per square inch under the following con- 
ditions : 

Assume a stream with 75 pounds nozzle pressure from a 
2-inch nozzle directly attached to a 6-inch vertical building- 
stand pipe one hundred feet in length which is fed by two 
250-foot lengths of 2^4 inch hose. 

The pressure is distributed as follows: 

Effective pressure at nozzle 75 pounds per square inch 

Loss of pressure in stand pipe, 

hose and hydrant 101 " " " " 

Loss due to difference in elevation 

between nozzle and main 43 " " " " 

Total pressure 219 

A pressure in the mains of approximately 225 pounds 
per square inch would be required to supply 75 pounds nozzle 
pressure to two 1 5-16 inch nozzles, each attached to one hun- 
dred feet of a 2^4 inch hose, which is in turn attached to a 
roof hydrant on a building one hundred feet high. 

The supply is assumed to be fed through a 6-inch building 
stand pipe, which is in turn fed by two 250 foot lengths of 
2^4 inch hose. 

The pressure is distributed as follows: 

Effective pressure at nozzle 75 pounds per square inch 

Loss of pressure in 2^4 inch hose 

on top of building, stand pipe 

2^4 inch hose on ground and 

hydrant 107 

Loss due to difference in elevation 

between nozzle and main 43 " " " " 

Total pressure 225 

It is to be noted that if the above buildings were located 
on a street in which there was a fire main to which the build- 
ing stand pipe was directly connected the required pressures 
would be materially reduced. 



86 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



To deliver 15,000 gallons per minute on any area of 
100,000 square feet in the congested value district would re- 
quire a pressure at the base of the hydrant of 229 pounds per 
square inch under the following conditions : 

Assume 2 inch diameter smooth bore nozzles on siamesed 
lines of 2^4 inch hose four hundred feet in length. 

The pressure is distributed as follows: 

Effective nozzle pressure 75 pounds per square inch 

Loss in hydrant and hose 154 " " " " 

Total pressure 229 " " " " 

In the above calculations the street hydrants furnishing 
the supply have been assumed to be located at city base. 

From the foregoing it may be seen that pressures up to 229 
pounds per square inch at the base of the hydrants are neces- 
sary to furnish our most important types of service. Further- 
more, as these services will be of the greatest use in checking 
the spread of a large fire, it is necessary that they be pro- 
vided at a time of maximum draft upon the system. 

The Twin Peaks reservoirs are located at an elevation of 
755 feet above city base; consequently the static pressure on 
the mains in the low lying parts of town will be 327 pounds 
per square inch. Therefore, to provide for a working pressure 
at the base of the hydrant of 229 pounds per square inch, 
the pipe system has been so designed that the losses due to 
friction at the time of maximum draft from the storage 
reservoirs are about 98 pounds per square inch in the vicinity 
of the foot of Market street. 

The natural rise of the ground as we approach Twin 
Peaks is almost balanced by the decrease in the friction losses 
of the system, and the required working pressure for all types 
of service will be available at all points of the congested value 
district. 

The pumping stations, being located nearer the congested 
value district than the fresh water reservoirs have less friction 
losses to overcome ; consequently a pressure of 300 pounds 
per square inch at the pumps will be sufficient. 

The conditions assumed in making the above estimates 
are representative of the most severe requirements which will 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



87 



arise in the use of the proposed system, and consequently the 
results show the highest pressures which will be required in 
its operation during extreme emergencies. For use in the 
first stages of ordinary fires and for extinguishing small fires, 
hydrant pressures of 100 pounds per square inch and upwards 
will be sufficient. As constantly keeping the mains under 
high pressure will greatly increase the difficulty and expense 
of maintaining the system and render operation more danger- 
ous to firemen without any compensating advantages, thb 
proposed system has been so designed that ordinarily the 
static pressure in the mains will be 150 pounds per square 
inch and less, depending upon their elevation. This pressure 
can be increased up to 325 pounds per square inch in the 
lower districts when needed. The methods by which this is 
to be accomplished will be described later. 

As the topography of the City is such that some of the 
hydrants in the higher portions of the protected area will be 
at elevations upwards to 400 feet above city base, it will not 
be possible to maintain a working pressure of two hundred 
and twenty-nine pounds at all points of the system. How- 
ever, as these regions of comparatively low pressure are all 
in the frame residence district, where the buildings are gen- 
erally less than fifty feet in height and the amount of com- 
bustible material is small, it is not necessary to provide for 
the concentration of as great a quantity of water nor such 
high nozzle pressures as in the lower districts. 

AREA TO BE PROTECTED. 

The area to be protected, about 5.300 acres, was determined 
upon after consultation with Mr. P. H. Shaughnessy. Chief 
Engineer of the Fire Department. It is situated in that part 
of the easterly water shed lying between the Potrero Hills 
and the Golden Gate, and includes all the area within the 
fire limits, together with the greater part of the district within 
which shingle roofs are prohibited. 

For convenience of discussion the protected area is divided 
into several districts. 

District No. 1. — This is roughly bounded by Channel, 
Division. Rhode Island, Seventeenth, Vermont, Division, 



88 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



Eleventh streets, Van Ness avenue and the Bay Shore, and 
contains about 2,400 acres. It includes most of the area 
within the hre limits and is practically all included within 
the area in which shingled roofs are prohibited. However, 
immediately after the fire of April 18th. 1906, a number of 
buildings were erected in the northerly and westerly portions 
of this district without fireproof roofs. 

Although practically all in the burned section, this dis- 
trict is the most important to be considered as it includes 
the congested value district, within which reconstruction is in 
active progress. 

Inside the fire limits which enclose the congested value 
district a number of high buildings of the so-called fireproof 
type and a still larger number of substantial brick buildings, 
mostly of the ordinary wooden joist construction, are being 
erected. These, when completed, will house the greater part of 
the important business interests of the city. 

The section immediately north of the fire limits, with the 
exception of Nob Hill, is being reconstructed as an appartment 
house and residence district, and the buildings are nearly all 
of frame construction, from three to five stories in height. 
It is believed that the portion of this section roughly bounded 
by Powell, California, Jones and Sacramento streets, in which 
is located the Fairmont Hotel, will be occupied by high class 
buildings which will contain immense values. 

The northerly and northeasterly slopes of Russian Hill 
and Nob Hill and the westerly and northerly slopes of Tele- 
graph Hill are being compactly covered with frame struc- 
tures. The majority of these buildings are being occupied as 
residences. However, along Montgomery avenue and adjacent 
streets there is a minor mercantile section containing also a 
number of all night saloons, dance halls and tenement houses. 

Along the bay shore are the wharves, constructed almost 
entirely of wood, a number of brick warehouses and numerous 
frame and brick buildings in which are housed important 
manufacturing and mercantile interests. In the vicinity of 
the northerly termination of Taylor street there are large 
lumber yards and wood working mills. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



89 



The section lying south of the fire limits is generally being 
rebuilt as a manufacturing and wholesale district. Lower 
class hotels and tenement houses of frame construction, three 
or four stories in height, are also being erected. Along Chan- 
nel street there are lumber and railway yards, wood working 
mills of frame construction, brick warehouses and wooden 
freight sheds. 

The grades of the streets in the portion of the district 
southerly from Sutter street and along the bay shore, with the 
exception of a small area in the vicinity of Rincon Hill, are 
generally flat, but the pavements are in such poor repair that 
they seriously retard the movement of heavy fire apparatus. 

In the area between Sutter and Bay streets, the grades 
are generally steep. In fact, in certain parts of this section, 
namely, the tops and adjacent slopes of Russian and Tele- 
graph Hills, it is impossible to quickly concentrate fire ap- 
paratus. The pavements are in a fair state of repair, though 
in the vicinity of the top of Russian and Telegraph Hills 
there are a number of streets not paved nor graded. 

There are three large areas of artificially filled or made 
ground within this district. One, extending northerly and 
northwesterly along the bay shore from Folsom street to 
Taylor street, contains about 250 acres. A portion of this 
area in the vicinity of the foot of Market street is being 
covered with important office buildings of fire resisting con- 
struction. Another one in the vicinity Division street, be- 
tween Eighth and Eleventh streets, and another extending 
southeasterly to Channel street from Seventh and Mission 
streets, containing 30 and 200 acres respectively, are being 
rapidly covered, principally with frame structures of mod- 
erate height. The existence of these large areas, within which 
water pipes and conduits are liable to be broken, greatly in- 
crease the danger that, in the event of a severe earthquake, 
a fire or fires starting in this vicinity will get beyond the 
control of the Fire Department and develop into a general 
conflagration. 

District No. 2. — This district is roughly bounded by 
Channel, Eighth, Seventeenth, Indiana streets, Twenty-first 
street, produced, and the Bay. It contains about 400 acres. 



90 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

It is outside of the fire limits and also outside of the area 
in which shingle roofs are prohibited; consequently nearly 
all of the buildings are of frame construction without fire 
resisting roofs. 

With a few exceptions the grades of the streets are Light, 
but the majority are not paved, and those on which the pave- 
ments have been constructed are in need of repair. It is diffi- 
cult to quickly move fire apparatus in this district. 

In the northern and northwestern portion of the district 
along Channel street are a number of lumber yards, wood 
working mills and factories of various kinds, together with 
the new freight sheds of the Southern Pacific Company and 
the Santa Fe Railroad Company. The central portion is 
occupied by the new wholesale district, which is housed almost 
entirely in temporary wooden buildings of flimsy construction. 
In the southeasterly portion there are a number of frame 
boarding and lodging houses occupied by laborers, frame 
residences and a minor mercantile section. Along the bay 
shore are situated the immensely valuable plants of the West- 
ern Sugar Refining Co., Risdon Iron Works, San Francisco 
Gas and Electric Co. and the Union Iron Works. These plants 
are equipped with private fire protection systems. 

A large portion of this district is artificially filled or made 
land, and all of the important water mains pass for a portion 
of their way over unstable ground. These conditions greatly 
increase the conflagration hazard. 

District No. 3. — This district is roughly bounded by 
Harrison, Army, Mission, Thirtieth, Sanchez, Clipper, Church, 
Jersey, Dolores, Twenty-third, Church, Nineteenth, Collins- 
wood, Seventeenth, Market and Eleventh streets. It contains 
about 1,100 acres. 

This entire district, with the exception of a small section 
in the northeasterly portion, is not included in the area in 
which fire resisting roofs are required nor within the fire 
limits. The greater portion is covered with frame buildings 
with shingle roofs. The streets are nearly all paved, but 
those in that portion of the northeastern portion included in 
the burnead area are greatly in need of repair. The grades 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



91 



of the streets, with the exception of those in the extreme 
western portion, are generally less than 5 per cent. 

The northeastern portion, in which there is about 100 
acres of artificially filled or made ground, is being rapidly 
rebuilt, and at present it contains an important minor mer- 
cantile section, a number of factories, steam laundries, plan- 
ing mills and other wood working plants of considerable value. 
The western and southern portion is a compactly built resi- 
dence district of frame construction, two or four stories in 
height, with shingle roofs. There is an important mercantile 
district extending through the center of the district along 
Mission and adjacent streets, and a minor mercantile district 
along Castro street between Market and Twentieth streets. 

While the buildings in the western and southern part of 
this district are not of a high order of construction, nor are 
the values very large, it is necessary that these sections be 
protected to such an extent that any fire can be controlled 
before it reaches the conflagration stage and is carried by the 
winds to the higher valued section. 

District No. 4. — This district is roughly bounded by 
Van Ness avenue, Market, Seventeenth, Clayton, Grove, De- 
visadero streets and Broadway. It contains about 1,900 acres. 

This district is outside of the fire limits, though the greater 
part is included within the area in which fire resisting roofs 
are required. However, it was not included in this area until 
it had been practically covered with frame buildings with 
shingle roofs. 

The grades of the streets, with the exception of those in 
Hayes Valley and vicinity, in the section west of Fillmore 
street, between Sacramento street and Golden Gate avenue 
and along Van Ness avenue, are generally sufficiently steep 
to seriously interfere with the rapid movement of heavy fire 
apparatus. The pavements are mostly in fair condition. The 
buildings average three stories in height and a number are 
four and five stories. 

Van Ness avenue and the adjacent streets between Jackson 
and Market streets, and Fillmore street and the nearby streets 
between Pacific avenue and Haight street, are at present the 
principal retail sections of the city. Along Van Ness avenue 



92 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

and vicinity large and valuable stocks of goods of all de- 
scriptions are housed in two and three story frame structures. 
Along Fillmore street there are solid blocks of frame buildings 
containing a number of the principal stores, together with 
saloons, offices and rooming houses. In the Hayes Valley 
district and along Golden Gate avenue between Van Ness 
avenue and Steiner street, with the exception of Jefferson 
Square, are solid blocks of frame buildings, three to four 
stories in height, housing automobile garages, stores, saloons 
and apartment houses. In fact, at present in the above de- 
scribed district are located the greatest values in the city, 
practically all housed in frame buildings from two to five 
stories in height, of which the majority are covered with 
shingle roofs. 

Under the present conditions, this is considered the most 
dangerous district in the city, owing to the fact that during 
the prevalence of a westerly wind, a fire once getting beyond 
control in its westerly part, in which the present fire fighting 
facilities are inadequate, could hardly be stopped before 
reaching Van Ness avenue. Because of this severe hazard, 
merchants are unable to insure to within 50 per cent, of the 
total value of their stocks, and what insurance can be secured 
is at comparatively exorbitant rates. 

For a long time previous to the recent fire the officials of 
the Fire Department, as well as insurance men generally, 
considered it certain that a fire starting in this section during 
the prevalence of one of the strong westerly winds so common 
throughout the greater part of the year, would, if it once 
escaped from the control of the department, burn unchecked 
until it reached the waters of the bay. A glance at the history 
of the Baltimore fire must convince even the most optimistic 
of the correctness of this view. That fire started in a district 
in which practically all of the buildings were of brick con- 
struction. The water supply for fire protection purposes was 
far better than that of San Francisco has ever been. The 
velocity of the wind at the time of starting was 14 miles 
per hour, and at no time exceeded 22 miles per hour. Yet not- 
withstanding the fact that the conditions for controlling the 
fire and the means for applying water were superior to those 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



93 



that exist here, it was impossible to check the fire on the 
leeward side and it burned for nearly two days, destroying 
all of the combustible material in its way. 

The menace which this district offers to the congested value 
district to leeward renders it absolutely necessary that means 
be provided for controlling a fire before it shall reach the 
proportions of a general conflagration. 

THE PROPOSED SYSTEM. 
The preceding pages have been devoted to a discussion of 
the conditions and requirements to which consideration must 
be given in designing a fire protection system for the City of 
San Francisco. 

The methods by which it is proposed to meet these con- 
ditions and fulfill the requirements were outlined in the open- 
ing pages of this report. They are discussed in detail in the 
following. While it is not claimed that the system proposed 
offers the only means through which San Francisco can be 
assured of efficient fire protection, it is believed that the 
protection provided will prove adequate for all requirements, 
either ordinary or emergency, and at a cost which, under the 
circumstances, is reasonable. 

A study of the effects of the recent earthquake and of 
descriptions of the results of simlar occurrences in other 
countries indicates that in the greater part of the protected 
area the distributing mains will be practically earthquake- 
proof. Attention is directed to the following special features 
by means of which an effort is to be made to render the pro- 
posed system as a whole not only earthquake-proof but panic- 
proof : — 

First. The installation in duplicate of the main storage 
reservoirs, the salt water pumping stations, and the main 
supply pipes connecting each to the distributing system, and 
the wide separation of these three main sources of supply. 

Second. The two powerful fire boats and the numerous 
fire boat connections along the water front through which 
water may be delivered into the distributing system. 

Third. The arrangement of the gate system so that by 
closing only five gate valves all the pipes liable to be destroyed 



94 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

by an earthquake can be shut off from the rest of the system. 

TWIN PEAKS STORAGE RESERVOIRS. 

Two storage reservoirs, each having a capacity of five 
million gallons, will be located on Twin Peaks in the vicinity 
of the intersection of Twentieth street with the southerly 
extension of Cole street, at an elevation of seven hundred and 
fifty-five feet above city base. The property on which they 
are to be constructed has been acquired by the City. Their 
capacity will be equal to the continuous delivery of fifteen 
thousand gallons per minute for about eleven hours; for 
shorter periods of time greater quantities can be delivered. 
They are to be constructed by making excavations of the 
required shape in the rock and lining the sides and bottoms 
with concrete. Gates and connecting pipes are to be so ar- 
ranged that either or both can be connected with the dis- 
tributing system at will. 

Two lines of 20 inch pipe will connect these reservoirs with 
the distributing system and to the distributing reservoirs 
described below. 

Under ordinary conditions it is advisable that only one 
reservoir be connected with the distributing system. Then 
in case of a sudden break in the pipe lines or distributing 
system, it will be impossible for the supply in more than one 
to be wasted, and the 5,000,000 gallons stored in the other 
will be available for use immediately upon the completion of 
the necessary repairs. 

The elevation of these reservoirs will be such that they 
will provide a pressure in the mains higher than required 
for fighting ordinary fires. As this pressure will only be used 
on rare occasions, and to maintain it constantly would ma- 
terially increase the cost of pumping and the difficulty and 
cost of maintenance, it is not proposed ordinarily to supply 
water to the system directly from this reservoir. 

DISTRIBUTING RESERVOIRS. 

In order that the various districts can be provided with 
sufficient water for use at ordinary fires under a moderate 
direct pressure the protected area has been divided into two 
zones. The lower includes approximately that section lying 
below the 150 foot contour; the remainder is in the upper 



Lte xo. r, 

AKS RESERVOIRS 



,000.000 gallons each 




>r an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

PROTECTION 

) UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 

'ublic Works and City Engineer 
CONNICK and T. W. RANSOM 

During the years 1907-8 
ity of Ordinance No. 353 (new series) 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
San Francisco. Cal. 

BMITTED JANUARY, 1908 

:d: 

h. 1908 y^^y^^i- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



95 



zone. Each zone is to be directly fed from a distributing 
reservoir. 

The one supplying the upper is to have a capacity of 
500,000 gallons. It will he located at an elevation of 490 
feet in the vicinity of the crossing of Seventeenth and Ash- 
bury streets, near which are several available sites. It may 
be constructed by making an excavation of the required shape 
in the ground and lining its sides and bottom with concrete, 
or it may be a circular steel tank. The water supply may be 
obtained from the Twin Peaks reservoir by gravity flow 
through the two lines of 20 inch pipe or it can be pumped 
directly from the fresh water pumping stations. 

The lower zone will be supplied from a reservoir of 
1,000,000 gallons capacity to be constructed in the roadway 
of Jones street between Sacramento and Clay streets. The 
elevation of the water surface will be about 329 feet.. An 
excavation will be made in the rock, the sides and bottom of 
which will be provided with an impervious lining. A roof 
constructed of steel and concrete will support the roadway 
of the street. The water supply for this reservoir may be 
pumped directly from the fresh water pumping station, or it 
may be obtained by gravity flow through the distributing 
system from the distributing reservoir of the upper zone or 
from the storage reservoirs on Twin Peaks. 

A gate house with the necessary pressure gauges, meters 
and telephone connections is to be located at each distributing 
reservoir. Men, detailed from nearby fire engine crews, to 
operate the gates are to be on duty at all times. 

When, in either zone, the necessity arises for the use of a 
pressure in excess of that provided by its distributing reser- 
voir, the pressure may be increased up to the full pressure 
from the Twin Peaks reservoirs by operating the proper gates 
at the gate houses to by-pass the flow around the distributing 
reservoirs. As these gates are to be fitted with hydraulic 
controlling apparatus, this operation should occupy little time. 

FRESH WATER PUMPING STATION'S. 

The storage and distributing reservoirs will be supplied 
with fresh water from groups of bored wells from which 
water will be pumped through the mains of the distributing 



96 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

system by two fresh water pumping stations. These stations, 
which will be identical in design, will be located near Harri- 
son and Seventh streets and Sixteenth and Shotwell streets, 
respectively. The wells from which they will draw will be 
bored at intervals of about 70 feet in the adjacent streets. 

These places have been selected for the reason that they 
are the most conveniently situated localities in the city from 
which it appears that sufficiently large quantities of water 
can be obtained. Preliminary investigations show that at 
least 50 gallons per minute can be pumped from each of a 
number of 12 inch wells in these vicinities without lowering 
the water plane more than 100 feet below the surface of the 
ground. As the pumping capacity of each station is to be 
1.050 gallons per minute, the preliminary plans provide for 
the sinking of twenty-one wells in connection with each; but 
it is confidently expected that further investigation will show 
a less number of wells to be sufficient, in which case the cost 
of installation will be reduced. 

The water from the wells is to be raised to the surface 
and delivered into a reinforced concrete cistern of 175,000 
gallons capacity, situated under each pumping station, by 
air pumps of the Pohle Air Lift type. These pumps will consist 
of air compressors in each station, a separate air pipe from 
the stations to each well and water pipes in the wells and 
leading therefrom to the cisterns under the stations. The 
only moving parts about the whole arrangement subject to 
wear or requiring attention will be in the air compressors, and 
these can be easily operated by one man. The pipes in the 
well will contain no valves or moving parts of any kind, and 
consequently will not be subject to wear or liable to become 
clogged by the sand which is pumped in greater or less quanti- 
ties from Dearly all bored wells in this city. It is recognized 
that pumps of this type are very inefficient in regard to the 
amount of power necessary for their operation, but their 
extreme simplicity and the consequent low cost of installing 
and maintaining them, together with their reliability of action, 
far outweigh the objection that the cost of power is com- 
paratively high. 

For reasons which are fully set forth in the description 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



97 



of the salt water pumping stations, the pumps for forcing 
water from the cisterns into the distributing mains will be 
of the multi-stage turbine type. 

After consideration of the different motive powers avail- 
able, and the intermittent character of the service required, 
it is recommended that electric motors be employed. The 
electric current is to be purchased from the various electric 
companies. In order to insure an uninterrupted service, an 
effort should be made to obtain connections to as many differ- 
ent sources as possible. To start a unit, it will be necessary 
merely to close the proper switch in a station. 

The mechanical equipment of each station will be as 
follows : — 

Two duplex air compressors, each capable of compressing 
six hundred cubic feet of free air per minute to a pressure 
of 80 pounds per square inch. 

Two 100 H. P. electric motors to drive the above air com- 
pressors. 

Two three-stage turbine pumps, each driven by a 75 H. P. 
electric motor connected directly to its shaft. The capacity 
of each of these pumps will be 525 gallons per minute against 
a head of 330 feet. 

Two five-stage turbine pumps, each driven by a 125 H. P. 
electric motor connected directly to its shaft. The capacity of 
each of these pumps will be 525 gallons per minute against 
a head of 500 feet. 

There will also be a five ton travelling crane, air receivers, 
all the necessary suction and discharge pipes, fittings and 
valves, a suitable switch board, and automatic instruments 
for recording the performance of the pumps and motors. 

The buildings in which the machinery is placed are to be 
of the most approved type of fire resisting construction and 
provided with firm foundations. In addition to the space re- 
quired for the machinery, provision will be made for the 
accommodation of a regular fire company. 

The discharge pipes from each station will be connected 
to the distributing mains of the lower zone, and water will 
be pumped into the various reservoirs through these mains, 
the gates connecting with the upper zone and the Twin Peaks 



98 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



reservoirs being opened as required. For delivering into the 
Twin Peaks reservoirs, the three and five stage pumps will 
be operated in series, the three stage pump discharging into 
the suction side of the five stage. For the reservoir of the 
upper zone, the five stage pumps will be used, and for the 
reservoir of the lower zone, the three stage. 

SALT WATER PUMPING STATIONS. 

Two salt water pumping stations will be constructed near 
the bay shore, one near the northerly termination of Polk 
street or Van Ness avenue, the other in the vicinity of the 
intersection of Second and Townsend streets. Sites for these 
stations will have to be acquired, and it is necessary that the 
foundations of both building and machinery rest directly on 
solid rock. 

Each station will be of sufficient size to provide for the 
installation of machinery to pump 16.000 gallons per minute 
against a pressure of 300 pounds per square inch, together 
with quarters for the men necessary for its operation. For the 
present, it is proposed to install at each station sufficient me- 
chanical equipment to pump 10,000 gallons per minute against 
a pressure of 300 pounds per square inch. 

In order to insure satisfactory operation in the hurry and 
confusion which may prevail during an emergency, the ma- 
chinery must be of the simplest types. The number of parts 
requiring attention or adjustment should be a minimum and 
the design and arrangement should be such as to render it im- 
probable that an error on the part of an operator will necessi- 
tate the shutting down of any considerable portion of a station. 

The possibility that gas and fresh water mains and electric 
power wires may be broken, and that means of transportation 
may be interrupted, make it imperative that each station be 
independent of all outside sources of power, fuel, or supplies 
for at least forty-eight hours while operating at full capacity. 

The fresh water reservoirs provide an ample supply of 
water under adequate pressure for the control of all but the 
largest fires, and even in the event of a general conflagration, 
with every man in the fire department on duty, they would 
supply one hundred streams of 250 gallons a minute each 
for between seven and eight hours. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



99 



In the event of the pipe lines between the Twin Peaks 
reservoirs and the distribution system being out of service, 
there would still be 1,000,000 gallons stored in the distributing 
reservoir of the lower zone ready for immediate use. This 
amount would occupy the entire force of the fire department 
for about 40 minutes. 

For these reasons it is evident that only on rare occasions 
will it be necessary to operate the pumps for the purpose of 
delivering water into the fire mains, and then it will not be 
a great disadvantage if about 30 minutes elapse between the 
receipt of an alarm at a station and the starting of all the 
pumps. 

Since the pumps are to operate infrequently the cost of 
fuel for actually running the plants will be small compared 
to the expense of keeping the machinery ready for operation 
and maintaining a trained crew ready for immediate service. 
Therefore, the plant in which the sum of the fixed charges 
(interest and depreciation), and cost of attendance, fuel and 
supplies necessary to keep it ready for operation are the least 
will be the most economical, regardless of the cost of fuel 
required while actually running. 

Size of Units. In order to secure flexibility of opera- 
tion, and to minimize the effect of accidents on the amount of 
water delivered^ a number of separate pumping units will be 
installed in each station, all of which, on account of the greater 
economy in repair parts, will be of the same size. The capacity 
of each unit will be two thousand gallons per minute against 
a pressure of three hundred pounds per square inch. This 
will require each station to be equipped with five units, with 
space provided for the installation of three additional units 
when necessary. 

Motors. The types of motors considered for driving 
the pumps in these stations may be divided into three classes. 
Steam Engines. Internal Combustion Engines, commonly 
known as Gas Engines, and Electric Motors. 

Electric motors operated by current, from the wires of 
private electric companies are not available for these stations 
because of the necessity that they be independent of outside 
sources of power. 



100 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

The proposition to install electric generators driven by 
steam or gas engines and to use the current generated to 
operate motors to drive pumps offers some advantages on the 
score of economy of operation, as it would be possible to use 
such a plant for the generation of current for municipal pur- 
poses when the pumps were not in use, and so make productive 
a large part of the stand by cost. However, the cost of in- 
stallation of such a plant, together with the necessary under- 
ground conduits, wiring, etc., renders it out of the question 
at the present time. Furthermore, it is an open question 
whether such a power plant can be operated under the control 
of two different municipal departments in a satisfactory man- 
ner. If at some future time the City finds it desirable to 
install such a plant, the mechanical equipment recommended 
is such that it may be altered at a minimum expense. 

Internal Combustion Engines operating on gas from mains 
in the street are not available for the reasons given above 
and because of the difficulty of safely storing a sufficient 
quantity of fuel on the premises. 

As will be seen by referring to the estimated cost of a 
gasoline engine plant, the additional cost of gas producers, 
with the extra attendance they would require, would make 
the cost of operating engines on producer gas prohibitive. 
Engines using a liquid primary fuel such as gasoline, there- 
fore, appear to be the most reliable and efficient type of in- 
ternal combustion for this service. 

In order to compare the relative economy, two sets of plans, 
together with estimates of the cost of installation and opera- 
tion of a pumping station, have been prepared. In one of 
these the most suitable type of internal combustion engine 
for this service has been considered; in the other the most 
suitable type of steam engine. A description of each of these 
plants and estimates of the cost are set forth in the following 
pages. 

DISCUSSION OF STEAM PLANT. 

Boilers. The rapidity with which steam may be raised 
in a boiler of the water tube type without danger of injury 
to the boiler or its setting, and the fact that large numbers of 
straight tube boilers are in such common use in this city that 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



101 



trained stokers may be obtained at short notice, led to the 
selection of boilers of this type without further consideration. 

Fuel. Because of its low cost, the ease and safety with 
which large quantities can be stored, and the minimum amount 
of labor that is required to feed it to the furnaces of a boiler 
plant, crude oil will be used as fuel. 

Steam Engine. The steam turbine has recently been 
developed to a high state of perfection and is especially de- 
sirable in a plant of this kind. It is the most simple engine 
built, being without reciprocating parts or valve gears. The 
only parts subject to wear or requiring attention are the main 
bearings, packing glands and governor. It may, therefore, 
be operated with less skilled attendance and at a less cost for 
repairs than any other type of engine. The high speed at 
which this engine rotates makes it possible to connect it 
directly to the shaft of the pump selected without the use of 
intermediate gearing or belts and to mount both engine and 
pump on one monolithic foundation of small dimensions. In 
addition, an engine of this type can be obtained at a price 
that will compare favorably with the cost of a simple engine 
of the reciprocating type such as would be suitable for a plant 
of this kind, and its steam economy will be somewhat better. 

Condensers. The type of boiler recommended is not 
suitable for the use of salt feed w r ater, and as there is danger 
of the fresh water service from the street mains being cut off, 
surface condensers are to be installed in connection with the 
turbines rather than to attempt to provide storage capacity 
for a sufficient quantity of boiler feed water to run the plant 
for a long time. It is estimated that the total cost of fuel 
burned while operating the plant, exclusive of stand by losses, 
will amount to only $1,460 per annum. From this, it is evi- 
dent that the possible economy in fuel which can be obtained 
by installing air pumps in connection with these condensers 
would not warrant the expense which would be entailed for 
extra attendants to operate them. Therefore, the condenser? 
will be open to the atmosphere. The circulating water will 
be drawn through the condensers by the main pumps so that 
it will not be necessary to install separate circulating pumps. 

Pumps. The pumps will be of the multi-stage turbine 



102 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



type. This is the most simple pump made for this service. 
A number of runners or impellers, one for each stage, are 
mounted directly on the driving shaft and rotate at high speed 
inside of a suitable casing. There are no moving valves in 
this pump and the only parts subject to wear are the bearings, 
packing glands and packing rings between the runners and 
casing. The wear on these parts is small, and in case of neces- 
sity they may be readily repaired and at minimum expense. 

Another reason for the adoption of this type of pump is 
that the closing of the valve on the discharge pipe through 
accident or design while the pump is running, will result only 
in a slight raise of the pressure in the discharge side of the 
casing, whereas a similar occurrence in the case of a plunger 
pump is likely to result in the breakage of some part of the 
pump or the engine driving it. An effort is usually made 
to protect a plunger pump from such accidents by providing 
a safety valve on the discharge side whieb will raise and re- 
lieve the pressure when it becomes too high. Experience has 
shown that these valves sometimes stick and that a plunger 
pump so equipped does not offer the same safely of operation 
as a centrifugal pump. 

These advantages, namely, ease and cheapness of repair 
and safety of operation, far outweigh the objection that this 
style of pump is less economical in the consumption of power 
than pumps of the plunger type. 

DESCRIPTION OF STATION. 

Plates 6, 7 and 8 show the arrangement recommended for 
the pumping stations. 

There will be four water tube boilers arranged in bat- 
teries of two, each battery being fitted with a separate smoke 
stack six and one-half feet in diameter and eighty-two feet 
high. 

Space is to be provided for the installation when neces- 
sary of the two additional boilers shown on the plan. The 
casings will be as nearly air tight as possible in order that 
the consumption of fuel when standing under steam ready for 
operation may be reduced to a minimum. The steam pipe is 
to be arranged so that an accident to a part will not disable 
the entire plant. Each boiler is to be capable of evaporating 



PLATE NO. 6 

3 EN ERA L ARRANGEMENT OF 



PUMPING STATIONS 



TEAM TURBINE ENGINES 

Capacity 16,000 gals, per minute 



Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 



ROTECTION 



•R THE DIRECTION OF THE 

Works and City Engineer 
IICK AND T. W. RANSOM 

■ the years 1907-8 
Ordinance No. 353 (new series) 
D OF SUPERVISORS 
Francisco, Cal. 
ed January, 1908 



DRIVEN BY 



nnrorl 



f 




PLATE So. (i 

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF 

PUMPING STATIONS 



Steam Turbine engines 

Capacity 16,000 gals, per minute 




SECTIONAL ELEVATION 



Plans for an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

FIRE PROTECTION 

PREPARED UNDiR THE DIRECTION OF THE 

Board of Public Works and City Engineer 
Br H. D. CONNICK AND T. W. RANSOM 

Dunne the years 1907-8 
Under authority of Ordinance No. 353 (new series) 
of the BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
San Francisco. Cal. 
Submitted January, 1908 
Approved: | _ 
Feb. 19th. 190S 



JPLA.TE NO. T 

NEPAL ARRANGEMENT OF 

PUMPING STATIONS 

DRIVEN BY 
EAM TURBINE ENGINE 

ipacity 16,000 gals, per minute 




uxiliary Water System 

FOR 

3.0TECTION 

l THE DIRECTION OF THE 

vVorks and City Engineer 
CK and T. W. RANSOM 

^he years 1907-8 

rdinance No. 353 (new series) 

) OF SUPERVISORS 

eancisco, cal. 

d January. 1908 




PLATE So. 7 

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF 

PUMPING STATIONS 
driven by 
steam Turbine engine 

Capacity 16,000 gals, per minute 




SECTIONAL ELEVATION 



. D. CONNI 

During 
ithority of O 
the BOAR 



Plans for an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

FIRE PROTECTION 

PREPARED UNDE 

Board of Public r/orks and City Engineer 



K AND T. W. RANSOM 

le years 1907-8 
linance No. 353 (new series) 
OF SUPERVISORS 
Khancisco. Cal. 



Fee. 19th. l'JOS 



: no. 8 

ANGEM ENT OF 

STATIONS 

IN BY 

INE ENGINES 




1] 



r an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

PROTECTION 

UNDER THE DIRECTION OK THE 

ublic Works and City Engineer 
20NNICK AND T. W. RANSOM 

during the years 1907-S 
ty of Ordinance No. 353 (new series) 
jSOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
Vfl&AN Francisco. Cal. 

3MITTED JANUARY, 1908 

190S /^/aiviitc^Aw^.^X 




PLAN 



PLATE N o. 8 

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF 

PUMPING STATIONS 

DR1VBN BY 
STEAM TURBINE ENGINES 

Capacity 16,000 gaU. per minute 



Plans for an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

FIRE PROTECTION 

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 

Board of Public Works and City Engineer 
By H. D. CONNICK and T. W. RANSOM 

During the years 1907-S 
Under authority of Ordinance No. 353 (now series) 
of the BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
San Francisco. Cal. 
Submitted January, 1908 
Approved: 



Feb. Wth. 190S 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



103 



not less than 26.200 pounds of water per hour at a pressure 
of one hundred and fifty pounds per square inch. It is esti- 
mated that three of these boilers will be sufficient to run the 
five pumps at full power and that when the additional pumps 
and boilers have been installed five will supply steam for the 
entire plant. It will, therefore, be possible to lay up one 
boiler for cleaning or repairs without affecting the capacity 
of the plant. 

There will be five pumps of the multi-stage turbine type, 
each capable of delivering not less than two thousand gallons 
of water per minute against a pressure of three hundred 
pounds per square inch when running at a speed of about 
eighteen hundred revolutions per minute. 

Each pump will be connected directly to the shaft of a 
steam turbine capable of developing not less than six hundred 
brake horse-power continuously and of carrying an overload 
of not less than twenty-five per cent for short intervals. Ar- 
rangements will be made that by varying the speed of the 
turbine or preferably by opening valves on the suction or 
discharge side of the pump and cutting out one or more 
stages, the pressure against which the pump is working may be 
varied between one hundred and fifty and three hundred 
pounds per scjuare inch without altering the quantity of 
water discharged. 

A condenser containing not less than twenty-four hun- 
dred square feet of cooling surface will be installed at each 
turbine for the purpose of condensing the exhaust steam. 
At the bottom of each condenser a connection will be made 
to drain the condensed water to centrifugal pumps which 
will raise and deliver it into the heater. 

Eight fuel oil tanks having a combined capacity of two 
thousand barrels will be provided. It is estimated that this 
will be sufficient fuel to run the station under service condi- 
tions for four weeks and retain in reserve a supply for forty- 
eight hours continuous operation at the ultimate capacity of 
sixteen thousand gallons per minute. 

Venturi meters, automatic registers and recording devices 
will be installed for recording the operation of the station. A 



104 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



fresh water cistern of fifty thousand gallons capacity will be 
built for storing fresh water for making up loss in the feed 
water for the boilers. In addition there will be tanks for the 
storage of lubricating oil, feed pumps, fuel oil pumps, an elec- 
tric lighting plant, a ten-ton electric traveling crane, a three 
thousand horse-power feed water heater, suction and discharge 
pipes from the pumps with the necessary strainers, check and 
gate valves and connections for priming the pumps and filling 
them with fresh water when not in use. 

BUILDINGS. 

The buildings for all stations are to be of the most ap- 
proved fire resistive type. No combustible material will enter 
into their construction and they will be fitted with wire glass 
windows and inside shutters and an outside sprinkler system. 
The roof will be of extra strength and special provision will 
be made to protect the smoke stacks of the steam plant from 
injury from a fire in the vicinity. 

INLET TUNNEL. 

The water supply for the pumps of each station will be 
drawn from the bay through a tunnel driven below the level 
of low tide so that water may flow directly from the bay into 
the station. As far as possible it will be located in solid rock 
and lined with concrete, heavily reinforced with steel. In 
unstable ground it will be a reinforced concrete conduit sup- 
ported upon a pile foundation. Suitable screens will be in- 
stalled at the bay end and shut-off gates provided so that the 
tunnel may be entered for inspection and repairs. 

DELIVERY PIPES. 

Two separate pipes will convey the water from the pumps 
in each station into the distributing system. The size of 
these pipes is to be such that one can deliver the entire capac- 
ity of the station into the system. 

COST OF STEAM PLANT. 

The cost of the above described plant ready for operation 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 105 

exclusive of the real estate on which it is situated and the 
intake tunnel, is estimated to be as follows : 

Boilers $ 51,276.00 

Steam Turbines 63.825.00 

Condensers 27,037.00 

Turbine Pumps 34,110.00 

Fuel Oil Tanks 6,080.00 

Electric Lighting Plant 2,094.00 

Crane 5,408.00 

Stairs. Railings and Gratings 750.00 

Boiler Feed Pumps 2,130.00 

Fuel Oil Pumps 1,410.00 

Feed Water Heater 1,845.00 

Steam. Exhaust and Feed Water Pipes 21,750.00 

Suction and Discharge Pipe and Fittings 7,255.00 

2 Venturi .Meters 2,000.00 

50,000 Gallon Fresh Water Cistern 3,000.00 

Buildings and Foundations 52,862.00 

Plans and Supervision, 5% 14,141.00 

Contingencies, 5% 14,141.00 



Total $311,114.00 



ANNUAL COST OF OPERATION OF STEAM PLANT. 

In estimating the annual cost of maintaining and oper- 
ating this plant the following assumptions have been made. 
While data as to the fuel necessary to keep a boiler with 
steam up. ready for instant operation is not extensive, use has 
been made of the best available and it is believed that the 
figures given below are conservative. 

One boiler is to be kept under full steam pressure at all 
times. The fuel necessary for this purpose has been taken 
at 7^2% of the fuel consumption at the rated capacity (520 
H. P) of the boiler. 

Two boilers are to be kept warm by circulating hot water 
through them. The fuel necessary for this purpose has been 
taken at 334% of the fuel consumption at the rated capacity 
of the boiler. 

To heat the brick work of the furnaces and raise steam 



106 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



on these two boilers will require two pounds of oil per rated 
horse-power. 

One pound of fuel oil will evaporate 14 pounds of water 
from and at 212° Fahr. 

A barrel of fuel oil weights 340 pounds. 

Six men will be required to operate a station. 

One pumping unit will be operated for twenty minutes 
each day; once a week, all units will be operated together for 
thirty minutes. 

Each pump will require 600 brake horse-power to drive it 
at full load. 

The steam turbines will require thirty pounds of steam 
or 2.14 pounds of fuel oil per brake horse-power per hour. 

Fuel, 6,360 barrels oil at $1.00 $ 6.360.00 

Attendance, 1 Chief Engineer at $2100 $2100 

2 Assistant Engineers at 1800 3600 

3 Stokers at 1200 3600 

9.300.00 

Supplies 100.00 

Repairs, y 2 % 1,555.00 

$17,315.00 

Adding to this the fixed charges, interest at 5% and 

depreciation, 2% 21.778.00 

We have as the total cost of operation $39,093.00 

DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE 
PLANT. 

ENGINES 

As experience has shown that because of more perfect 
lubrication, large sized gas engines of the horizontal type are 
more reliable in their operation than those of the vertical 
type, engines of the horizontal type have been selected. Re- 
liable builders have expressed a willingness to furnish this 
type of engine and to guarantee its successful operation. 

FUEL 

The estimate of the cost of operation has been based upon 



: no. o 

ANGEMENT OF 

STATIONS 

EN BY 

i ENGINES 

'gals, per minute 



&3 



>r an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

PROTECTION 

I UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 

ublic Works and City Engineer 
CONNICK and T. W. RANSOM 

puring the years 1907-8 
Sty of Ordinance No. 353 (new series) 
1BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
iSan Francisco. Cal. 
1 b m itte d january, 1908 
3d: 

H, 1908 ///^Ah^s 




PLiVTli No. 9 

GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF 

PUMPING STATIONS 

DRIVEN BY 
GASOLINE ENGINES 

Capacity 16,000 gals, per minute 



Plans f( r an Auxiliary Water System 

FOR 

FIRE PROTECTION 

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 

Board of Public Works and City Engineer 
Br H. D. CONNICK AND T. W. RANSOM 

Burin* the years 1907-8 
Under authority of Ordinance- No. 353 (new series) 
of the ROARD OK SUPERVISORS 
San Fkancisco. Cai.. 
Submitted January, 1908 
Approved: 

Feb. MtJh. 1908 7/ia^iAu.ni^^:t 



Late n t o. 10 

ERAL ARRANGEMENT OF 

JMPING STATIONS 

DRIVEN BY 
AS O LI N E ENGINES 

city 16,000 gals, per minute 



xiliary Water System 

FOR 

OTECTION 

THE DIRECTION OF THE 

orks and City Engineer 
K AND T. W. RANSOM 

le years W07-8 
inance No. 353 (new scries) 
OF SUPERVISORS 
ncisco. Cal. 

JANUARY, 1908 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



107 



the use of gasoline as fuel. It is recognized that cheaper 
fuels are available and might perhaps be used, but in the 
present state of the art of building engines of this size, the 
use of gasoline will insure greater certainty of operation. 

PUMPS 

For the same reasons that led to their selection in connec- 
tion with the steam plant, multi-stage turbine pumps are to be 
preferred. It will be necessary, however, on account of the 
comparatively slow speed at which gas engines operate, to use 
pumps which are designed for slower speeds and connect them 
to the engines by belts or gearing. 

DESCRIPTION OF GAS ENGINE STATION. 

Plates 9 and 10 show the arrangement on which the cost 
of a station of this type is based. 

There will be five pumps of the multi-stage turbine type 
each capable of delivering not less than two thousand gal- 
lons of water per minute against a pressure of three hundred 
pounds per square inch when running at a speed of about five 
hundred and ten revolutions per minute. 

Each pump will be driven by a separate gasoline engine 
of the four-cylinder, horizontal, double acting type, capable 
of developing six hundred brake horse-power at a speed of 
one hundred and fifty revolutions per minute. 

On account of the high speed at which the pumps will 
operate and the large amount of power to be transmitted, it is 
not deemed safe to use gears for connecting the engines and 
pumps and therefore a rope drive is to be used. This will 
consist of two separate continuous rope drives for each unit, 
each drive having twelve wraps of one and one-quarter inch 
rope. By adopting this arrangement, it will be possible should 
an accident happen to one of the ropes at a time when the 
pump is urgently needed, to remove that rope and operate on 
one rope until there is time to replace the injured one. 

Space is to be provided for the installation, when neces- 
sary, of the additional pumps and engines shown on the 
plans. 

The six steel tanks shown on the plans for the storage of 
gasoline have been designed so that gasoline may be stored 



108 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

under water, thus providing against the danger of fire or 
explosion. Their capacity will be sufficient for the storage of 
fuel to operate the plant under service conditions for six 
months and leave in reserve a supply for the continuous ope- 
ration of the entire station at its ultimate capacity of sixteen 
thousand gallons per minute for forty-eight hours. 

In addition each station will be equipped with all neces- 
sary suction and discharge pipes, strainers, check valves and 
gate valves ; venturi 'meters for measuring the water pumped, 
circulating pumps for jacket water, air compressor, electric 
light plant, twenty-ton cranes, necessary grating, ladders, 
etc. 

COST OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE PLANT. 

The cost of the above described plant ready for operation, 
exclusive of the real estate on which it is to be located and the 
intake tunnel, is estimated to be as follows : 



5—600 B. H. P. Gasoline Engines $165,990.00 

5 Rope Drives 4,560.00 

5 Turbine Pumps 40,000.00 

Gasoline Tanks 3,742.00 

Gratings, Stairs and Railings 2,660.00 

Exhaust Piping 1,160.00 

Pumps and Pipe for Water Circulation 3,250.00 

Electric Lighting Plant 2,174.00 

2— 20-ton Electric Cranes 17,106.00 

Air Compressors — Receivers and Pipe 4,200.00 

Suction and Discharge Pipes and Fittings 7,255.00 

2 Venturi Meters 2,000.00 

Building (including Machinery Foundations) .... 81,283.00 

Plans and Supervision 16,769.00 

Contingencies 16,769.00 



Total $368,924.00 



COST OF OPERATING INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE PLANT. 

In preparing the following estimate of the cost of main- 
taining and operating this plant, the same assumptions as to 
time of operation and power recpiired have been made as for 
the steam plant already described. The fuel consumption 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 109 

has been assumed at one-eighth gallon per brake horse-power 
per hour: 

Cost of operating gasoline plant: — 

Fuel, 23,250 gallons Gasoline at 17c $ 3,952.50 

Attendance, 1 Chief Engineer at $2100 $2100 

2 Assistant Engineers at 1800 3600 

3 Oilers at 1200 3600 

9,300.00 



Supplies 200.00 

Repairs 1,845.00 



$15,297.50 

Adding to this the fixed charges, interest at 5% and 

depreciation, 2% 25,825.00 



We have as the total cost of operation $41,122.50 



REASONS FOR RECOMMENDING STEAM PLANT. 

It appears from the above estimates that the cost of ope- 
ration of the steam plant will be $39,093.00 per annum as 
against $41,122.50 per annum for the internal combusion en- 
gine plant or that the steam plant will be cheaper to operate 
by $2,029.50 per year. While it might be found possible 
after the plant was completed, to use a cheaper grade of fuel 
than gasoline and so reduce the cost of operation of the in- 
ternal combustion engines below that of steam engines, it is 
apparent that the saving which might be realized can not be 
great. 

Taking into consideration the greater safety with which 
suitable fuel may be stored, the greater simplicity of the 
mechanical equipment, its greater reliability, and the fact that 
men competent to operate such a steam plant are always 
available at a moment's notice, there can be no question but 
that the steam plant offers the most desirable type of motive 
power for this service. 

FIRE BOATS. 

Two steel fire boats will be constructed. Ordinarily they 
will be used for the protection of property in the vicinity of 
the water front and Channel street. In the event of a general 



1 10 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

conflagration they may be used to deliver water from the bay 
into the distributing system through connections provided 
on the wharves, or directly into hose lines which can be laid 
to the scene of the fire. Should portions of the distributing 
system in the artificially filled in or made ground along the 
bay shore be destroyed they will be of great value in protect- 
ing property within those districts. 

In constructing and maintaining these fire boats it is 
recognized that the city will be assuming an expense in pro- 
tecting wharves and other State property along the water 
front, which it has been claimed, should be borne by the 
State. Attention is directed to the fact that although the 
wharves and buildings thereon belong to the State, the greater 
part of the merchandise on the docks, together with adjacent 
buildings and their contents, are largely the property of citi- 
zens of San Francisco and that this city is more vitally con- 
cerned in the safety of the water front and vicinity than is the 
State. Adequate protection can be had only through co-ope- 
ration of fire boats with the local fire department and the 
most certain method of insuring this is to have both main- 
tained and operated under the direction of the Chief En- 
gineer of the San Francisco Fire Department. 

In the accompanying table (Plate No. 11), are listed the 
principal dimensions, the sizes of boilers, engines and pumps, 
and actual discharge capacities under service conditions of a 
number of American fire boats. The tests of discharge ca- 
pacity were made under the direction of the Committee of 
Twenty of the National Board of Fire Underwriters and as 
there could be no object in underestimating these capacities, it 
is reasonable to assume that they represent the best results 
which could be obtained at the time. 

It is to be noted that the actual discharge capacity of the 
great majority of these boats was considerably less than the 
rated capacity. This appears to have been due principally 
to the insufficient size of the boilers and is easily accounted 
for by the fact that in the desire to keep the dimensions of 
the boats small so as to permit of rapid maneuvering and at 
the same time to provide large pumping capacity, designers 
and builders have been over optimistic as to the results which 



PLATE NO. 11 







/re/77£7r/r<J: 


'■ 

V- 














1 


'•: 






>* 




.. 


/% 
















•• 






> 








■' <■ 






























-S/Aoj***/>/6y{/*f<'>e 








SK 




3 




«? 


-< 


S-:x 




















4 


•••< 














fts/y/zxej/kx)/ J/arrj/ieee/ 






































































fi*i 


: 




/400 




XV 
















- . . 


■■ ■■' 


< 




./,V 






















<r 


■ 


> 


:fcY 




« V 








































































¥ 














J//ej/ - /Yo/ / o<,jAe<//o 




(5 
















-a" 




m 




0e/ee/"'& Af<xz/>//?esy 








&y 








-' 


% 


»i> 




m> 




' ..." .-„- " .- -^g o/ a - c 








vj- 








f 


■< 


























4 


li 















































































































































































































- 




«f 




r 




7 








a- 








- 




7 -V 








j 






it" 


~h 




















































































































































































<M?* 




J 
























m: 




















■ /f&YJw-Z"- 








jv 




/ 
























































J 








.•>".r 






i % 










•'- 




6 
























»>.,' 




J 


i 












/<fS0 


foo '-4'-S'<t6 '/ToJe 












J 














/S0O 
















































'i 




























-V 






























































































































•-■ 








/ 




i 




































































































































































c 


if 












••:,■,> 






4 


































































''Ml 























































































































































FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



111 



may be obtained from boilers and the quantity of steam that 
is required to operate pumps. It is not doubted that when 
these boats were new and the pumps in perfect condition, it 
was possible with all boiler surfaces clean and with picked 
coal, to operate them at their full rated capacities, but such 
conditions are rarely obtainable in service and boats should 
be designed with a view to service conditions and not for exhi- 
bition trials. 

It is desirable that a boat of the type recommended be 
placed upon the dry dock for cleaning and painting once 
every six months and in addition, occasional repairs to the 
machinery will necessitate her being out of commission for 
short intervals. In order that one boat may be available at 
all times, two boats are to be provided. 

Their design and arrangement are shown on Sheet Xo. 4. 
They are believed to be as large as can be utilized to advan- 
tage. Their approximate dimensions will be length over all, 
134 feet, 6 inches; length between perpendiculars, 125 feet, 
0 inches ; beam moulded, 26 feet, 0 inches ; depth moulded, 13 
feet, 6 inches; draft, 11 feet, 0 inches; displacement, 520 tons. 

The hulls will be constructed of steel in order to make 
them as light as possible and provide room for the installation 
of the necessary machinery and the storage of the fuel. This 
will also minimize the danger of their catching fire. They will 
be constructed in accordance with the highest requirements of 
Lloyd's or some other well known classification society. No 
advantage will, however, be gained by having them registered 
by these societies, unless it is desired to have them insured 
against marine accidents. 

Each boat will be fitted with two boilers of the water 
tube type, each having 2,770 square feet of heating surface 
and designed for a working pressure of 200 pounds per 
square inch. This type of boiler has been selected on account 
of the rapidity with which steam may be safely raised, be- 
cause for a given weight of boiler its capacity exceeds that of 
other types and for the reason that it may be easily and 
cheaply maintained. A boiler of the recommended size in use 
on San Francisco Bay has evaporated under the most favor- 
able conditions about 18,000 pounds of water per hour with 



1 12 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

natural draft. Under service conditions and without any 
special preparations it can be depended upon to evaporate 
from 12,000 to 14,000 pounds per hour. Each boiler will be 
fitted with a separate smoke stack. The fuel used will be 
crude oil, provision being made for the storage of about 20,000 
gallons in tanks alongside of the boilers. 

In order to increase the ease with which they can be 
maneuvered, the boats will be provided with twin screws, each 
being driven by a cross compound vertical condensing engine 
of the inverted cylinder type, with cylinders thirteen and 
twenty-eight inches in diameter respectively, and with a com- 
mon stroke of twenty-one inches. Under 180 pounds steam 
pressure each engine will develop about 400 indicated horse- 
power at 135 revolutions per minute. This will drive the 
boat at between eleven and twelve knots per hour, which is 
sufficient speed. 

For reasons which have already been discussed the pumps 
will be of the multi-stage turbine type driven by steam tur- 
bine engines. There will be two sets installed in each boat. 
Experience in other cities has shown that pressures of over 
150 pounds per square inch are rarely required in fighting 
fires on the water front. It may, however, occasionally be 
necessary to pump water into the distributing system or 
through excessively long hose lines and in this event pres- 
sures up to three hundred pounds per square inch will be de- 
sirable. In order that a maximum capacity may be obtained 
under each of these conditions, each pumping set will consist 
of two separate pumps each capable of delivering two thou- 
sand gallons per minute against a pressure of one hundred 
and fifty pounds per square inch. The casing of one of 
these pumps will be made sufficiently strong to withstand a 
pressure of three hundred pounds per square inch. The 
suction and discharge pipes will be arranged so that each 
pump may be connected to draw water from the bay and de- 
liver it into the delivery pipes on the boat, or one pump may 
deliver water from the bay into the suction of the other at a 
pressure of one hundred and fifty pounds per square inch 
and this pump will increase the pressure to three hundred 
pounds per square inch and discharge into the delivery pipes 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



113 



of the boat. By this means a pumping set may deliver 4,000 
gallons per minute against a pressure of 150 pounds per 
square inch or 2,000 gallons per minute against a pressure of 
300 pounds per square inch without sensibly altering its effi- 
ciency. As there will be two sets in each boat the total dis- 
charge capacity of a boat will be 8,000 gallons per minute 
against 150 pounds per square inch, or 4,000 gallons per 
minute against 300 pounds per square inch. 

Assuming that the efficiency of these pumps will be 60% 
and that the steam turbines will require twenty pounds of 
water per brake horse-power per hour, each [tumping set will 
require about 12,000 pounds of steam per hour for its ope- 
ration. It is recognized that these efficiencies are below those 
that will be guaranteed by responsible builders of this class 
of machinery, but it is required that the boats be able to 
work up to full capacity not only when first completed, but 
after several years of service. As the boilers will each easily 
evaporate 12,000 pounds of water per hour even if the heat- 
ing surfaces are somewhat foul, and it will not be necessary 
to operate both pumps and engines at full power at the same 
time, the proportions of machinery and boilers can be seen 
to be w T ell on the side of safety. 

As the type of boiler recommended is not suitable for use 
with salt feed water, a surface condenser to condense the ex- 
haust steam will be installed. Air pumps are also to be pro- 
vided and the engines operated on a vacuum in order to fully 
utilize the power of the boilers. 

Two monitors and one water tower with interchangeable 
nozzles up to four inches in diameter are to be fitted on top 
of the deck house. Portable monitors with nozzles up to two 
and three-quarters inches in diameter are to be placed one at 
each end of the boat. In the rail on each side of the boat 
two sockets will be fitted to which portable monitors with noz- 
zles up to two and three-quarters inches in diameter may be 
connected and used for delivering streams alongside of the 
boat or under a wharf should occasion demand. 

It is proposed to provide suitable shields to be used in 
connection with these monitors for the purpose of protecting 
the operators from the heat in case it is necessary to approach 



1 14 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

close to a fire and a system of sprinklers is to be so arranged 
as to play a spray of water over each monitor when desirable. 

Hydrant connections will be fitted at the sides and ends 
of the deck house near the deck for the purpose of connecting 
a number of hose lines for the delivery of water into the 
distributing system or leading hose lines to the scene of a 
fire. Space for storing hose will be provided under the deck 
at each end of the boat. 

Each boat will be provided with a steam steering engine 
in addition to the ordinary hand steering gear, a steam wind- 
lass, and an electric generator of 10 K. W. capacity to furnish 
current for lighting the vessel and for an 18-inch searchlight 
on top of the pilot house. Tow bitts, for use in case it is neces- 
sary to tow vessels away from burning wharves, are also to 
be fitted. 

In addition the boats will be furnished with a full equip- 
ment of compasses, life boats, davits, life preservers, life 
buoys, lights, anchors and chains to comply with the Rules 
and Regulations prescribed by the Board of Supervising In- 
spectors of the United States Steamboat Inspection Service. 

The spaces at the ends of the hull will be finished for use 
as trimming tanks and for the storage of fresh water to be 
used in making up losses in boiler feed water. 

With the exception of the galley, which is intended for 
the preparation of hot food in case the boat is detained at a 
fire for a long period, no living quarters are to be provided on 
the boats. 

A house is to be constructed on the wharf at which the 
boats will be stationed. It is planned that an office for the 
Chief Engineer, telephone, and sitting rooms, be provided on 
the first floor. On the second will be a dormitory, bath rooms 
and officers' quarters. In addition there will be a hose tower 
at one end. 

DISTRIBUTING SYSTEMS. 

It has already been stated that the protected area is to be 
divided into an upper and a lower zone. Each of these zones 
will be supplied with water through an independent distrib- 
uting system. These distributing systems may be connected 
into one, upon an emergency, as will be seen later. 



FOR SAX FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



115 



The size and location of the net work of pipes forming 
the distributing systems are shown on Sheet No. 1 of the ac- 
companying plans. 

From the distributing reservoir near the crossing of 17th 
and Ashbury streets, three 18-inch pipes will connect with 
the system. Of the two which directly supply the upper zone, 
one will lead down Ashbury and Haight streets and the other 
down Clayton and Hayes streets to the gridiron of the upper 
zone. The third will lead down 17th street to the junction of 
Market and Castro streets, and may be connected directly with 
the lower zone by the opening of a hydraulicly operated gate 
valve to be located at the junction of Market and 17th streets. 

Upper Zone. — The upper zone includes the higher portions 
of Districts No. 1 and No. 4 of the protected area. It will be 
completely encircled by 14-inch and 18-inch pipes and the 
streets of the section west of Van Ness avenue will be traversed 
at frequent intervals in both directions by lines of pipe 12 and 
14 inches in diameter. 

The section east of Van Ness avenue, which includes the 
summit and adjacent slopes of Nob Hill, will be traversed in 
an easterly and westerly direction by 12-inch mains, two 
blocks apart. There will also be provided a number of 10-inch 
mains in the north and south streets, together with a 14-inch 
and 18-inch main on Jones street. 

It is provided that a 20-inch main connecting the distrib- 
uting system of the upper zone with the Black Point pumping 
station will be constructed from Van Ness avenue and Pacific 
street along Pacific, Polk and Filbert streets, Van Ness avenue, 
North Point and Polk streets. 

The distributing reservoir of the lower zone can be sup- 
plied from the Twin Peaks storage reservoirs through the dis- 
tributing system of the upper zone at the rate of 12,000 gal- 
lons per minute. 

Lower Zone. — The lower zone includes the lower portion of 
Districts Nos. 1, 2 and 4, together with all of District No. 3 of 
the protected area. 

This zone will, under ordinary circumstances, receive its 
supply from the distributing reservoir to be constructed in 
Jones street between Sacramento and Clay streets. Two 18- 



1 16 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTIC N 

inch pipes will connect this reservoir with the distributing 
system. One, to be constructed along Riley. Taylor and 
Sacramento streets, will connect with the 18-inch main in 
Kearny street. The other will be laid along Jones, Sacra- 
mento and Taylor streets and connect with the distributing 
system at Sutter street, 

District No. 1. — The eastern portion of this district will be 
traversed by a line of pipe 18 and 20 inches in diameter which 
will connect the Black Point and Rincon Hill Pumping Sta- 
tions. Starting with a diameter of 20 inches at the Black 
Point Station, it will be laid along Polk, Bay, Hyde. Francisco, 
Leavenworth and Lombard streets to Montgomery avenue, 
where its diameter will be reduced to 18 inches, thence along 
Montgomery avenue, Kearny, Market, New Montgomery, Mis- 
sion and Second streets to Folsom street, where its diameter 
will be increased to 20 inches, thence along Second street to 
the Rincon Hill Station. 

The above route is entirely over solid ground and no spe- 
cial precautions will be necessary to protect this main from 
damage by severe earthquake shock. 

Another main line pipe of 18 to 20 inches in diameter will 
extend westerly and northerly from the Rincon Hill Pumping 
Station. Starting with a diameter of 20 inches, it will be laid 
along Townsend street, Sanford Place and Brannan street 
to Third street, where it will be reduced to 18 inches, thence 
along Brannan, Seventh, Bryant. Chesley. Harrison, Ninth, 
Folsom, Eleventh, Market streets and Van Ness avenue to 
Fulton streets where it will deflect westward along Fulton and 
Franklin streets to Ellis street, in order to avoid a dangerous 
region in which there were a number of breaks in Spring Val- 
ley pipes. 

Brannan street cresses an old arm of Mission Bay. which, 
together with some tributary sloughs, formerly extended in 
a northwesterly direction to the vicinity of Seventh and 
Mission streets. A portion of this area together with the ad- 
jacent filled mud flats suffered considerable disturbance in 
consequence of the recent earthquake. However, as Brannan 
street was one of the first filled streets constructed in this 
vicinity and in the portion between Seventh street and Second 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



117 



street, no serious displacement occurred during 1 the earth- 
quake, it lias been selected as the most desirable street in 
which to construct a main across Mission Flats. During its 
construction borings should be made and the pipe provided 
with a pile foundation, designed with consideration of the 
effects of earthquake, wherever the ground does not afford 
sufficient support. 

An 18-inch main is also to be provided through the center 
of this district along Market street, connecting the 18-inch 
main that crosses Market street at Kearny street to the 18-inch 
main that crosses at Eleventh street, 

A maximum protection is to be given the portion of the 
district bounded by Market street. Van Ness avenue, Bush. 
Stockton, Washington, Dupont streets, Broadway and the Bay 
shore, which includes the greater part of the congested value 
district. Mains are to be constructed on practically all the 
easterly and westerly streets and these are to be connected 
with the mains on the northerly and southerly streets at inter- 
vals of two and three blocks. 

Mains will be laid along the Bay shore northwesterly from 
Broadway as far as the northerly end of Powell street and on 
the adjacent low lands extending to the base of Telegraph 
and Russian Hills. 

The area south of Market street bounded by the bay shore, 
Channel. Division. Eleventh and Market streets is to be grid- 
ironed with mains on all the principal streets. 

Distrlct Xo. 2. — The new wholesale and warehouse district 
will be protected by 12-inch mains on Kansas, Minnesota, Six- 
teenth and Seventh streets. 

District Xo. 8. — Mains from 10 to 18 inches in diameter 
will entirely surround this district. An 18-inch main is pro- 
vided along Market street from Eleventh to Castro streets, and 
a 14-inch along Castro, Eighteenth, Dolores, Twenty-second 
and Guerrero streets to Twenty-fourth street. In addition the 
district will be frequently crossed in both directions by mains 
10 to 12 inches in diameter. 

District Xo. 4. — The section of this districe in the lower 
zone is to be protected by 12-inch pipes on Fell street between 
Fillmore and Van Ness avenue and on Laguna street between 



118 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Market and Ellis streets, together with a 14-inch main on 
Golden Gate avenue between Fillmore and Franklin streets. 

Connections Between Zones. — Along the common bound- 
aries of the upper and lower zones, the mains of the lower zone 
will be extended and connected with the mains encircling the 
upper zone. These connecting mains will be provided with 
gate valves which will be normally closed. Whenever it is de- 
sirable to reinforce the lower zone, water may be obtained 
directly from tue upper zone by opening these gates. 

PIPE SYSTEM. 

After consideration of the requirements of high pressure, 
together with the probable effects of earthquake shock and 
the fact that salt water may at times be used in the system, 
the conclusion has been reached that cast-iron is the most 
desirable material for the pipes. 

In firm ground they are to be of the bell and spigot type, 
with a specially designed lead joint. There are' to be deep 
double lead grooves in both spigot and hub end of each pipe, 
so placed that when the pipes are laid they will be opposite 
one' another. This type of joint is in successful use in several 
Eastern cities and a number of tests under a pressure of 450 
pounds per square inch show a remarkably small amount of 
leakage. 

In areas of artificially filled or made ground a special 
type of cast-iron pipe and joint as shown on Plate No. 12 will 
be used. This arrangement will permit of considerably more 
movement in the pipes than will the ordinary bell and spigot 
joint. 

The popular belief that it is impossible in countries sub- 
ject to earthquake to construct and maintain pipe lines with- 
out providing flexible joints at frequent intervals to permit of 
relative movement between different lengths of pipe is not 
altogether correct. 

The relative movement of two nearby points on solid 
ground on the same side of an earthquake fault is so small as 
to be inconsiderable, or in other words, the surface of the 
earth in so far as two points, say fifty feet apart are con- 
cerned, moves practically as a whole and the amount of the 



PLATE NO. 12 




PROPOSED PIPE JOINT FOR USE IN AREAS OF ARTIFICIALLY 
FILLED OR "MADE" GROUND. 



I'LATK No. 13 



THICKNESS AND WEIGHT OF CAST IRON PIPES. 
Weight are per length to lay 12 feet, including Standard Sockets. 



Nomina 

//Hide 
Diam. 
Inches 


100 Ft Hetad 

■*h3 L PRESSURE 


200 Ft heao 

3<S L3S r-tt&ssv/te 


f/ominoi 

Inside 
Diam. 
Inches 


Thickness 
Inches 


Weight, lbs., per 


Th/cknex. 
Inches 


We/g/7/,/hs.,per 


Foot 


Leng//i 


Foo/ 


Leng/h 


3 


.47 


4-2.3 


515 


52 


47.5 


S70. 


8 


10 


.50 


567 


680 


.56 


63.3 


760 


/O 


12 


.53 


712 


855 


.61 


80.8 


97C? 


/2 


/4 


.57 


900 


I080 


.66 


IO/.6 


7220 


/4 


16 


.60 


108.3 


/300 


.70 


1242 


/4&0 


/6 


18 


.63 


1266 


/520 


.75 


1483 


/780 


78 


20 


.66 


1466 


/760 


.79 


174/ 


2.090 


20 


Hannal 

Inside 
Dram. 
Inches 


Joo fy Head 

/30 LOS Pfr£33U*£ 


<4oo FY Head 

/73 LBS FfrESSV/IE 


//omi/vt 

Inside 

D/dm. 
Inches 


Thickness 
/nches 


Weigh/, /Ax, par 


Thichnesc 
inches 


fVe/g/77,/Ss.,per 


foot 


lff/7^/7) 


Foo/ 


Leng/h 


6 


.57 


52. / 


625 


.63 


56.8 


670 


3 


10 


.63 


708 


850 


.70 


78 9 


935 


/o 


12 


.69 


9/6 


//GO 


.77 


/O/G 


/220 


/2 


14 


.75 


//5.8 


/3SO 


.83 


Z27.5 


/530 


/4 


16 


.80 


/425 


/7/0 


.90 


/S8 3 


/900 


/6 


18 


.86 


170.0 


2040 


.97 


797 6 


2300 


/8 


20 


.92 


201 6 


2420 


/.04 


223/ 


2750 


20 


Mm/at 
Inside 
Diam. 
/nches 


SOO ft /Wead 
2/7 Las P/rsssu/fE 


6oe7 Ft F/^ad 

2*6 0 7-33 


M>mmt 
/node 
L?/am. 
/nches 


Tn/c/rnex^ 
/nches 


/fa, per 


Th/ckness 
/nches 


We/ght t lbs per 


Foo7 


length 


Foof 


Le-/?g/A 


8 


.66 


$/.7 


F+O 


.7i 


65.7 


7SO 


8 


/O 


. 74 


86 3 


/03S 


.SO 


92.1 


7/05 


/o 


/2 


.82 


//3 8 


/36S 


.99 


/22.I 


7465 


72 


74- 


.90 


/4*50 


/740 


.39 


/575 


789 O 


74 


/e 


• 38 


773.6 


2/55 


1.08 


/S5.4 


2345 


/6 


78 


/.07 


2204 


2643 


1.17 


236-4- 


2860 


73 


so 


A/5 


263 


J/5S 


1.27 


286 -3 


3435 


2Q 


NomtM 

Inside 
Diam. 
Inch's 


70U Ft Head 
304 Lbs Pressure: 


7SO Ft Head 
325 Lbs Fke&sukc 


Nominal 
Inside 
Diam 
Inches 


Thickness 
/nches 


We/ght. /bs.,per 


Thickness 
Inches 


We/ghf, Lbs. ; per 


Foot 


Length 


Foo/ 


Length 


a 


■ 75 


70 6 


850 


.78 


729 


87S 


8 


fO 


■86 


ZOO- 9 


/2/0 


■ 89 


/OJ.3 


7245 


/O 


12 


.97 


/35 4- 


1625 


/ 0/ 


/3S.6 


7675 


/2 


14 


107 


174-2. 


2090 


/ 


/80 5 


^/65 


Z4- 


16 


/ 18 


2/92 


2620 


/ 23 


2259 


273S 


/6 


18 


/28 


267/ 


3 2 OS 


/ 34 


276 9 


3322 


/8 


20 


/39 


320 8 


3850 


1.4-5 


332-7 


3938 


SO 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



119 



relative movement which occurs between adjacent pipe lengths 
need not be considered. On opposite sides of a fault, and in 
areas of soft alluvium and in artificially filled or made ground, 
the relative motion which may occur is so great that it is 
practically impossible to provide against the destruction of 
pipe. The method by which it is proposed to preserve the 
usefulness of the sections of the distribution system in firm 
ground in case the pipes are broken in the areas of artificially 
filled or made ground is set forth in the description of the gate 
system. 

The thickness of the pipes to be used will depend upon the 
pressure in the district within which they are to be laid. This 
thickness, together with the weights, for the various pressures, 
is shown on the accompanying table, Plate No. 13. 

All mains will be connected where they intersect in order 
to obtain as perfect a circulation as possible and where there 
are curves in the lines the sections of pipe will be bolted to- 
gether with wrought iron rods. The hydrants and 8-inch 
connections will be bolted to the mains in the same manner. 

On account of their weakened sections the special three and 
four way branches will be constructed of cast steel on pipe 
lines subject to static pressures of 400 feet and over. 

The friction losses of the system have been carefully com- 
puted with due consideration of the facts that the carrying 
capacity of pipe systems are considerably reduced by age and 
that portions may be out of use on account of the necessity of 
making repairs. 

Fire boat connections will be provided along the water 
front and on Channel street. These connections are to be in- 
stalled in duplicate — one on the Bulkhead line and one at 
the Pier head line. The necessity for this arises from the fact 
that if they are provided only at the Pier head line they are 
liable to be put out of service and if only at the Bulkhead line, 
they would seldom be available for use as the space between 
the piers is generally filled with ships which would have to 
be removed before the fire boats could enter. 

To remove sediment from the mains, blow off vaives will 
be provided at the low points of the distributing system. They 
will be arranged to discharge directly into the sewer. 



120 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

To prevent the accumulation of air in the pipe lines, auto- 
matic air valves will be installed at the summits or high 
points of the pipe system. 

Automatic relief valves will be installed at a number of 
points on the distributing system of each zone to reduce the 
dangerous effects of water hammer. As these devices have 
been known to fail at critical times because of lack of attention 
they will be located in selected fire engine houses, where they 
can be inspected and given the necessary care to insure their 
successful operation. They will be arranged to discharge into 
the sewer. 

Location of Mains in the Streets. — For a number of 
years, the various public service corporations have been con- 
structing pipe and conduit systems in the City streets. This 
work has proceeded regardless of any city supervision or regu- 
lation and generally upon no settled plan. The apparent de- 
sire of all has been to occupy the most available space and to 
be as near the surface as practicable. 

The sketch on Plate No. 14 shows the confusion of conduits, 
pipe lines, surface railways, etc., existing at the crossing of 
Ninth and Mission streets and indicates in a general way the 
difficulties lhat will attend the construction of an additional 
pipe system in this city. 

Prior to April 18, 1906, the City Engineer commenced to 
assemble on Maps of a suitable scale, all of the available data 
regarding structures occupying the streets. These maps, to- 
gether with a number of the original records of the public 
service corporations were destroyed in the fire. However, the 
work has been started again and is well under way. 

In general the location and depth of the mains will depend 
upon the position of the above mentioned underground struc- 
tures. However, it is desirable where possible, that they be 
laid on the opposite side of the street from the gas mains. In 
the high building districts, their tops should be not less than 
five feet below the surface. In outlying districts, this depth 
may be safely reduced to three and a half feet. 

GATE SYSTEM. 

Gate valves will be so placed that the main in any one 




tS/yow/rx? a/ze- erne/ /ocx7f/on of 
{yr?<z/er-<proc//7c/ 0£><sf/-cs c f/or?<s /'/? 

/V//V77J a/Taf M/<SJ/OA/ <JT<S. 



FOR SAX FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



121 



block may be cut off from the rest of the system for the pur- 
pose of making repairs or inspection without seriously affect- 
ing the supply to hydrants on other blocks. 

The buildings on the areas of artificially filled or made 
ground already described are to be afforded the same fire pro- 
tection as those situated on more solid ground but the proba- 
bility of the entire fire protection system of the city being put 
out of service by the destruction of the fire mains in these 
areas is to be guarded against by the special arrangement of 
the pipe and gate system described below. Each of these 
areas will be provided with its own distribution system of 
special pipe which will ordinarily be fed through one open 
gate valve of sufficient size to provide the necessary supply 
for private fire services and for all ordinary fires. The mains 
in each street will be extended to connect with the near-by 
mains of the distribution system of the lower zone. They will 
be provided with gate valves which will normally be closed. 
Should the ordinary supply furnished to these special distribu- 
tion systems in areas of artificially filled or made ground prove 
insufficient, it can quickly be increased by opening these closed 
gates on the boundaries of the district. These gates should be 
closed as soon as the necessity for their being open has passed. 
As the result of severe earthquake shock, should the mains 
forming the distribution systems in these districts be broken, 
it will be possible, by closing only five gate valves to entirely 
disconnect all of these broken mains from the distributing sys- 
tem of the lower zone. Even in the event of the occurrence of 
an earthquake equal in intensity to that of April 18, 1906, no 
difficulty should be experienced in closing these gates. This 
arrangement makes it possible for the pipes in the areas of 
artificially filled or made (jroiind to be put out of service with- 
out seriously interfering with the effectiveness of the remaining 
parts of the system. If fires break out in these areas while the 
valves are closed it will be necessary to depend for the water 
necessary to extinguish them upon the cisterns which are de- 
scribed later or to lead long hose lines from hydrants on the 
adjacent firm ground or from the fire boats, into the districts. 
While it will not be possible to concentrate large volumes of 
water during emergencies as quickly by this means as if the 



122 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



fire mains were un-damaged, it is believed that sufficient quan- 
tity will be available to prevent a general conflagration. 

All gates, with the exception of those on hydrant connec- 
tions, will be enclosed in brick or reinforced concrete cham- 
bers, to facilitate inspection or repairs. In order that they 
may be readily located in emergency they will, when practica- 
ble, be similarly situated in all street crossings and the gate 
chambers will be provided with special manhole frames and 
covers of distinctive design. 

In order to prevent disarrangement of the gate system, all 
gates will be so designed that the cover of a gate chamber 
which has been removed for the purpose of opening a closed 
gate can not be replaced until the gate has been closed nor can 
the cover be closed over a gate which is normally open unless 
the gate is open. 

The gates on all mains 12 inches and over in diameter 
will be the next size smaller than the main on which they are 
installed, a reducer being provided on each side of the gate. 
The advantages of this arrangement, viz., the reduction in 
cost and greater ease with which the gates may be opened or 
closed, more than offset the slight increase in the friction 
losses of the system. 

The gate valves will be of the single disc or wedge type 
with inside screw, and those 12 inches or more in diameter 
are to be provided with by-passes. 

They will be designed with a. view to use with sail water 
and bronze will be employed wherever corrosion is likely to 
interfere with their strength, durability or proper operation. 
All bolts will be mild steel, the stem of Tobin bronze. The 
gears, gear bracket, gland, stuffing box, bonnet, disc, by-pass 
elbows and operating nut of all gates will be made of east-iron 
having a tensile strength of not less than 18.000 pounds per 
square inch. 

All valves will be designed for a working pressure not less 
than the maximum static head at the location in which they 
are to be used and tested to a pressure of at least twice the 
working pressure, and the gears are to be so proportioned that 
the gates can be readily operated by one man. 

HYDRANTS. 

The hydrants will be so placed in the congested value dis- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



123 



trict that with hose lengths not exceeding 400 feet, 15.000 gal- 
lons per minute can be concentrated on any area of 100,000 
square feet. (15,000 gallons per minute is equal to the ca- 
pacity of about twenty-eight of the ordinary city steam fire 
engines). In other parts of the protected district they will 
be so situated that from 8,000 to 12,000 gallons per minute can 
be concentrated on a block. 

The connections between the hydrants and the mains will 
be eight inches in diameter and provided with a gate valve 
with a cast-iron gate box. The hydrant will be located, where 
possible, on the opposite side of the street from the main and 
the gate valve will be placed as close to the main as practica- 
ble so that in case of injury to the hydrant, the gate will be 
accessible for shutting off the water. 

The hydrants should be of the post type, designed to open 
against the pressure and with a view to their use with salt 
water. Bronze will be used wherever corrosion is likely to 
interfere either with their strength, durability or proper oper- 
ation, and in all metal parts of the valves and valve seats. 

The outlet nozzles should be controlled by independent 
valves. The area of the water way through the main valve 
should not be less than 28 square inches. The internal diam- 
eter of the stand pipe should be nine inches. The inlet at the 
base of the hydrant will be eight inches internal diameter. 
The hydrant should be so designed that all valves, seats, spin- 
dles, etc., can be removed without disconnecting the hydrant ; 
and that the main valve can be opened and closed by one man 
using a 15-inch wrench, when the hydrant is under the full 
static pressure. 

The hydrants used in each zone should be distinctively dif- 
ferent in design. They will be designed for a working pressure 
not less than the static head under which they are to be used 
and a test pressure of at least twice the working pressure. 

ELECTKOLYSIS. 

After the system is completed it will be necessary that elec- 
trolytic investigations be made to determine if there is any 
difference in potential between the pipes and the rails of 
the electric street railways. In areas in which this condition 
exists it will be necessary that proper remedial measures be 



124 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



promptly adopted in order to protect the pipe from electro- 
lytic corrosion. 

SYSTEM OF FIRE CISTERNS. 

The ordinance authorizing this report directs that the 
Board of Public Works procure through the City Engineer and 
file with the Supervisors plans and estimates of cost of "a sys- 
tem of cisterns of suitable capacity, to be constructed at such 
local ion in the business and residence sections as may be desig- 
nated by the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department." 

Sheet No. 3 shows the locations at which the Chief Engineer 
of the Fire Department designates that sixty of the proposed 
fire cisterns are to be constructed. Provision is made in the 
estimate for the construction of forty additional ones at such 
points as may appear desirable during the installation of the 
system. 

The capacity of each of the cisterns is to be 75,000 gallons 
and they are to be constructed of concrete reinforced with 
steel. 

TELEPHONE SYSTEM. 

To provide a means of communication between the officers 
of the Fire Department at the scene of a fire and the men on 
duty at the pumping stations and gate houses, a telephone 
system of 395 phones for the sole use of the department is in- 
cluded as part of the proposed system. The proposed locations 
of the call boxes and central stations are shown on sheet No. 2. 

Two telephone switchboards will be installed, one in each 
pumping station, each of which will serve about one-half the 
call boxes in the protected district. The two central stations 
at the pumping stations will be connected by four trunk lines 
and in addition there will be a line from each central station 
to the nearest offices of the Home Telephone Company, the 
Pacific States Telephone Co., and the central office of the Police 
and Fire alarm systems. These connections will be available 
in emergency to communicate with the stations and gate houses 
of the system if, for any reason, part of the special service is 
out of use. Two lines from each central station will run 1<> 
each of the gate houses and the fire boat stations. 

In general there will be six call boxes on each circuit, and 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



125 



the circuits will be so arranged that those in areas of arti- 
ficially filled or made ground can go out of service without 
affecting any other circuits. The call boxes will be provided 
with connections for portable instruments to be carried by the 
officers of the department and will be so located that at least 
one will be within convenient distance of any part of the 
protected districts, the distance from any hydrant to the near- 
est box not exceeding one block. 

To insure the maximum reliability of service all telephone 
wires will be underground. 

For the purpose of wiring this system, it is proposed, as 
far as they are available, to use the underground conduits at 
present being installed by the City, and those ducts of the 
underground conduit systems of the Home, and Pacific States 
Telephone Company, which under the terms of their franchise, 
are for the exclusive use of the city. 

FUTURE EXTENSIONS OF SYSTEM. 
It is believed that the proposed system will meet all the re- 
quirements of the City for a number of years to come. At 
some future time should it be found desirable to increase the 
quantities of water available or to extend the distribution sys- 
tem to cover additional territory or should any areas require 
more extended protection, such additions may readily be made 
as the system is so designed that it can be extended to meet 
future requirements. As previously indicated, the capacity of 
each pumping station may be increased six thousand gallons 
per minute, additional distributing reservoirs may be con- 
structed on any of the numerous sites in the City and fire 
mains and appurtenances may be laid without reconstructing 
any part of the system herein recommended. 

METHOD OF OPERATION. 

The following is a brief statement as to how the proposed 
system will be operated. 

With the exception of the special telephone service which 
should be maintained by the Department of Electricity, the 
system should be under the direction of the Chief Engineer 
of the Fire Department. 

The department will be notified of the discovery of a fire 



126 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

in the same manner as at present. Upon arrival at the scene 
of the fire the operator accompanying the Chief or Battalion 
Chief in command will connect a set of portable telephone in- 
struments to the most convenient call box, thereby establish- 
ing communication with the central telephone station, the gate- 
men at the distributing reservoirs, the pumping stations and 
the fire boat station. 

The mains in the low lying areas of the lower zone will 
ordinarily be under a static pressure of about one hundred and 
forty pounds per square inch. In the higher parts of this zone 
the pressures will range downward to sixty-six pounds per 
square inch, depending upon the elevations of the mains. These 
pressures will be adequate for private fire service and the 
control of ordinary fires. If, during the progress of a fire, 
the officer in charge desires the pressure increased, he can tele- 
phone to the gateman at the Clay street reservoir, who, can 
by operating the necessary hydraulicly controlled gates, con- 
nect the mains of the lower zone directly with the mains of 
the upper zone. If, for anj^ reason, the pressure or the quan- 
tity of water so obtained is not sufficient, the gateman at the 
Seventeenth street reservoir can be notified to open the gate 
on the eighteen-inch main in Seventeenth street at Castro 
street which connects the distributing reservoir of the upper 
zone with the distributing system of the lower zone. By these 
means the static pressures in the mains in the low lying areas 
of the lower zone will be increased to about two hundred and 
fifteen pounds per square inch and in the higher parts they will 
range downwards to one hundred and thirty pounds per square 
inch depending upon the elevation of the mains. Should it be 
desirable to still further increase these pressures, the gate- 
man at the Seventeenth street reservoir can, by operating the 
proper gates feed the mains of the lower zone directly from 
the Twin Peaks reservoirs. This will raise the pressures in 
the low lying areas of the lower zone to about three hundred 
and twenty-seven pounds per square inch and in the high re- 
gions they will range downwards to two hundred and fifty- 
seven pounds per square inch. 

The distributing system of the upper zone will normally be 
supplied with water from the Seventeenth street reservoir. The 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



127 



static pressures in the mains in the lower areas will be about 
one hundred and seventy-two pounds per square inch; in the 
higher regions they range downwards to seventy-five pounds 
per square inch. If desired, these pressures can be increased 
by operating the proper gates at the Seventeenth street dis- 
tributing reservoir and feeding the distributing system di- 
rectly from the Twin Peaks storage reservoirs to about two 
hundred and eighty-four pounds per square inch in the mains 
of the lower areas, and in the higher areas they will range 
downwards to one hundred and seventy-seven pounds per 
square inch. 

The working pressures when large quantities of water are 
being drawn from the system will be materially less than the 
static pressures given above. When the mains of the lower 
zone are connected to the Twin Peaks reservoirs and water is 
being delivered therefrom at the rate of 15,000 gallons per 
minute the working pressure will be about 229 pounds per 
square inch at the foot of Market street. 

Should the pressure or quantity of water delivered in either 
zone for any cause be insufficient, the supply may be increased 
by transmitting the necessary orders to the Salt Water Pump- 
ing Stations and having them put in service, and, in addition, 
when necessary, the fire boats may be connected to pump into 
the distributing system. 

With the large storage capacity provided it will not be 
necessary to operate the fresh water pumping stations during 
the progress of a fire and the pumping necessary to keep the 
reservoirs full may be done at any time. The machinery will 
need little attention. The closing or opening of a switch and 
two gate valves will be all that is required to start or stop a 
pump. It will be necessary to occasionally fill the oil cups 
and wipe the grease and dust off the machinery. One man in 
each station can easily attend to these duties. 

Six men. for whom quarters will be provided will be re- 
quired to operate each salt water pumping station. They will 
work in three eight-hour shifts, two to a shift, but those off 
watch will be required to remain in the station. Upon the 
receipt of a call for the operation of a station, the men off duty 



128 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



will be required to report immediately and remain until their 
services are no longer necessary. 

One boiler is to be maintained at all times, under full 
steam pressure, ready for instant service and water from this 
boiler is to be circulated through two of the remaining three 
so as to keep them hot and under a steam pressure of say ten 
pounds. The remaining boiler may be laid up for cleaning or 
repairs. 

Upon the receipt of a call for the operation of the station 
the fires under the two hot boilers will be lighted and full 
steam pressure raised as rapidly as possible. An experiment 
made upon a similar boiler in this city indicated that this will 
not require more than twenty minutes. 

It will be possible to start one pumping unit immediately 
after the receipt of a call and operate it by means of the boiler 
under steam. At the expiration of twenty minutes or less, a 
second unit may be started and the remaining three can be 
put into service in rapid succession. Within twenty-five or 
thirty minutes the five units in a station should be in service 
and each station be delivering ten thousand gallons per 
minute into the distributing system. It is believed that under 
no circumstances will it ever be necessary to start all of the 
pumps in so short a time as this. 

Each station is to be equipped with automatic instruments 
which will record the time of the receipt of all calls, the steam 
pressure on each boiler, the time at which each pump is started 
and the pressure and quantity of water delivered. The daily 
records from these instruments should be filed in the office of 
the Chief of the Fire Department. They will provide evidence 
of the efficiency of the operating force. 

For the purpose of drilling the crews and to insure the 
stations being constantly ready for immediate service, calls 
for the operation of one unit in each station should be sent 
in at irregular intervals, averaging about one call per day, and 
about once a week each station should be operated at full 
capacity for a short period. Connections are to be provided 
on the discharge pipes so that the water pumped during these 
practice drills may be discharged back into the bay and not 
into the distribution system. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



129 



One fire boat is to be maintained with steam up. ready for 
service. The other will be held in reserve and except when she 
is on the dry dock or undergoing repairs may be put into serv- 
ice when necessary. 

The crew for operating the boats will consist of : 

3 pilots. 

1 Chief Engineer. 

2 Assistant Engineers. 
5 Oilers. 

2 Stokers. 

One pilot, one engineer, two oilers and one stoker should be 
on duty at all times, ready for immediate service on the boat 
in service. The same number should be available at short no- 
tice in case it is necessary to use the reserve boat. The re- 
mainder may be allowed to be absent from the station with the 
permission of the Chief Engineer of the Fire Department. 

The duties of deck hands are to be performed by hosemen 
or members of the fire crew. As the principal duties of these 
men will be those of hosemen, they should be chosen from the 
regular employees of the fire department, and assigned to duty 
by the Chief Engineer of that department. At first and until 
it is possible to determine by experience what officers and men 
are necessary, it is suggested that arrangements be made so 
that not less than one officer and six hosemen will be available 
for duty on each boat at all times. 

The boat in service will be maintained with one boiler 
under full steam pressure at all times. The other will be kept 
under a steam pressure just sufficient to insure its being hot. 
The boiler under steam will be sufficient for the operation of 
the main engines or for one half of the pumps. If fires are 
lighted under the other boiler immediately upon the receipt of 
a call, it will be possible to have both boilers under full steam 
pressure by the time the boat arrives at the scene of the fire 
or within a few minutes afterwards. 

When necessary to place a boat in the dry dock for cleaning 
and painting or to make any repairs, that boat will be put in 
reserve and the other placed in service. Under these condi- 
tions it will be desirable to assign one crew to duty on the re- 
serve boat to assist in any work that is being done and to alter 
the watches to suit. 



130 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Ordinarily the boat in reserve will be stationed at her 
berth ready for service but without fires under the boilers. 
Should a large fire make it desirable to use this boat it will be 
possible, with the type of boiler recommended to raise steam 
and put the boat in service in from thirty to forty minutes. 

It was stated in describing the types of service desirable, 
that hand held streams can not be safely utilized with nozzle 
pressures in excess of seventy-five pounds per square inch. 
As the nozzle pressure is partly dependent upon the length of 
hose used and as the different hose lines used at a large fire 
are of widely varying lengths, it is evident that the hydrant 
pressure suitable for one stream may be either too high or too 
low for other streams. In order to avoid the danger of insuffi- 
cient pressure, provision has been made for pressures as high 
as will be required under the most exacting conditions. 

The safety of the hosemen is to be assured by means of 
the hydrant pressure regulator described below. Each hose 
is to be equipped with a fitting to be attached to the hydrant 
outlet between the hydrant and the hose. This fitting will 
consist of a throttle valve next to the hydrant by means of 
which the amount of water flowing into the hose may be regu- 
lated, a pressure gauge which will indicate the pressure in the 
hose, and a relief valve which will open and discharge any 
surplus water into the street in case the throttle valve is 
opened so that the pressure in the hose becomes too high. This 
relief valve will be adjustable so that it may be set to open at 
any desired pressure between seventy-five and two hundred 
and fifty pounds per square inch. A man should be detailed 
from each hose company whose sole duty it shall be to stand 
at the hydrant and manipulate the throttle valve. The use 
of this regulator will make it perfectly safe for the officer in 
charge at a fire to order the pressure in the distributing mains 
increased without notifying the men stationed at the various 
hydrants. The gauge will show the increase of pressure as 
soon as it occurs and if, for any reason, the throttle valve is 
not promptly closed, the relief valve will open and prevent any 
accident to the men handling the hose. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



131 



USE FOR SANITARY AND FLUSHING PURPOSES. 

It has long been advocated that it would be desirable to 
utilize water for washing the streets, and that this service 
could be successfully secured in connection with an auxiliary 
water supply system for fire protection. Consideration of the 
existing conditions indicates that the suggested combination 
of a street cleaning and fire fighting device is not desirable. 
Any water used in washing the streets will find its way, to- 
gether with any dirt that it will gather, to the nearest available 
catchbasin or cesspool where the heaviest portion of whatever 
it may be carrying in suspension will be deposited. The water, 
together with the lighter part of its load will flow to the 
sewer where the major part of this will in turn be deposited. 

Properly designed sewers are given sufficient grade to be 
self -cleansing, but it is a well-known fact that every one of the 
important outfall sewers draining the protected districts are in 
such condition that the only way that they can be cleansed is 
by sending men into them, who shovel the dirt into buckets 
in which it is hoisted to the surface by hand and deposited in 
wagons to be hauled away. The eatchbasins are also cleaned 
by men shoveling their contents into wagons by which it is 
hauled away. 

It is far cheaper, not to mention less objectionable to sight 
and smell, to shovel dirt from the pavement directly into 
wagons than to wash it into sewers and cesspools, and then to 
hoist it out in buckets by hand and shovel it into wagons. 

There is a question as to what extent it is advisable to flush 
paved streets with water under pressure because of the possi- 
bility of injuring the pavement. It appears that this is ac- 
complished not only through the erosive effect of the stream 
upon the surface of the pavement, but it washes the filling 
material out from the joints of a block pavement and the 
blocks themselves may be disturbed. 

In regard to the value of flushing as a means of cleaning 
the sewers of this City, the following extract from a Report 
upon a System of Sewers for the City and County of San 
Francisco, dated October 21, 1899. proposed by C. E. Grunsky, 
Civil Engineer in Charge and Marsden Manson and C. S. 
Tilton. Associate Engineers, is of interest. 



132 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



''The custom of attempting to flush the defective sewers of 
San Francisco in the late summer and early autumn months 
has given rise to the idea that all sewers need flushing. It is 
made very apparent through the sense of smell that they need 
something, and it is at once concluded that flushing is the 
remedy. But the examination conducted in 1892-93 by the 
Board of Engineers shows plainly that the defects in the sew- 
ers are such that flushing cannot accomplish its purpose, and 
that when these defects shall have been corrected, the nui- 
sances which appear to call for flushing will hardly occur, and 
properly applied flushing devices and the ordinary application 
of flushing by water may then be made efficient when neces- 
sary." 

"It should be well understood that in a well-designed and 
well-constructed sewer system, the mains and sub-mains should 
remain clean or may be entirely cleansed by flushing devices 
utilizing the sewage itself for this purpose." 

"The entire lack of system which clvaracterizes the existing 
sewers of this City has given a very exaggerated importance 
to the idea of flushing sewers with salt water. The stenches 
from our sewers in August and September of each year are 
caused, not altogether by a need of flushing, but by irregular- 
ities and defects in grades and sizes which permit accumula- 
tions of sewage, which gradually putrefy. Hence, after the 
full volume of water from a three or four inch hose has I>< < n 
poured under pressure into the storm-water inlets, for hours 
the stench remains. No reasonable volume of water will flush 
a sewer having the defects of construction explained in the 
Reports of 1892-93." 

"Only the systematic correction of grades and the propor- 
tioning of sizes to the volume to be carried, will prevent these 
accumulations of putreseible matter." 

"There are many individual instances and types of very 
defective construction throughout the City which could be 
cited that will not in any manner be improved by flushing. But 
when these defects shall have been corrected and the new mains 
herein provided for shall have been constructed and equipped 
so far as necessary with flushing arrangements, the needs and, 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



133 



costs of additional flushing will be greatly reduced, and in the 
main restricted to dead-ends." 

" It is therefore recommended that the subject of flushing 
the lot <red sneers be left for future consideration of the Board 
of Public Works, when the systematic correction of known de- 
fects shall have been accomplished and the necessity for, cost 
and extent of its application greatly reduced." 

In order that the system may be efficient as a fire fighting 
machine, it has been designed that under ordinary conditions 
the static pressure on the hydrants will be about one hundred 
and fifty pounds and that upon receipt of an alarm of fire 
the pressure may be increased without warning to upwards 
of three hundred pounds. If this sudden increase in pressure 
were to take place while a gang of laborers were washing 
down a street pavement or flushing a sewer, the hose would 
be jerked out of their hands and the result would be disas- 
trous to the laborers and qny pedestrians who might be on 
the street at the time. 

The use of this high pressure system by others than the 
trained men of the fire department is liable to result in injury 
to the hydrants or distributing pipes and cause the disabling 
or failure of the system at a critical time. 

It will be possible by providing hydrant fittings similar to 
those which are to be used by the fire department for control- 
ling the pressure in the hose, to use this system for these pur- 
poses but for the reasons mentioned above, it is recommended 
that no attempt be made to do so. 



134 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



ESTIMATED COST. 

The cost of the proposed system has been estimated as 
follows : 

Two storage reservoirs on top of Twin Peaks, capac- 
ity 10,000,000 gallons $ 126.000 

Distributing reservoir of Upper Zone near Seven- 
teenth and Ashbury streets, capacity 500,000 gals. 17,000 

Distributing reservoir of Lower Zone in Jones street, 
between Sacramento and Clay streets, capacity 
1,000,000 gallons 55,000 

Distributing system consisting of 483,558 lineal feet 
of cast-iron pipe with necessary specials, gate 
valves, gate boxes, hydrants, air valves, relief 
valves, blow-off valves and fire boat connections . . 2,900,000 



One hundred 75,000 gallon cisterns 600.000 

Two fresh water pumping stations 117.000 

Two salt water pumping stations 650.000 

Two fire boats : . . 300,000 

Quarters for men on wharf 10,000 

Telephone system 125,000 

Real Estate for distributing reservoirs and pumping 

stations 100,000 

Engineering — preparation of plans, specifications, 

testing materials and inspection of construction . . 200,000 



Total cost of installing system $5,200,00 



In the following estimate of the cost of operating and 
maintaining this system, no allowance has been included for 
interest, depreciation or sinking funds. The depreciation on 
pumping stations and fire boats will be about two per cent, 
on the remainder of the system about one per cent. What 
interest it will be necessary to pay and the method of creating 
a sinking fund for the proposed bond issue are matters beyond 
the scope of this report. 

It has been assumed that the system will be operated under 
the following conditions : 

The fresh water pumping stations will be required to 
pump 56,000,000 gallons per year through the distributing 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



135 



mains. Of this, 32,000,000 gallons will be delivered into the 
Twin Peaks reservoirs 8,000,000 gallons into the distributing 
reservoir of the upper zone and 16,000.000 gallons into the dis- 
tributing reservoir of the lower zone. The vertical lift from 
the water level in the wells to the cistern under each station 
will be 100 feet. The combined efficiency of the air lift 
pumps (ratio of useful work done in lifting water to electric 
current delivered at the switchboard), will be 16.5 per cent. 
The combined efficiency of the turbine pumps will be 56.5 
per cent. 

The occasions on which it will be necessary for the salt 
water pumping stations to deliver water into the distributing 
mains will be so rare that the cost of operating the pumps at 
these times will not materially affect the cost of operating the 
system. 

The conditions under which the salt water pumping sta- 
tions will be operated will be identical with those set forth 
under the discussion of those stations. 

It is estimated from all available facts and data that the 
fire boats will be called upon to answer fifty alarms each year : 

They wiil cover a total distance of one hundred miles in 
responding to these alarms : 

The pumping machinery on these boats will be operated at 
full power twenty-five hours per year. 

Attention is directed to the fact that the installation of 
this system will enable the fire department to dispense with the 
use of a number of steam tire engines in the protected districts 
so that the annual appropriation for the maintenance of that 
department will not necessarily be increased by the full cost 
of operation as given below. 

In estimating the cost of operation of the fire boats, no 
allowance has been made for the fire crew, it being assumed 
that these men will be transferred from the present employes 
in the department, who because of the installation of the pro- 
posed system, can be dispensed with at present engine stations. 



136 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



ANNUAL COST OF OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE. 

Reservoirs, gate house, distributing system and cisterns ; 



1 Gateman at Gate House of Upper Zone. . . .$ 1,200 
1 Gateman at Gate House of Lower Zone. . . . 1,200 

6 Laborers at $960 5,760 

1 Foreman at $1,500 1,500 

Supplies, Tools, Etc 5,000 



14,660 $14,660 

Two Fresh "Water Pumping Stations : 

1 Engineer at each station at $1,680 3,360 

Supplies and Repairs 735 

Electric Current 6,837 



10,932 10,932 

Two Salt Water Pumping Stations: 

Fuel, Supplies and Repairs 16,030 

Engineers and Assistants 18,600 



34,630 34,630 

Two Fire Boats: 

Fuel, Supplies and Repairs 4,000 

Pilots, Engineers and Assistants 20,400 



24,400 24,400 

Telephone System: 

Supplies. Repairs, Etc 6,500 

6 Operators at $1,200 7,200 



13,700 13,700 



Annual Cost of Operation and Maintenance $98,322 



Respectfully submitted, 

HARRIS D. H. CONNICK, 
Assistant Engineer, Board of Public Works. 
T. W. RANSOM, 
Consulting Mechanical Engineer. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



137 



APPENDIX NO. 1. 
In the preparation of this report data modified to suit local 
conditions and extracts from such published works, articles 
and reports of investigation bearing upon the general problem 
of fire protection and upon the effects of earthquakes as 
seemed desirable have been freely used. Full acknowledg- 
ment is hereby tendered collectively because of the difficul- 
ties of making special acknowledgment in each case. 
American Society of Civil Engineers. — Report of committee 
of the San Francisco Association of members of the 
American Society of Civil Engineers. The effects of 
the San Francisco earthquake of April 18th, 1906, on 
engineering construction. 

American Society Civil Engineers. Proc : Vo. 33. No. 
3 pp. 229-345. Discussion Vol. 33. No. 5, pp. 537-547. 

Allen Kenneth. — Report to special committee of the Atlantic 
City Board of Trade on a high pressure Salt Water 
main and pumping station. 

Allen Kenneth. — Amount of Water Used at Fires. Engineer- 
ing News. Nov. 15, 1906, p. 509. 

Baltimore Conflagration. — Report of the Committee on Fire 
Resistive Construction of the National Fire Protection 
Association, 1904. 

Bibbins. J. R. — -Gas Power for High Pressure City Fire 
Service. Cassier's Magazine, March 1904. 

Blauvelt, Albert, — High Pressure Systems for City Fire Pro- 
tection. Cassier's Magazine, Sept. 1905. 

Branner. John C. — -Geology and the Earthquake. An essay in 
"The California Earthquake of 1906," edited by David 
Starr Jordan. 

Branner. John C. — The California Earthquake; Movements 
Along the Santa Cruz Fault Line. Engineering News, 
Vol. 55, No. 20, p. 542. 

Brown, Prof. Charles W. — The Jamaica Earthquake. Popu- 
lar Science Monthly, May, 1907. 

Chatterton, Alfred. — The Prevention and Extinction of Fires. 
Min. cf Proc. of the Inst, of C. E.. Vol. XCIII, pp. 437. 

Coney Island. — A High Pressure Water System at Coney 
Island, N. Y. Engineering Record. May 20. 1905. 



138 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Cockrill, J. W— The Use of Sea Water for Street Watering, 
Sewer-Flushing and the Other Purposes Required by 
Sanitary Authorities. Min. Proc. of the Inst, of C. E., 
Vol. CX, p. 345. 

Crandal, F. H. — Leakage From Underground Pipes. Jour. 
New England Water Works Association. Vol. 12, pp. 
245-249; discussion, pp. 249-259. 

Crocker, Edward F. — " Fire Boat Protection," paper read at 
the convention of the international Association of Fire 
Engineers at Washington, D. C, Oct. 10th, 1907. 

Crosby, E. U. — "Eliminating the Conflagration Hazard." 
Jour. New England Water Works Association. Vol. 15, 
pp. 97-109 ; discussion, pp. 110-118. 

Crowell, Foster. — Report made to Merchants' Association of 
New York on an auxiliary salt water supply system for 
New York City for fire protection, street washing, sewer 
cleaning and other purposes. August, 1900. 

Crowell, Foster. — Report and supplemental report to the Com- 
mittee on Insurance of the New York Merchants' Asso- 
ciation on the plans for a supplementary water supply 
for fire protection in New York City. 

Darting, Edwin. — Necessity for Large Sized Pipes. Jour, of 
the New England Water Works Association. Vol. 4. 
p. 180. 

Davison, Charles A. — Study of Recent Earthquakes, 1905. 

Derleth, Charles, Jr. — The Destructive Extent of the Califor- 
nia Earthquake of 1906. Its effect upon structures 
and structural material within the Earthquake Belt. 
An essay in "The California Earthquake of 1906." Ed- 
ited by David Starr Jordan. 

Derleth, Charles, Jr. — Report on the San Francisco Earth- 
quake. Engineering News, Vol. 55, pp. 503-504, 525-526. 

Derleth, Charles, Jr. — Some Effects of the San Francisco 
Earthquake on Water Works, Sewers, Car Tracks and 
Buildings. Engineering News, Vol. 55, pp. 548-554. 

Derleth, Charles, Jr. — The Destructive Extent of the San 
Francisco Earthquake of 1906. Engineering News, 
Vol. 55, pp. 707-713. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



139 



Description and Test of Separate Fire Main System in Con- 
gested Mercantile and Light Manufacturing District 
of Cleveland, Ohio. Cleveland Inspection Bureau. 
Sept. 14, 1907. 

de Varona, 1. M. — High Pressure Fire Service, Borough of 
Manhattan. Annual Report of the Department of 
Water Supply, Gas and Electricity. City of New York, 
1905. 

de Varona, I. M. — Report on Tests of Hydrants for High 
Pressure Fire Service for the Borough of Brooklyn and 
the Borough of Manhattan, made to the Commissioner 
Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity. 
May, 1905. 

de Varona, I. M. — High Pressure Water Service. Coney Island. 
Annual Report of the Department of Water Supply, 
Gas and Electricity, City of New York. 1905. 

de Varona, I. M. — High Pressure Fire Service for Borough 
of Brooklyn. Annual Report of the Department of 
Water Supply, Gas and Electricity. City of New 
York, 1905. 

de Varona, I. M. — Report on Proposed High Pressure Fire 
Service for the Borough of Brooklyn, New York. En- 
gineering News. March 24, 1904. 

Engineering News. — Earthquakes in Japan, Oct. 1891. En- 
gineering News, 1892, Vol. 1, p. 26 ; Vol. 2, p. 170. 

Engineering News. — Earthquake in India, June, 1897. En- 
gineering News, Vol. 2, p. 290. 

Engineering News. — List of Great Earthquakes With Loss of 
Life. Engineering News, 1894. Vol. 1, p. 421. 

Engineering News. — Russian Transcancaia Earthquake, Feb. 
13, 1902. Engineering News. Vol. 1. pp. 141-341. 

Engineering News. — Notable Earthquakes. Engineering News, 
1902, Vol. 1, p. 393. 

Engineering News. — Amount of Water Used at Fires. Sept. 
13, 1906, p. 277; p. 281. 

Engineering News. — Test of the Fire-Boat Robert A. Van 
Wyck on Delaware River. Engineering News, 1898, 
Vol. 1. p. 300. 



140 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Engineering News. — Effect of Inadequate Water Supply on 
Insurance Rates at Pittsburg. Engineering News, 1902, 
Vol. 1, p. 172. 

Engineering News. — Indifference of the Public Regarding 
Fire Protection. Engineering News, 1894, Vol. 2, p. 72. 

Engineering News. — Use of River Water for Fire Protection 
Purposes at Detroit, Mich. Engineering News, 1894. 
Vol. 2, pp. 43, 518, 519. 

Engineering News. — Pipe Lines Operated From Fire Boats 
for Fire Protection Purposes at Cleveland, Ohio. En- 
gineering News, 1893, Vol. 1, p. 9 ; 1894, Vol. 2, p. 43. 

Engineering News. — Equipment of Private Tugs for Fire Pro- 
tection Purposes at Chicago, 111. Engineering News, 
1894, Vol. 2, p. 163. 

Engineering News. — The Salt Water Fire Protection System 
at Key West, Florida. Engineering News, June 20, 
1907. 

Engineering News. — Record of Large Fires in the United 
States and Canada, 1820-1904. Engineering News, 

1905, Vol. 1. p. 447. 

Engineering News. — Separate High Pressure Fire Insurance 
System for Providence, R. I. Engineering News, 1898, 
Vol. 2. p. 196. 

Engineering News. — The Use of Salt Water for Fire Protec- 
tion and for Other Purposes at the United States Navy 
Yards and at Norfolk, New York, Puget Sound and 
Key West. Engineering News, Feb. 2, 1905. 

Engineering News. — Water Supply and Fire Protection. Les- 
sons from the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire. 
Engineering News, April 26, 1906. 

Engineering News. — Water Supply and Fire Protection. En- 
gineering News, May 20, 1905. 

Engineering News. — Washing Pavements with Hose Streams. 
Engineering News, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 454. 

Engineering News. — Earthquake at Kingston, Jamaica. En- 
gineering News, Vol. LVII, pp. 79, 115. 

Engineering News. — Valpariso Earthquake of August 16-17. 

1906. Engineering News, Vol. LVI, pp. 205-213. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



141 



Engineering News. — The San Francisco Disaster, Earthquake 
and Fire Ruin in the Bay Counties of California. En- 
gineering News, Vol. 55. pp. 478-480. 

• Engineering Record.— Valpariso Earthquake of August 16, 
1906. Engineering Record. Nov. 24. 1906. 

Engineering Record. — Auxiliary High Pressure Water System 
at Newark, N. J. 

Engineering Record. — Large Service Pipes for Private Fire 
Protection. Engineering Record, June 29, 1905. 

Engineering Record. — High Service Turbo Service Pumping 
Station at Toronto, Can. Engineering Record, April 
1, 1905; March 10, 1906. 

Engineering Record. — High Pressure Water System at Win- 
nipeg. Engineering Record, Jan. 19, 1907. 

Engineering Record. — The High Pressure Water System at 
Coney Island, N. Y. Engineering Record, May 20, 
1905. 

Engineering Record. — Revised Plans for a Fire Protection 
System for New York. Engineering Record, March 25, 
1905. 

Engineering Record. — High Pressure Water System at New- 
ark, N. J. Engineering Record, May 6, 1905. 

Experiments in Boston With the Paris System of Washing 
Asphalt. Engineering News, 1901, Vol. 1, p. 409. 

Fairbanks, Harold W. — The Great Earthquake Rift of Cali- 
fornia. An essay in "The California Earthquake of 
1906," Edited by David Starr Jordan. 

Fanning, J. T. — Arrangement of Hydrants and Pipes for 
Fire Protection. Jour. New England Water Works 
Association, Vol. 7, pp. 79-81. 

Fanning, J. T. — Distributing Mains and Fire Service. Proc. 
American Water Works Association, 1906. 

Fanning, J. T. — Expanding Water Supply Systems. Pro- 
ceedings American Water Works Association, 1906, p. 
304. 

Fire-Boat Robert A. Van Wyck Test on Delaware River. En- 
gineering News, 1898, Vol. 1, p. 300. 

Fire Insurance. — Effect of Inadequate Water Supply on Rates 
at Pittsburg. Engineering News, 1902, Vol. 1. p. 172. 



142 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Fire Protection. — Indifference of the Public. Engineering 
News, 1894, Vol. 2, p. 72. 

Fire Protection, Detroit, Mich. — Use of River Water. Engi- 
neering News, 1894, Vol. 2, pp. 43, 518, 519. 

Fire Proteciion, Cleveland, Ohio. — Pipe Lines Operated From 
Fire Boats. Engineering News, 1893, Vol. 1, p. 9 ; 1894, 
Vol. 2, p. 43. 

Fire Protection, Chicago. — Equipment of Private Tugs. En- 
gineering News, 1894, Vol. 2, p. 163. 

Freeman, John R. — The Prevention of Conflagration. Annual 
meeting A. S. C. E. 1906. Engineering News, July 5, 
1906. 

Freeman, John R. — On Safeguarding the Lives in Theatres. 
Freeman, John R. — Hydraulics of Fire Streams. Trans. Am. 

Soc. C. E., November, 1889. 
Freeman, John R. — The Arrangement of Hydrants and Water 

Pipes for Protection of a City Against Fire. Jour. 

New England Water Works Association. Vol. 7, No. 

1, pp. 49-77. Dis. pp. 77-81. 
Freeman, John R. — Fire Streams; Some New Experiments 

and Practical Tables. Jor. New England Water Works 

Association. Vol. 4, pp. 95-167 ; discussion, 168-171. 
Freeman, John R. — Report made to B. S. Coler (Comptroller 

New York City) on New York's Water Supply. March 

23d, 1900. 

Freitag, J. K. — -Fires Losses in the United States. The Engi- 
neering Magazine, June, 1906. 

Fuller, Myron L. — Notes on the Jamaica Earthquake, Journal 
of Geology, Nov. 1907. 

Galloway, J. D. — The Recent Earthquake in Central Cali- 
fornia and the Resulting Fire in San Francisco. Engi- 
neering News, Vol. 55, pp. 523-525. 

Gilbert, G. K. — The Earthquake as a Natural Phenomenon. 

Geikie, Archibald. — Text Book of Geology. 

The San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of April 18, 1906. 
Bulletin No. 324, United States Geological Survey. 

Goad, Chas. E. — Conflagrations During the Last Ten Years. 
Proceedings of the British Fire Prevention Committee. 
Vol. 2. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



143 



Grunsky, C. E. — Report on an Auxiliary High Pressure Fire 
Protection System for San Francisco, Cal., by C. E. 
Grunsky, City Engineer. Report of the Board of Pub- 
lic Works of San Francisco, Cal., 1903-4. 

Hartford, Conn.— Report of Committee on Auxiliary High 
Pressure Fire Protection Water Supply to the Court 
of Common Council of the City of Hartford, Conn. 
March 5th, 1907. 

Haskell, J. C. — Water Supply at Fires. Jor. New England 
Water Works Association. Vol. 7, pp. 47-48 

Hancock, J. C— Water Hammer on Mains and Remedy. Jor. 
New England Water Works Association. Vol. 5, pp. 
11-14. 

Hand, F. L. — High Pressure Water Supplies. Proceedings of 
the American Water Works Association, 1906, p. 411. 

Heller, Clarence. — The Effects of the San Francisco Earth- 
quake and Fire on Steel Buildings. The Engineering 
Magazine, July, 1906. 

High Pressure Pumping Plant. — Need of Special Water Sys- 
tems Where There Are No Reliable Public Supplies. 
Actual Tests of the Plants at the J amestown Exposition 
and at Coney Island. Insurance Engineering, Oct. 
1907. 

High Pressure System for Fighting Fire in the Borough of 
Manhattan. — Report of joint committee of the New 
York Board of Fire Underwriters and of the New York 
Fire Insurance Exchange, May 15th, 1905. 

High Pressure Systems for Fire Service. — Report of the Com- 
mittee of the National Fire Protective Association. 
Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Na- 
tional Fire Protective Association. 

High Pressure Fire Service at Chicago. — Bulletin No. 37 of 
the National Fire Protection Association, Aug. 4th. 
1903. 

Hobbs, Wm. Herbert, Earthquakes. 

Holden. E. S. — A Catalogue of Earthquakes on the Pacific 
Coast, 1769 to 1897. By Edward S. Holden, City of 
Washington, published by the Smithsonian Institution, 
1898. 8 ii, 253 pp., with 5 plates and 5 text figures. 
From Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections. Volume 
XXXVII. (Number 1087.) 



144 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Hopson, E. G. — Pressures in City Water Works Systems From 
the Point of View of Fire Protection. 

Howard, J. W. — Flushing With Water Under Pressure In- 
jures Pavements. Engineering News, April 18th, 1907. 

Humphrey, Richard L. — The Effects of the Earthquake and 
Fire on Various Structures and Structural Materials. 
Bulletin No. 324, United States Geological Survey. 

Insurance in Foreign Countries. — Special Consular Report, 
Vol. XXXVIII. 

Insurance Engineering. — New York's High Pressure Fire 
Protection System. Insurance Engineering, Aug. 1907. 

Insurance Engineering. Grain Elevator Fires. Insurance 
Engineering, Dee. 1907. 

Insurance Engineering. — Need of Special Water Systems 
Where There Are No Reliable Public Supplies and Ac- 
tual Tests of the High Pressure Pumping Plants at the 
Jamestown Exposition and at Coney Island. Insurance 
Engineering, Oct. 1907. 

Insurance Year Book for 1907. — (Fire and Marine.) 

Jackson, Geo. W. — Report on a High Pressure Water System 
to the Commission on High Pressure Water Systems for 
the City of Chicago, 111. 

Jordan, David Starr.— The Earthquake Rift, April, 1906. 
An essay in "The California Earthquake of 1906," 
Published by A. M. Robertson. 

Key West. — The Salt Water Fire Protection System. Engi- 
neering News, June 20, 1907. 

King, L. M. — Report to Merchants' Association on a Salt 
Water pumping system to protect Van Ness avenue. 
Merchants' Association Review, Vol. 2, No. 122, Oct. 
1906. 

King, L. M. — Report to Merchants' Association on Auxiliary 
Salt Water supply system for fire protection in San 
Francisco. Merchants' Association Review, Vol. 2, 
No. 121, Sept. 1906. 

Kuchling, E. — Distribution Systems. Jor. New England Water 
Works Association. Vol. 14, pp. 104-107. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



145 



Lawson, Andrew C. — Sketch of the Geology of the San Fran- 
cisco Peninsula, United States Geological Survey. Fif- 
teenth Annual Report. 

Le Conte, L. J. — Some interesting facts regarding the great 
earthquake of April 18th, 1906, which was followed by 
a general conflagration, involving one-half of the entire 
City of San Francisco, Cal. Proceedings of the Amer- 
ican Water Works Association, 1906, p. 386. 

Leakage at Leaded Joints of Pipes. — Jor. New England Water 
Works Association, Vol. 11, p. 93-94. 

Lockett, S. H. — Water Problems Concerning Fire Protection 
in Cities. Municipal Engineering, Oct. 1906. 

Manby, E. J.— The Granada Earthquake of Dec. 25, 1884. 
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institute of Civil 
Engineers, Vol. LXXXV, p. 275. 

Manson, Marsden. — Report to the Mayor and Committee on 
reconstruction on the improvements, fire avenues and 
thoroughfares, lowering Rincon Hill, Auxiliary Fire 
System and Water Front Improvements. Oct. 1906. 

McAdie, Alexander G. — Catalogue of Earthquakes on the Pa- 
cific coast, 1897-1906. Smithsonian Miscellaneous Col- 
lections, Vol. XLIX. 

McAdie, Alexander G. — Climatology of California. 

Mclnnes, F. A. — Boston Salt Water Fire System. Jor. New 
England Water Works Association, Vol. 13, pp. 304-313. 

Milne, John — On Construction in Earthquake Countries, with 
discussion. Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution 
of Civil Engineers. Vol. LXXXIII, p. 278. 

Milne, John. — On Building in Earthquake Countries. Min- 
utes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engi- 
neers. Vol. C, p. 326. 

Milne, John. — Building Construction in Earthquake Countries. 
Engineering News, 1891, Vol. 1, p. 33. 

Milne, John. — "Seismology." 

Milne, John. — "Earthquakes and Other Earth Movements." 

Milne, John. — Consideration Concerning the Probable Effects 
of Earthquakes on Water Works and the Special Pre- 
cautions to be Taken in Earthquake Countries. Ap- 



146 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



pendix No. 1. The Water Supply of Towns, by W. K. 
Burton. 

Middlemiss, C. S. — Report on the Bengal Earthquake of July 
14th, -1885. Reports of the Geological Survey of India. 
Vol. XVIII, p. 4 (Abstract) Minutes of the Proceed- 
ings of the Institute of Civil Engineers. Vol. LXXXV, 
p. 508. 

Mining and Scientific Press— After Earthquake and Fire. 
Moore, C. E. — Earthquake Effects at Santa Clara, Palo Alto 

and San Jose, Cal. Engineering News, Vol. 55, pp. 

526-527. 

Moore, Francis C. — Water Works and Pipe Distribution. 
Municipal Journal and Engineer. — Special Hydrants for 

Street Departments. Municipal Journal and Engineer, 

June 5, 1907. 

Municipal Journal and Engineer. — Suggestions for High Pres- 
sure Fire Systems. Municipal Journal and Engineer, 
June 5, 1907. 

Municipal Engineering. — High Pressure Fire System for To- 
ronto, Ont. Municipal Engineering, Oct. 1906. 

National Board of Fire Underwriters. — Reports on the Fire 
and Conflagration Hazard Existing in a Number of the 
Larger American Cities by the Committee of Twenty 
of the National Board of Fire Underwriters. 

National Fire Protection Association. — Annual Reports and 
Bulletins of National Fire Protection Associations. 

New York. — New York's High-Pressure Fire Protection Sys- 
tem. Insurance Engineering, August, 1907. 

Neff, J. H. — The Quantity of Water Used for Fire Service in 
Madison. Wis. Wisconsin Engineer. Feb. 1903. 

New York. — Revised Plans for a Fire Protection Water Sys- 
tem for New York. Engineering Record, March 25, 
1905. 

Newark. — A High Pressure Water System at Newark, N. J. 

Engineering Record, May 6, 1905. 
Parsons, H. de B. — American Fire Boats. Tranactions of the 

Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. Vol. 

LV. 1896. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



147 



Parsons. H. de B. — The Tall Building Under Test of Fire. 

Engineering Magazine, Feb. 1899. 
Philadelphia New Fire Fighting Service. — The Iron Age. Jan. 

21, 1904. 

Potter, Alexander. — Garbage Disposal and Street Cleaning. 
Municipal Engineering, Oct. 1907. 

Quick. Alfred M. — Water Service at the Baltimore Fire. Pro- 
ceedings American Water Works Association, 1904. 

Ransome. Frederick Leslie. — The Probable Cause of the San 
Francisco Earthquake. National Geog. Magazine, Vol. 
17, No. 5, pp. 280-296. 

Reed, Albert S. — The San Francisco Conflagration of April. 
1906. Special Report to the National Board of Fire 
Underwriters Committee of Twenty. 

Report of the Director of the Mint Upon the Production of 
the Precious Metals in the United States During the 
Calendar Year 1905. Treasury Annual Reports, 1906. 
Production of Precious Metals. 

Records of Large Fires in the United States and Canada, 1820- 
1904. Engineering News, Vol. 1, p. 447. 

Report of the Sub-Committee on Water Supply and Fire Pro- 
tection to the Committee on the Reconstruction of San 
Francisco, Cal. 

Sacks, Edwin O. — Fire Prevention in Europe. London Engi- 
neering Serial during 1897-1898-1899. 

Savelle, C. M. — Amount of Water Used at Fires. Engineering 
News, Oct. 25, 1906, p. 440. 

San Francisco. — Report of the Sub-Committee in Statistics to 
the Chairman and Committee on Reconstruction, April 
24, 1907. 

San Francisco Earthquake. — Report of the Sub-Committee of 
the State Earthquake Commission on State Instru- 
mental Records of the Recent Earthquake. 

San Francisco. — Report on the City of San Francisco, Cal.. 
issued by the National Board of Fire Underwriters 
Committee of Twenty. Oct. 1905. 

San Francisco. — Report of Sub-Committee on Water Supply 
and Fire Protection to the Committee on the Recon- 
struction of San Francisco, May 26th, 1906. 



148 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Schussler, Herman. — The Water Supply of San Francisco, 
California, Before, During and After the* Earthquake 
of April 18th, 1906, and the Subsequent Conflagration. 

Sewell, John S. — The Effects of the Earthquake and Fire on 
Buildings, Engineering Structures and Structural Ma- 
terials. Bulletin No. 324, United States Geological Sur- 
vey. 

Separate High Pressure Fire Service System for Providence, 
E. I. Engineering Neks, 1898, Vol. 2, p. 196. 

Shaughnessy, P. D. — Some Lessons From the San Francisco 
Earthquake and Conflagration. Paper read before Dal- 
las Convention of International Association of Fire 
Engineers. Fire and Water Engineering, Nov. 3, 1906. 

Soule, Prof. Frank. — The Earthquake and Fire and Their Ef- 
fect on Structural Steel and Steel-Frame Buildings. 
Bulletin No. 324, United States Geological Survey. 

Suess, Edward. — The Face of the Earth. 

Special Hydrants for Street Departments. Municipal Jour- 
nal and Engineer, June 5, 1907. 

Suggestions for High Pressure Fire Systems. Municipal Jour- 
nal and Engineer, June 5, 1907. 

Sylvester, I. W. — Amount of Water Used at Fires. Engineer- 
ing News, Oct. 11, 1906, p. 383. 

The Iron Age. — Philadelphia's New Fire Fighting Service. 
The Iron Age, Jan. 21, 1904. 

The Use of Salt Water for Fire Protection and for Other Pur- 
poses at the United States Navy Yards, at Norfolk, New 
York, Puget Sound and Key West. Engineering News, 
Feb. 2d, 1905. 

Taber, Stephen. — Local Effects of the California Earthquake 
of 1906. An essay in The California Earthquake of 
1906, published by A. M. Robertson. 

Toronto. — High Pressure Fire System for Toronto, Ont. Mu- 
nicipal Engineering, Oct. 1906. 

Toronto. — High Service Turbo Pumping Station at Toronto, 
Canada. Engineering Record, April 1, 1905. Engi- 
neering Record, March 10, 1906. 

Trautwine, J. C, Jr. — Fire Mains. Proceedings of the Phila- 
delphia Engineers' Club, Jan. 1903. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



149 



Turner, J. H. T. — The Construction of the Yokohama Water 
Works, with discussion. Minutes of Proceedings of the 
Institute of Civil Engineers. Vol. C, p. 277. 

Water Supply and Fire Protection, Lessons From the San 
Francisco Earthquake and Fire. Engineering News. 
April 26, 1906. 

Water Supply and Fire Protection. Engineering News, May 
20, 1905. 

Watt, Bolla V. — Fire Protection for San Francisco. Trans- 
actions of the Commonwealth Club. Vol. 2, No. 8. 

Washing Pavements With Hose Streams. — Engineering News. 
1904. Vol. 2, p. 454. 

Weaver, John. — Annual Report for 1906 of the Superintend- 
ent of the High Pressure Fire Service of Philadelphia. 
Penn. 

Weston, E. B. — Separate High Pressure Fire System of Prov- 
idence, R. I. Jor. New England Water Works Asso- 
ciation, Vol. 13, pp. 85-91 ; discussion, pp. 91-93. 

Winnepeg. — High Pressure Water System. Engineering Rec- 
ord, Jan. 19, 1907. 

Wood, H. O. — Preliminary Report on Earthquake Investiga- 
tion in the City and County of San Francisco. 



150 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



APPENDIX NO. 2. 

EFFECTS OF SALT WATER ON SYSTEMS OF CAST 
IRON PIPE IN THE VICINITY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, CAL. 

Although the deleterious effects of salt water on iron pipes 
and valves are well known, the following descriptions of a 
number of samples taken from cast iron pipe used in this 
vicinity for conveying salt water are of interest. 

Sample No. 1. Sample taken from the 16-inch diameter 
discharge pipe of the Olympic Salt Water Pumping Station 
at the Ocean Beach near the Cliff House. The pipe has been 
in use 12 years conveying salt water under about 150 lbs. per 
square inch pressure. The inside of the pipe was covered 
with a thick marine growth of mussels, barnacles, etc., ex- 
ceeding }i of an inch in thickness. At the time the sample 
was taken the iron was }i of an inch thick. The deteriorating 
effect of salt water is plainly indicated on the inside of the 
pipe to a depth of % of an inch. 

Sample No. 2. Sample taken from 8-inch diameter pipe at 
Lurline Baths has been in use about 12 years conveying warm 
salt water under low pressure. No information was obtained 
regarding the coating. The inside of the pipe was covered 
with a scale about 1 inch in thickness. At the time the sample 
was taken the iron was y 2 of an inch thick. The deteriorating 
effect of salt water is indicated on the inside of the pipe to a 
depth of l /x of an inch. 

Sample No. 3. Sample taken from an 8-inch diameter el- 
bow at Olympic Club, has been in use conveying cold salt 
water under pressure. No information as to time in use or 
coating. The inside of the pipe covered with scale % of an 
inch thick. Thickness of sample 11-16 of an inch. The dete- 
riorating effect of salt water is indicated on the inside of the 
pipe to a depth of 1-16 of an inch. 

Sample No. 4. Sample taken from a cast-iron condenser 
which has been in use for 23 years, and subject on one side to 
the action of salt water at a temperature of about 160 de- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



151 



grees. Original thinckness Ji of an inch. Thickness of sample 
3/$ of an inch and the deteriorating- effect of hot salt water is 
indicated to a depth of 1-16 of an inch. 

Sample No. 5. Same as above except subject to action of 
salt water on both sides. Thickness of sample yi to j/ & of an 
inch. The deteriorating effect of hot salt water is indicated to 
a depth of 1-16 of an inch on both sides. 

Sample No. 6. Sample taken from 10-inch branch on 24- 
inch cast-iron pipe of the San Francisco Gas and Electric Co., 
which had been in use about 16 years conveying cold water 
for condensing purposes under a pressure of about 20 lbs. It 
has been stated that this pipe was originally coated with as- 
phaltum. The inside of the pipe was coated with scale, bar- 
nacles, etc., to a depth of }i of an inch. Thickness of sample, 
24 of an inch. The deteriorating effect of salt water on the 
inside of the pipe is indicated to a depth of l /s of an inch. 

Sample No. 7. Sample taken from an 8-mch gate valve 
bonnet on a pipe line of the San Francisco Gas and Electric 
Co. at Third and Townsend streets, which had been in use 
about 16 years under 10 pounds pressure, conveying cold salt 
water for condenser purposes. Inside of bonnet covered with 
scale and rust ^4 of an inch in thickness. Thickness of sample 
^ of an inch. The deteriorating effect of salt water is in- 
dicated on the inside to a depth of *4 of an inch. The outside 
of this sample shows effects of some agency attacking the iron 
to a depth of 1-32 of an inch. 

Sample No. 8. Sample taken from a 6-inch pipe in the 
salt water fire protection system of the Western Sugar Re- 
finery. The pipe had been in use 2 years and failed under 80 
lbs. pressure. This pipe was coated but there is no data as to 
its character. The inside of the pipe was coated with a scale 
Y\ to ]/ 2 of an inch in thickness. At the time the sample was 
taken the iron was 9-16 of an inch in thickness. The deterior- 
ating effect of salt water is indicated to a depth of ]/% of an 
inch. 

Sample No. 9. Sample taken from an 8-inch pipe in the 
salt water fire protection system of the Western Sugar Re- 
finery. The pipe had been in use under 80 lbs. pressure for 
two years. This pipe was coated but there is no data as to its 



152 1 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



character. The inside of the pipe was coated with a scale of 
% to y 2 of an inch thick. At the time the sample was taken 
the iron was 7-16 of an inch in thickness. The deteriorating 
effect of salt water is indicated on the inside to a depth of l /% 
of an inch. 

Sample No. 10. Sample taken from an 8-inch cast-iron 
suction pipe at the Merchants' Ice and Cold Storage plant. 
The pipe had been in nse four years. The pipe had been 
coated. At the time the sample was taken the thickness of the 
metal was J /> of an inch. The deteriorating effect of salt 
water is indicated to a depth of 1-16 of an inch. 

Sample No. 11. Sample taken from a 6-inch cast-iron pipe 
from the Merchants' Ice and Cold Storage plant (old loca- 
tion). The pipe was in use 15 years. At the time the sample 
was taken the thickness of the metal was Y% of an inch. The 
deteriorating effect of salt water is indicated to a depth of 
8-16 of an inch. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



153 



APPENDIX NO. 3. 
LEAKAGE FROM CAST-IRON PIPE SYSTEMS. 

The following data regarding the amount of leakage from 
pipe systems compiled from various sources, has been used in 
estimating the probable leakage that may occur in the proposed 
system. 

Providence, R. I. 

The following data is from Report on New York's Water 
Supply, by John R. Freeman. 

"The City of Providence has a special fire protection pipe, 
now (June 19, 1900), about three years old, 5.57 miles long, 
mainly 16 inches in diameter, under an average pressure of 114 
pounds per square inch in the business section. This pipe has 
no connections of any description except fire hydrants and a 
waste pipe. A test of the tightness of this pipe was very kindly 
made for me by Mr. Otis Clapp, City Engineer of Providence, 
June 10, 1900, by tapping a small water meter in on a by-pass 
around the main gate. There is good reason to believe the 
main gate substantially tight; while there is possibly some 
leak from the 4:-inch gate between high and low pressure; prob- 
ably more tlian enough to offset any leak at main gate. 

The test sliows a leakage for the entire 5.57 miles at the 
rate of 2,487 gals, per 24 hours, which is 446 gallons per mile 
per 24 hours, equivalent to 0.22 gallons per foot of leaded joint 
per 24 hours." 

New York High Pressure Fire Protection System. 

(Notes on the testing of something over two miles of 12- 
inch pipe and one section of 20-inch.) 

"The tests were made under a pressure of 450 pounds per 
square inch which is maintained for at least ten minutes. In 
the case of the 12-inch pipe the amount of leakage allowed by 
the specifications averaged 6.06 gallons per section tested; flu 
actual leakage as found by test was 4.07 gal. The total lineal 
feet of 12-inch pipe was 11,369 feet and the total lineal feet 
of joints {the circumference of the pipes times the number of 
joints) was 4.067.6, in which the total amount of actual leak- 



1.54 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



age was 69.18 gallons or 2.45 gals, per foot of leaded joint in 
24 hours. The average of all of these was at- the rate of 4,627 
gallons per day per mile." 

"In the test of the section of 20-inch pipe leakage was at 
the rate of 7,245 gallons per day per mile." 

"Every joint of this pipe may be considered as a special 
joint; the spigot ends of the pipes being furnished with two 
machined grooves. ' ' 

The following table showing results of tests of the High 
Pressure Fire Service mains laid in Brooklyn, prior to De- 
cember 10, 1905, is compiled from the Annual Report for 1905 
of the Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity for 
the City of New York. 







e w 








i> c 


Size 
of 
Main 


Length 
of 
Main 


Allowed Leakage 
Gals, per 10 minut( 


Test Leakage in Ga 
per 10 minutes 


Lineal 
Feet 
of 

Leaded 
Joint 


Rates of Test Leak 
to Allowed Leakaj 


Leakage in Gals, j 
Foot of Leaded Jo 
per 24 Hours 


20-inch . 


.. 4751.1 


80.62 


41.14 


2901.846 


.51 


2.04 


16-inch . 


.. 5750.3 


81.70 


39.54 


2941.667 


.48 


1-.93 


12-inch . 


. .11859.3 


120.43 


66.82 


4331.483 


.55 


2.22 



Note. — The test was made in the trench under a pressure of 
450 lbs. per square inch. 

From this data it has been concluded that with good work- 
manship the average leakage per foot of leaded joint when the 
pipe system is under pressure from the Twin Peaks Storage 
Reservoirs will not exceed 1.17 gals, per 24 hours, and that the 
average leakage per foot of leaded joint when the pipe system 
is under pressure from the distributing reservoirs will not ex- 
ceed 0.27 gallons per twenty-four hours. These quantities have 
been used in estimating the probable yearly amount of leakage 
from the system. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



155 



APPENDIX NO. 4. 
BILL NO. 128. 
ORDINANCE NO. 126 (New Series). 

Determining and Declaring that public interest and neces- 
sity demand the construction and completion of an auxiliary 
water system for fire protection and for sanitary and flushing 
purposes, and directing the Board of Public Works to procure 
through the City Engineer and file with the Supervisors plans 
and estimates of the cost of said system. 

Whereas, The system of fire protection for San Francisco 
was dismantled and rendered practically useless during and 
subsequent to the earthquake-fire of April 18, 1906 ; and 

Whereas, Said disaster has demonstrated the absolute ne- 
cessity of providing an auxiliary water system for fire protec- 
tion and for sanitary and flushing purposes, independent of 
the regular system used for domestic supply ; and 

Whereas, The concentration of business places in former 
residence sections of the City and County and the consequent 
increased fire hazard therefrom renders it imperative to af- 
ford fire protection to the warehouses and stores wherein are 
contained the clothing and food supplies of the community; 
and 

Whereas, In the rebuilding of the burnt district of the City 
and County, particularly in the former business sections, fire 
protection must first be assured by a high pressure water sys- 
tem before modern office buildings can be constructed and 
maintained with safety; now therefore 

Be it ordained by the People of the City and County of San 
Francisco as follows: 

Section 1. It is hereby determined and declared that pub- 
lic interest and necessity demand the construction by the City 
and County of an auxiliary water system for fire protection, 
and for sanitary and flushing purposes, together with such es- 
sentials as may be necessary to the proper equipment and 
maintenance thereof. 



156 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Sec 2. It is further determined and declared that the cost 
of said auxiliary water system for fire protection and for sani- 
tary and flushing purposes, in addition to other necessary ex- 
penses of the City and County, will exceed the income and rev- 
enue provided for any one year and will render it necessary to 
incur a municipal bonded indebtedness therefor. 

Sec. 3. The Board of Public Works is hereby directed to 
procure, through the City Engineer, and file with the Super- 
visors, plans and estimates of cost of the contsruction by the 
City and County of the following component parts of said aux- 
iliary water system for fire protection and for sanitary and 
flushing purposes said plans and estimates to be submitted in 
such detail as will enable the Board of Supervisors to deter- 
mine the expediency of submitting the question of construc- 
tion thereof, in whole or in part, to the electors, to wit: 

DISTRICT NO. 1. 

A high pressure salt water pumping system, consisting of 
the following: 

1. Two or more pumping stations of suitable capacity and 
furnishing water at a pressure of 300 pounds to the square 
inch at the pumps. 

2. Municipal fireboats of the same capacity at each of the 
pumping stations and furnishing water at the same pressure. 

3. A suitable system of distributing mains, hydrants and 
appurtenances, covering that district of the city bounded as 
follows: Beginning at the termination of Brannan street at 
the Bay shore; thence along Brannan street to Ninth street; 
along Ninth street to Market street; along Market street to 
Van Ness avenue; along Van Ness avenue to North Point 
street ; along California street from Van Ness avenue to Kear- 
ny street; along Kearny street to Montgomery avenue; along 
Montgomery avenue to Mason street; along Mason street to 
Bay street; along Bay street to East street; along East street 
and the Bay shore to Brannan street. 

4. Auxiliary reservoirs, if required, on high points in 
above district not protected by the high pressure mains. 

5. A suitable telephone system connecting the various por- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



157 



tions of the district with each of the pumping stations and the 
fire-boat intakes. 

DISTRICT NO. 2. 

An auxiliary fire protection system, either high pressure 
or reservoir, as the City Engineer may determine, protecting 
the wholesale and manufacturing district, bounded approxi- 
mately as follows : Beginning at San Bruno avenue and Di- 
vision street; thence along San Bruno avenue to Sixteenth 
street; along Sixteenth street to Rhode Island street; along 
Rhode Island street to Seventeenth street; along Seventeenth 
street to Minnesota street; along Minnesota street to Nine- 
teenth street; along Nineteenth street to Kentucky street; 
along Kentucky street to Sixteenth street; along Sixteenth 
street to Eighth street; along Eighth street to Division street; 
along Division street to San Bruno avenue. 

DISTRICT NO. 3. 

An auxiliary fire protection system, of such character as 
the City Engineer may determine, protecting the following dis- 
trict : Fillmore street, from Broadway to Fulton street ; Devis- 
adero street, from California to Oak street. 

SYSTEM OF CISTERNS. 

A system of cisterns of suitable capacity, to be constructed 
at such locations in the business and residence sections, as 
may be designated by the Chief Engineer of the Fire Depart- 
ment. 

Sec. 4. The Clerk is hereby directed to publish this Ordi- 
nance in the official newspaper for a period of fourteen days. 

Sec. 5. This Ordinance shall take effect and be in force 
immediately. 

In Board of Supervisors, San Francisco, December 31, 
1906. 

After having been published five successive days, accord- 
ing to law, taken up and finally passed by the following vote : 

Ayes — Supervisors Boxton, Coleman, Davis, Furey, Galla- 
gher, Lonergan, Mamlock, McGushin, Nicholas. Rea, Walsh, 
Wilson. 



158 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM EOR FIRE PROTECTION 

Absent — Supervisors Coffey, Harrigan, Kelly, Philli 
Sanderson. 

GEO. B. KEANE, Clerk. 
Approved, San Francisco, January 2, 1907. 

E. E. SCHMITZ, 
]\Iayor and ex-Officio President of the Board of Supervisors. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



159 



EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. 

BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS OF THE PACIFIC. 

1414 MERCHANTS EXCHANGE BUILDING. 

San Francisco, Cal., Feb. 17, 1908. 
Hon. Marsden Manson, City Engineer, San Francisco, Cal. 

Dear Sir : — We were this morning in receipt of report by 
Chief Engineer Robinson of the Underwriters' Laboratories, 
Inc., which I have the honor to transmit to you. The detailed 
report on the plan now before the Honorable Board of Super- 
visors is practically a strong affirmation of Engineer Robin- 
son's former endorsement, worded as follows: "Generally, 
I believe with you that if this system is installed as 
specified in the report, it will be the best and most 
up-to=date of its kind in the world." 

I have the honor to remain, yours respectfully, 

(Signed) WM. J. DUTTOX, 
Chairman Committee on Fire Department and Water Supply. 



160 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

UNDERWEITERS ' LABORATORIES, INC. 

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE 
UNDERWRITERS. 

Chicago, 111., February 12, 1908. 
Mr. William J. Dutton, Chairman Committee on Fire Depart- 
ment and Water Supply, 1414 Merchants Exchange Build- 
ing, San Francisco, Calif. 
Dear Sir: — In accordance with your instructions, I have 
examined the report on the proposed auxiliary water system 
for fire protection in San Francisco, submitted by Mr. H. D. 
H. Connick and Mr. T. W. Ransom, Engineers, and beg to offer 
report as follows : 

At the request of your Committee, I visited San Francisco 
in June, 1907, to confer with the engineers regarding the pro- 
posed system. During my stay I had frequent conferences 
with Mr. Thomas P. Woodward, then City Engineer, and with 
Mr. Connick and Mr. Ransom, who were engaged in the prep- 
aration of the report. Chief P. H. Shaughnessy, of the Fire 
Department, was also consulted on several occasions, particu- 
larly in reference to the system of cisterns which is to form 
part of the fire protection of your city. 

At the outset, I wish to say that I am in sympathy with 
the general plan proposed by the engineers, and believe that a 
system of this character and scope is essential to the proper 
protection of the city of San Francisco against fire. 

EFFECT OF EARTHQUAKE. 

The first question which naturally arises, relative to any 
system of underground pipes to be used for fire protection in 
localities subject to earthquake, concerns its reliability when 
subjected to disturbances of this character. The general im- 
pression among those who have not studied the problem is that 
although the system may be well designed and constructed, the 
mains will be ruptured and pumping stations and reservoirs 
seriously damaged or rendered useless. 

As stated in the report, the effect of an earthquake more 
severe than that of April 18th, 1906, is problematical, but the 
investigation of the effect of this earthquake has supplied 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



161 



ample data to warrant positive conclusions regarding the safe- 
ty of the structures in question. The information obtained is 
believed to be sufficient to justify the conclusions reached by 
the engineers. 

My observations during the months of June, July and Au- 
gust, 1906, also indicate that good foundations, good design, 
materials and workmanship will render a system of mains and 
water supplies (and buildings, for that matter) reasonably 
safe against serious damage by an earthquake as severe as 
that of April 18th, 1906. With the exception of the filled-in 
areas, where good foundations are impossible, there would 
seem to be no reason why structures of this description cannot 
be made materially safer than building structures. It is also 
probable that the danger of breakage in mains in unstable 
ground can be very materially reduced by supporting the pip- 
ing on deep piling. 

A well designed and constructed system of fire mains, sup- 
plied from widely separated pumping stations and reservoirs 
located on firm ground, provided with a proper system of con- 
trolling valves, and handled by a corps of experienced men, 
will be reasonably safe against serious damage by earthquake. 
It is believed that the system proposed will fulfill all of these 
essential requirements. 

The installation of a modern system of fire protection would 
be to the best interest of San Francisco, even if it were certain 
that such protection would be destroyed by an earthquake as 
severe as that of 1906. 

NECESSITY FOR BETTER FIRE PROTECTION. 

As stated in the report, the conflagration hazard in San 
Francisco has always been considered greater than in most 
other American cities, due to the topographical and climatic 
conditions, the practical isolation of the city, the large number 
of frame buildings, and the inadequacy of the water supply. 
Almost any of these conditions furnishes adequate reason for 
substantial improvement in the fire protection of the city. It 
remained for the earthquake of 1906 to clearly demonstrate the 
real weakness of present facilities in such emergency, and the 
necessity for an independent system of fire protection specially 
designed and constructed to meet the conditions at such times. 



162 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



San Francisco, in common with most other large cities, has 
outgrown the present methods of fire protection. The gradual 
increase in the height and area of buildings and concentration 
of inflammable materials present difficulties in fire extinguish- 
ment which are beyond the scope of present methods, and it is 
reasonable to expect that these unfavorable conditions will be 
still further increased as the city is rebuilt. 

A strong, although perhaps not altogether sufficient, reason 
for the installation of a safe, modern and efficient fire system is 
the beneficial influence such additional protection will have on 
outside capital. 

The conditions peculiar to San Francisco, together with 
those common to all modern cities, and the fact that the local- 
ity is subject to earthquake, leave no doubt as to the necessity 
for the adoption of such protection as is recommended in the 
preliminary report. 

TYPES OF SERVICE. 

The types of service recommended by the engineers show 
an appreciation of the fundamental requirements of a fire pro- 
tection system which is as gratifying as it is unusual. 

A study of the evolution of fire fighting methods, from the 
early bucket brigade and hand pumping engine down to the 
present portable steam fire engine, of the causes of failure to 
control fires by present methods, and of the principles involved 
in successful systems used for the protection of private prop- 
erties, indicates that if any marked degree of progress is to be 
made in the protection of our cities against fire, it can only 
be accomplished by the development of a system by means of 
which water can be applied to the seat of a fire in the short- 
est possible time. 

The so-called high pressure system is the natural outgrowth 
of the desire to accomplish the result mentioned, but it is an 
unfortunate fact that thus far no system has been installed 
which contemplates the full utilization of proven methods of 
fire extinguishment, Any such system is incomplete which 
merely provides ample water at street levels under pressures 
adequate for the work to be accomplished, and fails to provide 
for the utilization of all proper methods facilitating the sav- 
ing of time in extinguishing fires in their incipient state. 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



163 



The system proposed for San Francisco will furnish a 
greater degree of protection than is at present provided in any 
other city. The recommendation regarding the use of auto- 
matic sprinkler systems, inside and outside stand pipes, and 
open sprinkler systems, as a proper part of the fire protection 
system as a whole, is fully warranted by past experience with 
these devices. If anything, the engineers have been too con- 
servative in the limitations imposed, particularly in regard to 
connections having a normally closed valve in the street. Under 
the restrictions prescribed there is no apparent reason for lim- 
iting a full size connection to stand pipes in buildings other 
than to Class A. While it is probably true that connections to 
buildings of inferior construction are in greater danger of 
being broken than in the so-called Class A buildings, it should 
be remembered that the necessity for adequate and prompt 
protection is far greater in the inferior buildings. 

Moreover, these connections are under the direct control of 
the fire department. With a properly designed system, the ad- 
vantages gained by the direct connection far outweigh any 
possible objection. 

The recommendation for both V/ 2 and 2 l / 2 inch hose for 
inside stand pipes is excellent, as it provides for the prompt 
use of small but effective streams without endangering the lives 
of those who attempt to extinguish a fire in its incipiency. The 
later use of the larger streams by the fireman is in no wise pre- 
vented by this arrangement. 

The uses and limitations of the various types of hand and 
mechanically held outside streams are well covered in the 
report, but the efficiency of outside stand pipes on buildings 
can be very greatly increased by direct full size connections 
with the mains, installing closed valves in the street connec- 
tions. The many arguments in favor of such connections 
would seem to far outweigh any objections. Streams can be 
placed in operation in a much shorter time; the loss by fric- 
tion will be very materially reduced; the piping is cheaper 
than the cost of the hose necessary to otherwise make the con- 
nection; the amount of hose to be carried by the fire depart- 
ment is reduced, and larger streams may be used. The last 
reason is of particular importance, as more prompt concentra- 



164 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

tion of large volumes of water will be possible, and the effect- 
iveness of the system in fighting fires in buildings across streets 
materially increased. 

Many of the above arguments can be advanced in favor of 
fixed but normally closed connections to open sprinkler sys- 
tems. The danger of loss of water could be obviated by the 
use of special keys to be placed in the hands of the fire de- 
partment only. Attention is called to the fact that open 
sprinklers and so-called water curtains have little value as a 
protection against fire, unless the water is at once directed 
against the objects to be protected. In itself a water curtain 
is a very poor fire retardant and is easily deflected by the wind. 

The reasons given for not recommending the proposed sys- 
tem for street flushing purposes are considered sufficient, but 
it may be added that experience has shown when fire appa- 
ratus is used for several purposes, it almost invariably results 
in a material reduction of the fire protection furnished. No 
system of this character should be under the control of more 
than one city department. 

A high pressure system, while furnishing the best means 
of preventing the spread of a conflagration, should be of great- 
est value in preventing fires from developing into conflagra- 
tions. The removal of present fire engines from districts 
served by a high pressure system, or, in fact any radical 
change in present methods, will depend almost entirely on the 
efficiency of the system in controlling small fires. The fire de- 
partment must first be thoroughly familiar with the use of the 
larger fixed engine, and this engine must be capable of per- 
forming all that is expected of it. 

WATER SUPPLIES. 

The water supplies recommended, while somewhat larger 
than usually considered necessary for the protection of the 
congested districts in a city of the size of San Francisco, are 
justified by the unusual conditions. These, and the reasons for 
the recommendations, are quite fully set forth in the report. 

The practical duplication of each source of supply is par- 
ticularly desirable on account of the possibility that some of 
the water may be unavailable in case of severe earthquake, the 
probability that considerable quantities will be wasted through 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 



165 



broken mains in unstable ground, and the fact that the relia- 
bility of the whole system may be dependent upon its ability 
to deliver large volumes of water in one or more limited areas. 
Provision for the concentration of 15,000 gallons per minute 
(about fifteen 2-inch streams) in any block, is conservative 
under these conditions. Should a conflagration develop, con- 
siderable additional supply will be necessary to confine it to 
the narrowest possible limits. 

From a consideration of these conditions and the fact that 
it may be necessary to supply large volumes of water for many 
hours, and possibly several days, it will be seen that the sup- 
plies recommended are not excessive. 

The arrangement by which the primary source of supply is 
taken from fresh water reservoirs, and the salt water pumping 
stations and fire boats used only in case of emergency or for 
very large fires, is very desirable — not only on account of the 
objections to the use of salt water in the mains and appa- 
ratus, but also on account of the greater reliability of the 
gravity service. 

RESERVOIRS. 

San Francisco is particularly fortunate in available sites 
for reservoirs which can be used for fire protection. The num- 
ber and location of the various reservoirs recommended are 
satisfactory, but I wish to call attention to the danger of pos- 
sible interruption of service, which is introduced by the method 
advocated for the control of the water from these sources. 
Under normal conditions the Twin Peaks reservoir will be 
entirely shut off, and the system in each zone supplied by a 
distributing reservoir of comparatively limited capacity. In 
order to receive continued gravity supply, it is now necessary 
to open the valves connecting with the reservoir at next higher 
elevation. The exact method of accomplishing this is not spec- 
ified, but the human element should be eliminated as far as 
possible by the use of some automatic means for securing con- 
tinued service. 

The method of filling the Twin Peaks reservoir and the 
upper distributing reservoir by pumping through the main 
piping is objectionable, as the mains will be subjected to the 
full static pressure from these reservoirs while this is being 



166 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



done. The system is designed for every day use at ordinary 
fires, and the method of refilling suggested would necessarily 
introduce pressure disturbance of frequent occurrence, and 
often for considerable periods. As it is very undesirable to 
disturb the normal working pressures maintained in the sys- 
tem unless absolutely necessary, independent filling connec- 
tions to these reservoirs are deemed to be essential. The an- 
nual consumption will be mostly from the distributing reser- 
voirs, and on this account the possibility of using Spring Val- 
ley water to maintain levels in the Twin Peaks reservoir 
should be considered. If such arrangement is economical, some 
modification of the fresh water pumping stations would prob- 
ably be advisable. 

PUMPING STATIONS. 

The location and general character of the construction ad- 
vocated for the buildings would seem to be satisfactory. If 
severely exposed by surrounding property, the wall openings 
should be as few and as small as possible. The efficiency of 
the window protection specified is largely dependent upon the 
size of the openings, the selection and relative position of the 
devices used. The shutters should preferably be outside of 
the wired glass. 

The fuel capacity is considered large enough to meet all 
ordinary conditions. Under extreme conditions there would 
probably be time to replenish the supply. It is advised that 
the oils tanks be placed as far as possible from the main build- 
ings and in such position that, if liberated, the oil will drain 
away from the building and the intakes from the Bay. It is 
assumed that the pits containing each pair of tanks will be 
entirely independent, and that the oil supply pumps will be 
of such size and so connected that the plant can be maintained 
at full duty in case of breakage in any pump. Tbe boiler feed 
pumps should also fulfill the latter condition. 

Past experience has shown the desirability of some modi- 
fications in the arrangement of the steam connections indi- 
cated on the plans of the stations. Greater safety would be 
provided by supplying each pumping unit through an inde- 
pendent steam connection from the header in the boiler room, 
and placing a shut-off valve in this connection close to the 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA • 



167 



header. It would also be advisable to so locate the header that 
the valves in the independent connections from the boilers can 
be operated from the engine room. It is assumed that proper- 
means will be provided for keeping the steam connections free 
from water. 

The type and capacity of the boilers recommended are con- 
sidered satisfactory, and under normal conditions full duty 
from the pumping stations could in all probability be obtained 
before the fresh water supply is exhausted. In case of severe 
earthquake, however, there might be some question in regard 
to this— particularly if any considerable breakage of mains 
should take place in the filled-in areas. 

PUMPS. 

The selection of steam power for the pumping stations is 
considered wise, and would have been justified even had the 
cost been materially in favor of the gas engine equipment. 
Under the various fire calls to which such plants must respond, 
the steam driven pump is many times more reliable than 
pumps driven by gas engines. This is particularly true under 
the conditions existing in San Francisco. 

The multi-stage centrifugal pump is of comparatively re- 
cent development, and has been selected for this service in 
similar plants in some of the eastern cities. It is believed that 
it will prove perfectly satisfactory for fire purposes but par- 
ticular attention should be given to the balance of the pump, to 
the protection of the internal parts against the corrosive action 
of salt water, and to the reliability of the suction priming. The 
latter point is of importance on account of the inability of the 
pumps to pick up suction when unprimed. 

Independent suction pipes taking water from a common 
sump, as shown in the plans, will furnish a greater degree of 
safety in San Francisco than a suction pipe common to all 
units and in which a vacuum must be maintained. The prim- 
ing should be from some wholly reliable independent source. 

Although not clear from the preliminary plans, it is as- 
sumed that the suction pipes will be provided with foot valves, 
and that a check valve will be installed on the discharge from 
each pump. 



168 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

So far as known, the use of the turbine engine in plants of 
this character is new, and I have been unable to obtain any 
complete information in regard to their reliability for this 
service. The information secured has all been of a favorable 
nature. 

The simplicity of both the pumps and engines recommended 
is vastly in their favor for fire protection purposes. 

FIRE BOATS. 

The number, type and method of operating the boats would 
seem to be satisfactory. While it is realized that the use of 
fuel oil is common on the Coast, and its dangers well under- 
stood, attention is called to the necessity for extreme care in 
safeguarding the storage of this fuel so near to the boilers. 
The previous comment relative to balance and protection 
against corrosion also apply to the pumps for the boats. 

PROTECTED AREA. 

A study of the conditions in the districts which it is pro- 
posed to protect indicates that the system is somewhat more 
extensive than the danger of a general conflagration warrants. 

The protection afforded in parts of the Western Addition 
(District No. 4), as now settled, is not all that could be desired 
on account of the distance between the mains. The location of 
many large mercantile establishments on certain streets in this 
district, the prevailing winds and general frame construction, 
constitute a much greater fire menace to the city as a whole 
than the conditions existing in District No. 2, or in the more 
southerly portions of District No. 3. 

Outlying districts covered with low buildings and contain- 
ing only a few large plants do not present the same necessity 
for a high pressure system as business and manufacturing lo- 
calities where the buildings are higher, the areas greater and 
where large quantities of combustible materials are stored. 

DISTRIBUTION 

The general scheme of the distribution system is considered 
satisfactory, although the friction losses under maximum draft 
are somewhat higher than usually allowed. This is offset by 
the fact that the reservoirs have good elevation and considera- 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



169 



ble pressure losses can be permitted without materially affect- 
ing the protection afforded. 

The division of the main gridiron into two independent 
systems at different levels is justified by the necessity for re- 
ducing the normal working pressures to a point which will 
permit effective handling under ordinary conditions, and by 
the reduced cost of maintenance which this arrangement af- 
fords. 

The control and protection provided for the various filled- 
in districts is considered satisfactory, particularly as increased 
supply is always at command by opening the nearest valves 
in the connections to the mains located in firm ground. The 
arrangement for increasing the supply at the borders of the 
lower zone by opening valves in the connections to the upper 
zone, should also give satisfactory results. 

I have been unable to make detailed investigation relative to 
the amount of protection required in the various sections of the 
districts served, but with the possible exception of some streets 
in the southeastern portion of District No. 1, and in the locali- 
ties between Telegraph and Nob hills, the distribution system 
appears to be comprehensive. It is possible that the conditions 
in these localities do not require protection in addition to that 
already provided. 

The mains provided in District No. 4, although not com- 
pletely covering the area, furnish very valuable protection and 
greatly reduce the danger of a fire developing into a confla- 
gration. At the same time, as previously stated, the necessity 
for additional protection in this district is believed to be 
greater than for the protection of District No. 2 or the more 
southerly portions of District No. 3. 

Examination of the plans submitted shows that the hy- 
drants are generally somewhat further apart than is consid- 
ered desirable for a system of this character. Generally speak- 
ing, hydrants should not exceed 200 or possibly 250 feet apart 
in the congested value districts, a wider spacing being permis- 
sible in districts where the conditions do not require the con- 
centration of such large volumes of water or the higher service 
pressures. The frequent spacing of hydrants is necessary on 
account of the great loss of pressure due to friction in long 



170 



AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 



lengths of hose, the lack of promptness of action where long 
lengths must be laid, and on account of the smaller amount of 
hose with which the Fire Department may be equipped. 

The distribution of hydrants on the system proposed for 
San Francisco is complicated, on account of the unusual size 
of the city blocks and the fact that there may be some ques- 
tion in regard to the amount of protection required in the 
burned district. At present these requirements are in all 
probability different from what they were at the time of my 
visit. They should be carefully studied before the mains are 
actually installed, and provision made for additional hydrants 
as the conditions may warrant. This applies particularly to 
outlying areas in which the hydrants are now widely spaced — 
often in excess of 400 feet, and sometimes 800 to 900 feet. 

It is noted that the hydrants are spaced closer together 
along Market street and in districts which will probably prove 
to be the more congested areas as the city is rebuilt. I appre- 
ciate the fact that the protection afforded by the present dis- 
tribution may be ample for the conditions as they now exist, 
but wish particularly to call attention to the desirability of 
making provision for a close spacing of the hydrants as the ne- 
cessity for this may develop. It may prove economical to 
place plugged outlets in the mains as they are laid — installing 
the hydrants at a later time. 

The gate system for the control of the mains and the form, 
materials and depth to which the mains are buried, are consid- 
ered satisfactory. It is assumed that proper check valves will 
be installed in the connections for the fire boats. 

METHOD OF OPERATION. 

The normal pressures of 140 to 160 pounds in the lower 
and 75 to 172 pounds in the upper zone are adequate for the 
control of all ordinary fires, except in the upper stories of a 
few very high buildings. The necessary pressures for these 
localities can be obtained on short notice. 

The methods of obtaining higher pressures under the more 
unusual conditions requiring the concentration of large vol- 
umes of water are considered satisfactory, but attention is 
called to the desirability of equipment which will permit the 
system to be effectively used for the longest possible time with- 



FOR SAX FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



171 



out increasing the normal pressures. This can be obtained by 
a close spacing of the hydrants and fixed connections to the 
mains, even though these connections are normally shut off. 

The recommendation for the every day use of the system 
should be adopted, as it is essential that the Fire Department 
be thoroughly familiar with all details of its manipulation. 
When the buildings in the districts served are adequately 
equipped with apparatus supplied by connections to the mains, 
the present fire engines can be used to better advantage in the 
outlying districts. With most of the apparatus on the ground, 
practically all that is needed will be the men to handle it. 

Too much emphasis cannot be given to the importance of 
intelligently carrying out the recommendations relating to the 
special corps of firemen who will have charge of the valves con- 
trolling the system, and the transmission of the fire chief's or- 
ders to the various pumping and controlling stations in ease 
the telephone system is out of order. On the valve men will 
rest the responsibility of intelligently handling the system at 
times of emergency, when coolness, confidence and a thorough 
knowledge of details are required. They should stand by the 
valves at all fires, and should not be required to perform other 
duties except under the orders of the Chief of the Fire De- 
partment. 

The selection, organization and maintenance of this corps 
should be given the most careful attention, as the duties of the 
men under ordinary conditions are apt to be such as to give 
the impression that men less capable can be utilized. It would 
also seem advisable that the methods of handling the system in 
times of emergency be made a matter of common knowledge in 
the department. 

The system should be under the constant supervision of the 
Fire Department. The officers in the various districts should 
be held responsible for its frequent inspection and the condi- 
tion of all the apparatus used in connection with the system. 

In order that the firemen may have confidence in the sys- 
tem, frequent drills will be necessary so that they may become 
thoroughly familiar with the use of both the inside and out- 
side apparatus under service conditions. The department will 
have to be furnished with considerable new equipment, such 



172 AUXILIARY WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION 

as hose, nozzles and nozzle holders, etc. In all probability ad- 
ditional wagons will have to be provided to convey both men 
and apparatus to fires. The necessity of providing such ad- 
ditional apparatus by the time the system is ready for use 
should not be lost sight of. 

FIRE CISTERNS. 

In districts protected by the high pressure system, the ne- 
cessity for fire cisterns is confined to localities in which break- 
age of mains may be expected to occur at time of earthquake. 

Examination of the map on which the location and condi- 
tion of all cisterns is indicated, shows that it is proposed to in- 
stall sixty-five (65) new cisterns. A study of the location of the 
new cisterns indicates that while Chief Shaughnessy fully ap- 
preciates the necessity for additional protection in the soft or 
filled-in areas, he is perhaps unduly apprehensive regarding 
the security of the high pressure mains in firm ground. 

With the exception of five (5) in District No. 2, and possi- 
bly one (1) in the extreme eastern portion of District No. 1, the 
cisterns located south of Market street and in the Mission 
would seem necessary. The eighteen (18) cisterns located in 
the Western Addition, along Van Ness avenue and near the 
City Hall, are in reasonably firm ground, and would not ap- 
pear to be required by any danger of breakage in the under- 
ground mains. On account of its proximity to the water 
front, there would also seem to be some question regarding the 
necessity for the new cistern in Davis street. 

The forty-five (45) cisterns which are now installed, but 
out of order, should, of course, be repaired and placed in 
commission as soon as possible. 

TELEPHONE SYSTEM. 

Under this head arrangements are outlined for a sufficient 
and well safeguarded system for providing means of communi- 
cation between the officers of the Fire Department at the scene 
of a fire, and the men on duty at the pumping stations and 
gate houses. The matter of a wholly efficient Fire Signaling 
System is, of course, of vital importance in connection with 
the high pressure system, and any improvements possible in 
the present fire alarm telegraph service in San Francisco should 



FOR SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 



173 



be given the necessary attention at this time. 

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the comments 
which I have made covering the various sections of the engi- 
neer's report, are not in the nature of adverse criticisms, but 
rather suggestions which I hope may be in some measure help- 
ful in deciding upon the final form for the completed specifi- 
cations. 

As I stated at the beginning of this report, I now reiterate 
at its conclusion, my opinion that the proposition for an aux- 
iliary water system for fire protection in San Francisco, as 
covered by the engineers' report, is the one best suited to the 
present needs of the city ; one which will prove of lasting bene- 
fit to the community, and, if efficiently operated, show itself 
to be a wise investment in the curtailment of loss by fire and 
in the substantial recognition such curtailment must receive 
from Fire Insurance Companies doing business in San Fran- 
cisco. 

In line with this latter thought, it is important that the 
necessary specifications and standards for all building equip- 
ments to receive recognition by you, such as automatic sprin- 
kler equipments, inside and outside stand pipes, connections, 
hose, nozzles, etc., should be formulated and placed in the 
hands of property owners at the inception of the work. 

Respectfully submitted, 
(Signed) W. C. ROBINSON, 
Chief Engineer, Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. 



I 




PLANS 

FOR AN AUXILIARY 

WATER SYSTEM 
FIRE PROTECTION 

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS and CITY ENGINEER